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INTRODUCTION 
The footage aftermath of the 7.0 magnitude earthquake that 
devastated Haiti on January 12, 2010 touched the hearts of millions as 
they saw buildings flattened to the ground, leaving victims without 
homes and suffering without basic necessities.1 The earthquake 
                                                                                                                         
 
1. See Olivier Laurent, Haiti Earthquake: Five Years After, TIME (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://time.com/3662225/haiti-earthquake-five-year-after/ (describing the 2010 earthquake in 
Haiti); Haiti Earthquake Fast Facts, CNN (Dec. 13, 2015, 4:01 PM), http://www. 
cnn.com/2013/12/12/world/haiti-earthquake-fast-facts/ (discussing the devastation of the 2010 
earthquake). 
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resulted in over 200,000 deaths, 300,000 injuries, and 1.5 million 
people being initially displaced from their homes.2 In the wake of the 
earthquake, relief came from governments and private citizens alike, 
with US$13.34 billion allocated by international agencies and US$4 
billion from the US Government.3 As part of this relief effort, the 
agricultural biotechnology corporation Monsanto donated 60,000 seed 
sacks, equivalent to 475 tons, of hybrid corn seeds and vegetable 
seeds.4 Despite the dire situation in Haiti at the time, many Haitian 
farmers so vehemently opposed the donation that they vowed to burn 
the donated seeds.5 In fact, the farmers considered the donation to be 
so catastrophic that they called it “a new earthquake” and 
characterized it as a strong attack on small agriculture, biodiversity, 
Creole seeds, farmers, and what was left of the environment in Haiti.6 
The reason for this seemingly odd response? GMOs.7 
Prior to 1994, no food sold in US stores contained genetically 
modified organisms (“GMOs”), which are defined as “organisms (i.e. 
plants, animals or microorganisms) in which the genetic material 
(“DNA”) has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by 
mating and/or natural recombination.”8 In 2015, over seventy percent 
                                                                                                                         
 
2. See Haiti Earthquake Fast Facts, supra note 1 (giving statistics on the earthquake in 
Haiti in 2010); Richard Pallardy, Haiti Earthquake of 2010, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/event/Haiti-earthquake-of-2010 (giving information about the 2010 
earthquake). 
3. See Haiti Earthquake Fast Facts, supra note 1 (providing information on the amount 
of relief contributed to the country of Haiti after the earthquake); Haiti Earthquake of 2010, 
supra note 2 (discussing relief efforts). 
4. See Beverly Bell, Haitian Farmers Commit to Burning Monsanto Hybrid Seeds, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 17, 2010, 12:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beverly-
bell/haitian-farmers-commit-to_b_578807.html (discussing the Monsanto donation); Michelle 
Greenhalgh, Haitian Farmers Reject Monsanto Donation, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (June 7, 2010), 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/06/haitian-farmers-burn-monsanto-hybrid-seeds/ 
(explaining Monsanto’s donation of 60,000 seed sacks). 
5. Bell, supra note 4 (highlighting the vow of the Haitian farmers to burn the Monsanto 
seeds); Greenhalgh, supra note 4 (detailing this pledge). 
6. Greenhalgh, supra note 4 (stating why the Haitian farmers so strongly opposed the 
donation); Bell, supra note 4 (describing the reasoning behind the farmers’ dissent). 
7. See Bell, supra note 4 (discussing the anti-GMO sentiments of the Haitian farmers); 
Greenhalgh, supra note 4 (explaining the views of the farmers with respect to GMOs and the 
Monsanto donation). 
8. Frequently asked questions on genetically modified foods, WHO 
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas_work/food-technology/faq-genetically-modified-food/en/ 
(defining genetically modified organisms (GMOs)); Elizabeth Weise, Genetically engineered 
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of items sold in US food stores contained GMOs.9 Yet, until July 
2016, the United States resisted joining more than sixty nations that 
require GMO labeling and instead regulated GMOs using a voluntary 
labeling system, since the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
does not distinguish foods containing GMOs from those that do not.10 
While the FDA has not required labeling because of this policy, at 
least ninety-two percent of US citizens desire GMOs to be labeled.11 
Furthermore, despite the fact that more than sixty percent of US 
citizens believe that “natural” signifies that a food product contains no 
GMOs, the FDA has never issued a formal definition of the word 
“natural,” and therefore has allowed companies to advertise their 
products that contain GMOs or were made using genetic engineering 
                                                                                                                         
 
foods Q & A, USA TODAY (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/  
2012/10/28/gmo-questions/1658225/ (identifying 1994 as the first year a GMO product was 
brought to the US market); GMO Timeline – A History of Genetically Modified Foods, GMO 
AWARENESS (Dec. 30, 2015), http://gmo-awareness.com/all-about-gmos/gmo-timeline-a-
history-of-genetically-modified-foods/ (listing important dates in the development of GMOs, 
including 1994 as the first year a GMO product was on the US market). 
9. See Travis Nunziato, “You Say Tomato, I Say Solanum Lycopersicum Containing 
Beta-ionone and Phenylacetaldehyde”: An Analysis of Connecticut’s GMO Labeling 
Legislation, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 471, 472 (2014) (assessing the percentage of products sold 
in the United States that contain GMOs to be seventy percent); see also Michael Potter, Give 
Americans what they want and deserve: Label GMO Foods, MICH. LIVE (Dec. 30, 2015), 
http://www.mlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/09/give_americans_what_they_want.html 
(explaining that seventy percent of food on the shelves of grocery stores contain GMOs). 
10. See Christina Sarich, The 64 Countries That Require GMO Labeling – U.S. Buckles 
Under Biotech Pressure, NAT. SOC’Y (Oct. 13, 2014), http://naturalsociety.com/64-countries-
require-gmo-labeling-not-united-states/ (stating that during 2014, the United States was not 
one of the sixty-four countries that require GMO labeling); Carey Gillam, House Passes Anti-
GMO Labeling Law, REUTERS (July 23, 2015, 4:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-gmo-labeling-idUSKCN0PX17920150723 (stating that sixty-four countries required GMO 
labeling in 2015). 
11. See Julie M. Muller, Naturally Misleading: FDA’s Unwillingness To Define 
“Natural” and the Quest for GMO Transparency Through State Mandatory Labeling 
Initiatives, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 511, 523 (2015) (stating that despite its stated intention to 
formally define “natural,” the FDA has never issued a formal definition for the term); US Polls 
on GE Food Labeling, CTR. FOOD SAFETY, http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/issues/976/ge-
food-labeling/us-polls-on-ge-food-labeling (citing numerous reports that report over ninety-
two percent of US citizens want the federal government to require GMO labeling); Gary 
Langer, Poll: Skepticism of Genetically Modified Foods, ABC NEWS (June 19, 2015), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=97567&page=1 (describing a poll in which 
ninety-three percent of US citizens believe that the federal government should require labels 
on food saying whether it’s been genetically modified or “bio-engineered”). 
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(“GE”) as “natural.”12 Since the FDA has not changed its policy on 
GMOs since 1992, it continues to maintain a bare minimum standard 
of review for foods containing GMOs.13 The FDA relies solely on 
voluntary information provided by food manufacturers to ensure 
safety and compliance with its standards.14 
This regulatory framework departs both from US public opinion 
and global standards.15 Perhaps one of the most comprehensive GMO 
regulatory systems is that of the European Union, which is rooted in a 
fundamental policy known as the precautionary principle.16 In sharp 
contrast with the United States, which assumes that GMOs are not 
materially different from traditional foods and are safe for human 
consumption, the European Union has designed its entire GMO 
regulatory system on the precautionary principle and assumes that 
genetically modified foods are not safe until proven otherwise by 
                                                                                                                         
 
12. See Andrea Rock, Where GMOs hide in your food, CONSUMER REP. (Oct. 2014) 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2014/10/where-gmos-hide-in-your-food/index.htm 
(describing a Consumer Reports National Survey in which over sixty percent of people said 
they believed “natural” means “no GMOs”); Muller, supra note 11 (citing a survey in which 
over sixty percent of people said that “natural” means that a product contained no GMOs). 
13. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. 
14. See Food From Genetically Engineered Plants, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/GEPlants/ (last updated Nov. 19, 2015) 
(detailing the FDA policy on food from genetically engineered plants and the agency’s 
biotechnology policy); U.S. Regulation Of Genetically Modified Crops, FED’N AM. 
SCIENTISTS, http://fas.org/biosecurity/education/dualuse-agriculture/2.-agricultural-biotechn  
ology/us-regulation-of-genetically-engineered-crops.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) 
(explaining how the FDA regulates GMOs and describing the agency’s voluntary consultation 
process with manufacturers). 
15. See GMO foods: What you need to know, CONSUMER REP. (Feb. 26, 2015, 3:20 PM), 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2015/02/gmo-foods-what-you-need-to-
know/index.htm (discussing that GMO labeling is mandatory in more than sixty countries, 
which did not include the United States during 2015); Tom McKay, 64 Countries That Have 
GMO Labeling Laws, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT (May 14, 2014), https://www.genetic 
literacyproject.org/2014/05/14/64-countries-that-have-gmo-labeling-laws/ (distinguishing the 
United States from the sixty-four countries that mandated GMO labeling through 2014). 
16. See Harrison Joss, The Rise Of Frankenbeer: A Holistic Analysis On International 
Labeling And Beverage Laws Through The Lens Of This Ongoing Controversy Of Genetically 
Modified Organisms, 21 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 147 (2014) (commenting on how the 
precautionary principle in the European Union has created the “strictest and broadest 
regulations”); Mystery Bridgers, Genetically Modified Organisms And The Precautionary 
Principle: How The GMO Dispute Before The World Trade Organization Could Decide The 
Fate Of International GMO Regulation, 22 TEMP. ENV’T L. & TECH. J. 171, 184 (2004) 
(explaining how the European Union used the precautionary principle to design its GMO 
regulations). 
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reliable scientific research.17 In accordance with the precautionary 
principle, the European Union requires companies to indicate if their 
products contain any amount of GMOs past a threshold level.18 This 
requirement allows consumers to choose whether or not to consume 
food containing GMOs.19 Unlike the US structure, the EU regulatory 
system operates in a way that reflects public opinion, which is quite 
distrustful of genetic engineering and is strongly anti-GMO.20 Since 
the European Union presumes foods containing GMOs to be harmful 
unless proven otherwise under the precautionary principle, companies 
seeking approval of genetically modified products are required to 
submit detailed application materials and undergo a rigorous approval 
process based on independent assessments.21 
While the United States has regulated GMOs from a position 
that greatly contrasts with that of the European Union for over two 
                                                                                                                         
 
17. See Emily Marden, Risk And Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy On Genetically 
Modified Food And Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 735 (2003) (explaining how the United 
States has taken an approach that stands in contrast with the precautionary principle, upon 
which the European Union has based its GMO regulatory system); Bridgers, supra note 16, at 
184 (stating how the European Union designed its GMO regulatory system using the 
precautionary principle). 
18. See infra Section I.B and accompanying text (providing an overview for the EU 
GMO regulatory system and its foundation in the precautionary principle). 
19. See Katherine Wilinska, Aquadvantage Is Not Real Advantage: European 
Biotechnology Regulations and the United States’ September 2010 FDA Review of Genetically 
Modified Salmon, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 145, 156 (2012) (describing how the precautionary 
principle has influenced the EU GMO regulatory system and how the European Union errs on 
the side of caution even without any demonstrable risk); Stephanie Amaru, A Natural 
Compromise: A Moderate Solution to the GMO and “Natural” Labeling Disputes, 69 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 575, 600 (2014) (explaining how, as opposed to the US system under the FDA’s 
policy, the European Union has determined a threshold level for GMOs and labeling 
requirements according to that level). 
20. See Nathan W. Eckley, Reaping The Benefits Of Agricultural Biotechnology Through 
Uniform Regulation, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 433, 442 (2002) (explaining that the motivation 
behind the strict approach of the European Union is public distrust of GMOs); Wilinska, supra 
note 19, at 155-56 (explaining how European consumers are deeply skeptical about the small 
environmental impact of GM foods and do not trust the food safety regulations of the 
European Union). 
21. See Javier Guillem Carrau, Lack Of Sherpas For a GMO Escape Route In The EU, 
10 GERMAN L.J. 1169, 1180 (2009) (“[The European Union] regulates a ‘case by case’ 
authorization process, applying the precautionary principle, in order to make decisions on the 
basis of risk assessment, scientific criteria, the introduction of emergency and surveillance 
programmes, and so on.”); Wilinska, supra note 19, at 157 (explaining how under the 
precautionary principle, the European Union assumes that new technology is not safe until 
proven otherwise by extensive scientific research conducted by a separate designated agency). 
632 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
decades, this stark polarity has suddenly lessened, as the United States 
reversed its long-held policy on GMO labeling by enacting federal 
GMO labeling requirements under S. 764 in 2016.22 The complete 
reversal in US policy occurred as a result of the state movement that 
pushed for GMO labeling requirements and brought about much 
dispute among those in federal government, the food industry, and 
state government.23 From 2014 to 2016, consumer demand for GMO 
labeling reached an all time high in the United States, as individual 
states such as Vermont and Connecticut enacted their own legislation 
mandating the labeling of GMOs.24 While the FDA has refused to 
require such labeling since 1992 in contrast with growing public 
opposition, these states listened to the concerns of their citizens and 
acted in defiance of the FDA’s policy.25 It is this consumer opposition 
and state action that prompted the US Congress to quickly implement 
S. 764, which mandates GMO labeling of bioengineered foods, as a 
solution to the GMO labeling crisis.26 S. 764 signaled both triumph 
and defeat on both sides of the GMO debate, as those advocating state 
GMO labeling measures witnessed the revolutionary laws of 
Vermont, Connecticut, and Maine become federally preempted, while 
others who vehemently opposed GMO labeling watched it become a 
                                                                                                                         
 
22. See infra Section II.A (highlighting this sudden shift to mandatory GMO labeling 
under S. 764). 
23. See infra Section II.A. (explaining the impact of the state movement toward 
mandatory GMO labeling on the US federal government and the conflict associated with such 
state measures). 
24. See Dana Ford & Lorenzo Ferrigno, Vermont Governor Signs GMO Food Labeling 
Into Law, CNN (May 8, 2014, 9:17 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/08/health/vermont-
gmo-labeling/ (announcing that Vermont passed the first state GMO labeling law without a 
requirement that other states enact similar laws in order for it to go into effect); Stephanie 
Strom, Connecticut Approves Labeling Genetically Modified Foods, NY TIMES (June 3, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/business/connecticut-approves-qualified-genetic-
labeling.html?r=0 (stating that Connecticut became the first state to pass a GMO labeling law 
and explaining the conditions that had to be met for the law to go into effect). 
25. See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 
22984-01 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 FDA Statement of Policy] (not requiring GMO 
labeling); Clare Leschin-Hoar, Vermont Takes On Genetically Modified Foods With New 
Labeling Law, GUARDIAN (May 8, 2014, 10:38 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/vermont-gmo-labeling-law-genetically-modified-foods-lawsuits (describing some of 
the arguments surrounding the states’ actions to require GMO labeling when the FDA does 
not). 
26. See infra Section II.A. 
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federal requirement.27 While S. 764 has been met with both great 
praise and disdain, it is undeniable that the federal measure will 
significantly change the way in which GMOs are regulated at the 
federal level, which used to be governed solely by the 1992 FDA 
Statement of Policy and the agency’s strict opposition to GMO 
labeling requirements.28 
Therefore, as shown by this brief overview, the regulatory 
systems of the European Union and United States that govern GMOs 
radically differ due to the contrasting principles upon which they are 
based.29 The US regulatory system is based on the substantial 
equivalence doctrine, which assumes that GMOs are substantially 
equivalent to their traditional counterparts and therefore present no 
new risks beyond those of conventional organisms.30 In contrast to the 
United States, the European Union formed an entirely new regulatory 
system based on the precautionary principle, which allows 
governments to take preventative action to avoid potentially serious 
environmental dangers even if the causal connection has not been 
scientifically confirmed.31 Accordingly, the two regulatory systems 
are unlikely to ever completely mirror one another.32 However, the 
                                                                                                                         
 
27. See infra Section II.A.10. 
28. See infra Sections I.A, II.A.10. 
29. See generally Rebecca M. Bratspies, Is Anyone Regulating? The Curious State Of 
GMO Governance In The United States, 37 VT. L. REV. 923, 929-39 (2013) (explaining how 
the substantial equivalence doctrine, which asserts that genetically engineered products are 
equivalent to their unmodified counterparts, formed the basis of the US GMO regulatory 
system); Wilinksa, supra note 19, at 156-57 (detailing how the precautionary principle, which 
serves as the foundation of the EU GMO regulatory system, presumes genetically engineered 
products to be unsafe until proven otherwise). 
30. See Bratspies, supra note 29, at 929 (defining the substantial equivalence doctrine); 
Nunziato, supra note 9, at 479 (stating that the FDA treats GMOs as substantially equivalent to 
their non-GMO counterparts). 
31. See Wilinska, supra note 19, at 156 (describing how the European Union, even 
without evidence of risk, errs on the side of caution); Bridgers, supra note 16, at 184 
(articulating how a lack of scientific certainty concerning the cause of risks should not be an 
obstacle to preventative action being taken). 
32. See The EU-US Dispute over GMOs: Risk Perceptions and the Quest for Regulatory 
Dominance, EU CTR. N.C. (May 2007), http://europe.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/  
08/Brief0705-GMOs.pdf (highlighting the many differences between the two regulatory 
systems and commenting on how the transatlantic differences have not been settled); Jessica 
Lau, Same Science, Different Policies: Regulating Genetically Modified Foods in the U.S. and 
Europe, SCI. IN NEWS (Aug. 2015), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2015/same-science-
different-policies/ (comparing the two regulatory systems and explaining how the United 
 
634 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
United States has followed the example of the European Union and 
implemented a mandatory labeling regime under S. 764 in order to 
avoid a patchwork system of GMO labeling requirements and calm 
public unrest.33 While mandatory GMO labeling is now a reality in 
the United States, there still exists a preferable solution that better 
aligns with public opinion and will result in true GMO transparency 
based on the Consumer Right to Know Policy.34 
Part I of this Note will discuss the US and EU regulatory 
systems and will introduce the debate over GMO labeling in the 
United States. Part II will discuss the state GMO labeling laws that 
prompted Congress to pass S. 764 and will include a discussion of the 
Consumer Right to Know Policy. Part II will also detail how the 
demand for mandatory GMO labeling led to a crisis in the European 
Union in 1997, when several Member States banned an approved 
GMO product because it was not required to be labeled as a GMO. 
Finally, this Part will discuss how the opposition from the Member 
States was only resolved through the implementation of stricter 
labeling requirements under the Traceability and Labeling 
Regulation. Part III will offer a solution to the current US debate over 
mandatory GMO labeling. In Part III, this Note will argue that while 
the United States successfully followed the example of the European 
Union by implementing a mandatory GMO labeling regime, it failed 
to achieve GMO transparency. Part III will show how the United 
States Congress should replace S. 764 with a system based on the 
Consumer Right to Know Policy that requires labeling based on the 
process of genetic engineering. By implementing such a system at the 
federal level, the United States will answer the public demand for the 
ability to make informed decisions and adhere to the 1992 FDA 
Statement of Policy. 
 
                                                                                                                         
 
States focuses on the end product while the European Union emphasizes the processes used to 
develop the end product). 
33. See infra Part II. 
34. See infra Part III. 
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I. THE US AND EU GMO REGULATORY SYSTEMS 
This Part gives an overview of both the US and EU GMO 
regulatory systems, including their foundational principles and how 
they were developed. Section I.A explains the Coordinated 
Framework and the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy, which led to the 
decision not to mandate GMO labeling in the United States. Section 
I.B details the many changes sustained by the EU GMO regulatory 
system and further discusses the series of Directives and Regulations 
that have formed the European Union’s current regulatory system. 
Through these discussions, Section I.A shows how the United States 
has based its GMO regulatory system on the substantial equivalence 
doctrine, while Section I.B stresses the importance of the 
precautionary principle as the foundation of the EU GMO regulatory 
system. Finally, Section I.B also includes a comparison of the EU and 
US GMO regulatory systems. 
A. US Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms 
This Section details how the United States regulates GMOs 
through existing laws within three federal agencies under a system 
known as the Coordinated Framework. Section I.A.1 examines the 
regulation of GMOs under the Coordinated Framework, while Section 
I.A.2 explains how the FDA regulates GMOs through existing law 
under the Federal Food and Drug Cosmetic Act (“FDCA.”) Section 
I.A.3 provides an analysis of the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy 
concerning GMOs and the substantial equivalence doctrine. Section 
I.A.4 explains the lack of mandatory labeling for GMOs, while 
Sections I.A.5 and I.A.6 provide the FDA position on defining 
“natural” and labeling products that do not contain GMOs. Finally, 
Section I.A.7 shows how the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy has been 
upheld by the courts. 
1. The Roles, Benefits, and Concerns of GMOs 
Genetic modification is a process of biotechnology whereby 
genetic material of an organism is manipulated to deliberately modify 
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the organism’s characteristics to create new variations of life.35 This 
technology has been greatly beneficial in agriculture and 
pharmaceuticals.36 For example, the first human insulin was created 
using methods of genetic modification.37 Because of GMOs, farmers 
are able to plant herbicide-resistant plants and plants that are more 
resistant to diseases, droughts, and pesticides.38 This has also led to 
increased crop productivity, longer shelf life, lower use of chemical 
pesticides, and lower average levels of fungal toxins on produce.39 
                                                                                                                         
 
35. See Nunziato, supra note 9, at 474 (giving a definition for genetic modification); 
Definition of biotechnology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/biotechnology (last visited Jan. 6, 2016) (“Definition of biotechnology: the 
manipulation (as through genetic engineering) of living organisms or their components to 
produce useful usually commercial products (as pest resistant crops, new bacterial strains, or 
novel pharmaceuticals)”). To create these new variations of life, scientists first extract DNA 
from the designed organism and isolate a particular gene of interest. After a particular section 
of DNA has been extracted and isolated, scientists can manipulate the gene to work in the new 
organism and finally combine it with another segment of DNA from another cell to create a 
“new” organism. As a result, the organism is able to express the trait encoded by that gene, 
usually to the organism’s benefit. See Amy Glasscock, How America Can Move Closer 
Toward Mandated Labeling for Genetically Modified Foods and Remain 1st Amendment 
Compliant, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 223, 226 (2014) (detailing the process involved 
in genetic engineering and how original organisms are modified to result in a new 
transformation); Charlotte Davis, A Right to Know about GMOs: What American Meat 
Institute v. USDA Means for Vermont’s Food Labeling Law, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 
EDITION 32, 36 (2015) (describing the results of this process); Nunziato, supra note 9, at 474-
75 (describing how a GMO is developed and explaining that the new organism can express the 
new trait that is encoded by the gene). 
36. See Benefits of Genetic Engineering, XAMPLIFIED, http://www.chemistrylearning. 
com/benefits-of-genetic-engineering/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) (describing many of the 
benefits of genetic engineering in the field of science); Nunziato, supra note 9, at 475 
(explaining how genetic modification has brought about many benefits in the areas of 
agriculture and pharmaceuticals). 
37. See Nunziato, supra note 9, at 475 (describing how the first human insulin was 
created using genetic modification methods); Benefits of Genetic Engineering, supra note 36 
(describing how genetic engineering was used to develop human insulin). 
38. See George A. Kimbrell & Aurora L. Paulsen, The Constitutionality of State-
Mandated Labeling For Genetically Engineered Foods: A Definitive Defense, 39 VT. L. REV. 
341, 355 (2014) (stating that genetically engineered crops are agricultural biotechnology’s 
major research and development focus); Benefits of Genetic Engineering, supra note 36 
(giving an overview of many of the agricultural benefits of genetic engineering). 
39. See Valery Federici, Genetically Modified Food and Informed Consumer Choice: 
Comparing U.S. and E.U. Labeling Law, 35 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 515, 524 (2010) (putting 
forth many of the positive impacts of GMOs); Kyndra A. Lundquist, Note, Unapproved 
Genetically Modified Corn: It’s What’s for Dinner, 100 IOWA L. REV. 825, 830 (2015) 
(detailing some of the agricultural advances made with genetic engineering); Nunziato, supra 
note 9, at 475-76 (explaining some of the benefits of GMOs). 
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The popularity of such biotechnology is not to be underestimated.40 
As of 2014, genetically engineered crops made up ninety-three 
percent of US corn acreage, ninety-four percent of US soybean 
acreage, and ninety-six percent of US cotton acreage.41 Worldwide, 
the number of acres planted with genetically engineered crops grew 
from 167 million acres in 2004 to 448 million acres in 2014.42 
GMO proponents argue that in addition to the benefits 
previously described, other positive impacts include lower food 
prices, reduction in greenhouse gases, increased production of 
biofuels, decrease in soil erosion, and social benefits like reduction in 
hunger in developing countries.43 On the opposite side of the debate, 
there are many concerns over the safety of GMOs with respect to 
human health and the environment.44 Part of these concerns stem from 
what is unknown about GMOs, specifically how genetically modified 
genes interact with other genes and the environment.45 Health 
concerns include increased allergenicity, compromised immune 
                                                                                                                         
 
40. See JUSTICE MING W. CHIN ET AL., FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND THE 
LAW § 13:16, 1 (showing the impressive impact of biotechnology); Biotech industry – 
Statistics & Facts, STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/topics/1634/biotechnology-industry/ 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2017) (stating that the United States generates US$90 billion in biotech 
revenue and that globally, US$160 billion were spent on biopharmaceuticals in 2011). 
41. See CHIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 1 (giving statistics for genetically engineered 
crops); Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S.: Recent Trends, US DEP’T 
AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically-
engineered-crops-in-the-us/recent-trends-in-ge-adoption.aspx (showing statistics concerning 
GE soy and corn crops). 
42. See  CHIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 1 (describing how the number of acres grown 
worldwide has multiplied); Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops in 2014, 
INT’L SERV. ACQUISITION AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, http://www.isaaa.org/resources/  
publications/pocketk/16/ (showing this jump in GE crops). 
43. See CHIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 1 (setting forth these benefits by GMO 
proponents); Maria Gabriela Balboa, Legal Framework To Secure The Benefits While 
Controlling The Risks Of Genetically Modified Foods: A Comparison Of The Cartagena 
Protocol And Three National Approaches, 31 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENV’T L. 255, 258-59 
(2012) (discussing these and other benefits claimed by GMO advocates). 
44. See Balboa, supra note 43, at 259 (contrasting the listed benefits with the common 
fears surrounding GMOs); Nunziato, supra note 9, at 476 (discussing many of the fears 
surrounding GMOs). 
45. See generally Balboa, supra note 43, at 259-61 (explaining many of the concerns 
surrounding the unknown effects of GMOs); Nunziato, supra note 9, at 476 (analyzing many 
of the arguments against GMOs based on what is not known about them). 
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function, antibiotic resistance, and increased toxicity.46 With respect 
to agriculture, the biggest benefits of GMOs are also seen by some as 
the biggest negatives of genetic engineering.47 While genetic 
engineering is used for its ability to make crops more herbicide-
resistant, environmentalists are concerned that this may lead to 
increased human consumption of dangerous toxins and may 
jeopardize seed diversity.48 While most scientific research supports 
the argument that GMOs are safe for human health, many individuals 
around the world demand either a ban on the use of GMOs or labeling 
laws that require GMO information on food labels.49 
                                                                                                                         
 
46. See Balboa, supra note 43, at 259 (discussing these concerns); Nunziato, supra note 
9, at 476 (analyzing some of the concerns regarding GMOs). 
47. See Herbicide Resistant Crops, GMO COMPASS (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.gmo-
compass.org/eng/agri_biotechnology/breeding_aims/146.herbicide_resistant_crops.html 
(explaining the position of critics who claim that the use of herbicide resistant crops can lead 
to an increase in herbicide use and damage biodiversity); Rachel Rettner, New GMO 
Controversy: Are The Herbicides Dangerous, LIVE SCI. (Aug. 19, 2015, 5:08 PM), 
http://www.livescience.com/51917-gmo-herbicides-health.html (explaining the argument that 
herbicide resistant GM crops have caused an increase in the use of herbicide). 
48. See Beth Hoffman, GMO Crops Mean More Herbicide, Not Less, FORBES (July 2, 
2013, 11:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bethhoffman/2013/07/02/gmo-crops-mean-
more-herbicide-not-less/#35c065faa371 (stating that despite the main argument that 
genetically engineered crops will allow farmers to use less herbicide and pesticide, USDA and 
EPA data shows that the use of genetically engineered crops has actually increased the use of 
herbicide in the United States); Herbicide Tolerant Crops, BEYOND PESTICIDES, 
http://www.beyondpesticides.org/programs/genetic-engineering/herbicide-tolerance (citing a 
USDA report that found that herbicide use on GE corn rose from 1.5 pounds per planted acre 
in 2001 to more than 2.0 pounds in 2010). 
49. See Jon Entine, The Debate About GMO Safety Is Over, Thanks To A New Trillion-
Meal Study, FORBES (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonentine/2014/09/17/the-
debate-about-gmo-safety-is-over-thanks-to-a-new-trillion-meal-study/#4eb692b7ca93 
(explaining how many major studies have found that GMOs are as safe or safer than 
conventional or organic foods and that biotechnology does not pose an unusual risk to human 
health); Stefaan Blancke, Why People Oppose GMOs Even Though Science Says They Are 
Safe, SCI. AM. (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-people-
oppose-gmos-even-though-science-says-they-are-safe/ (analyzing why so many individuals 
oppose GMOs and believe that they are harmful to human health and the environment despite 
“overwhelming evidence that proves GMOs are safe to eat, and that they bring environmental 
benefits by making agriculture more sustainable”); McKay, supra note 15 (explaining that 
even though GMO foods are generally considered safe for human consumption, 64 countries 
required GMO labeling in 2014). 
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2. United States: The Food and Drug Administration and Other 
Agencies 
In 1986, the White House Office of Science and Technology 
(“OST”) began regulating biotechnology by issuing the Coordinated 
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (“Coordinated 
Framework”).50 Intended to be the comprehensive federal policy that 
would assure safety in biotechnology, the Coordinated Framework 
was based upon two principal policy views.51 The first policy element 
was that existing law was sufficient to deal with the regulatory needs 
of genetically modified products, which signaled the administration’s 
refusal to promulgate GMO-specific rules.52 The second policy factor, 
known as the “substantial equivalence doctrine,” maintains that 
products containing GMOs present no new risks as opposed to 
traditional products that are not genetically modified.53 Although the 
Coordinated Framework was not enacted into law, it would later 
become clear that its principles were to be the foundation of the US 
GMO regulatory system.54 The Coordinated Framework was mirrored 
by the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy, which brought about the GMO 
regulatory process that the United States has used for over twenty 
years.55 
                                                                                                                         
 
50. See Nunziato, supra note 9, at 477 (detailing the Coordinated Framework); 
Lundquist, supra note 39, at 831 (explaining the Coordinated Framework). 
51. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 
(June 26, 1986); Lundquist, supra note 39, at 831 (quoting the Coordinated Framework and 
describing its stated purpose); Nunziato, supra note 9, at 477 (detailing the fundamental 
purpose of the Coordinated Framework). 
52. See Lundquist, supra note 39, at 831 (acknowledging the idea under the Coordinated 
Framework that existing law is sufficient to regulate GMOs); Nunziato, supra note 9, at 477 
(stating the stance that no new legislation was required under the Framework to regulate GMO 
products). 
53. See Lundquist, supra note 39, at 831 (explaining the substantial equivalence 
doctrine); Sheryl Lawrence, What Would You Do With a Fluorescent Green Pig? How Novel 
Transgenic Products Reveal Flaws in the Foundational Assumptions for the Regulation of 
Biotechnology, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201, 219 (2007) (describing this second policy factor). 
54. See Lundquist, supra note 39, at 831 (demonstrating how the GMO regulatory 
system is guided by the Coordinated Framework); Bratspies, supra note 29, at 929-30 (“ . . . 
with virtually no modifications in the intervening decades, this Coordinated Framework 
continues to govern regulatory decisions about agricultural biotechnology.”). 
55. See Bratspies, supra note 29, at 938 (explaining how the FDA built upon the 
substantial equivalence mindset of the Coordinated Framework); Nunziato, supra note 9, at 
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While this policy did not implement any new measures 
specifically crafted for GMOs, it placed the regulation of foods, 
medical devices, drugs, biologics, and pesticides developed through 
modern biotechnology within the same existing statutory system that 
regulates similar products developed using traditional methods, such 
as traditionally bred foods.56 Traditional breeding usually involves the 
hybridization between varieties of the same species and, therefore, 
can only introduce traits that are found in close relatives.57 Thus, corn 
that has been produced using genetic modification is treated the same 
as corn that has been produced without the use of such methods.58 
Hence, products that are derived from traditional methods, like 
traditional crossbreeding, are to be regulated under the same rules and 
standards as products derived from genetic engineering methods, 
including gene insertion.59 Under this framework, GMOs are 
regulated by the FDA under two sections of the FDCA.60 The first 
component of this framework is the General Safety Clause of FDCA 
Section 402(a)(1), which considers food that contains any poisonous 
or dangerous substance that makes it injurious to health as adulterated 
and subject to seizure.61 The second component is the Food Additives 
Amendment of FDCA Section 409, which provides the procedures for 
approval of food additives and divides substances that are added to 
food into two categories: food additives and substances generally 
                                                                                                                         
 
478 (describing how the Coordinated Framework is still the same basic organizing principle 
for GMO regulation in the United States). 
56. See Jeffrey K. Francer, Frankenstein Foods or Flavor Savers?: Regulating 
Agricultural Biotechnology in the United States and European Union, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 257, 265-66 (2000) (detailing what is regulated within the existing law); Nunziato, supra 
note 9, at 477-78 (explaining that no new laws would be enacted to regulate biotechnology). 
57. See 1992 FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 25, at 22986 (discussing traditional 
breeding). 
58. See generally id.; Nunziato, supra note 9, at 479 (giving the corn example). 
59. See Francer, supra note 56, at 265-66 (demonstrating how such products would be 
regulated under the same rules). See generally Bratspies, supra note 29, at 929-30 (detailing 
the principles of the Coordinated Framework). 
60. See Bratspies, supra note 29, at 937-38 (detailing the regulatory power of the FDA 
and the FDCA); Francer, supra note 56, at 267-70 (giving an overview of the statutory 
framework of the FDA regulatory system). 
61. 21 U.S.C. § 341(a)(1) (1994); see Francer, supra note 56, at 268 (quoting section 
402(a)(1) of the FDCA and describing the power of the FDA under the General Safety 
Clause). 
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recognized as safe (“GRAS”).62 This section allows the FDA to 
subject manufacturers to premarket approval unless their food product 
is recognized as safe.63 In order to be deemed safe under the FDCA, 
competent scientists must be reasonably certain that a substance is not 
harmful under the intended conditions of the use.64 A food additive 
that does not fit this definition is considered “unsafe,” and the food 
containing the additive is deemed adulterated.65 If the substance is 
determined to be “safe,” it is not considered a food additive and thus 
no prior FDA approval is necessary.66 
The Coordinated Framework resulted in a three-part regulatory 
system that delegates genetic engineering regulation to three 
government agencies: the FDA, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”), and the United States Department of Agriculture 
(“USDA”).67 Under the Coordinated Framework, the FDA has 
authority to regulate food, feed, veterinary drugs, and food additives 
developed by biotechnology as delegated by the FDCA.68 As a second 
part of the Coordinated Framework, the EPA is responsible for 
regulating the manufacture and release into the environment of 
microbial products of biotechnology and pesticides manufactured 
through biotechnology through the Toxic Substances Control Act 
                                                                                                                         
 
62. See Francer, supra note 56, at 267 (discussing section 409 of the FDCA); Bratspies, 
supra note 29, at 937 (explaining that substances added to food fall into either of these two 
categories). 
63. See Bratspies, supra note 29, at 937 (discussing how the FDA can mandate 
premarket approval with respect to food additives); Francer, supra note 56, at 269 (describing 
the application of premarket approval to food additives depending on their safety status). 
64. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(i) (2016); see Bratspies, supra note 29, at 937 (describing how 
the FDA defines “safe” with respect to premarket approval for food additives). 
65. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 342(a)(1), (2)(C) (2015); see Bratspies, supra note 29, at 937 
(stating that the FDA will deem a food containing an additive that is unsafe as “adulterated”). 
66. See Bratspies, supra note 29, at 937 (explaining that if a substance added to food is 
“generally recognized as safe,” it is not deemed to be a food additive and therefore prior FDA 
approval is not required); Francer, supra note 56, at 269 (stating that the FDA is allowed to 
require food manufacturers to apply for premarket approval of food that has a substance added 
to it unless the food is “generally recognized as safe”). 
67. See Lundquist, supra note 39, at 831-32 (detailing the three-part system under the 
Coordinated Framework and how responsibilities are divided among the agencies); Francer, 
supra note 56, at 66 (explaining how the different agencies work within the framework); 
Muller, supra note 11, at 519 (describing how the regulation of biotechnology is divided 
among the three agencies under the Coordinated Framework). 
68. See Nunziato, supra note 9, at 478 (establishing the FDA’s responsibilities); Francer, 
supra note 56, at 266 (articulating the FDA regulation of GMOs through the FDCA). 
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(“TSCA”) and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act (“FIFRA”).69 Finally, as the third part of this Framework, the 
USDA is charged with regulating the use of genetically modified 
plants, animals, and microorganisms in agriculture as part of the 
Federal Plant Protection Act.70 
The regulation carried out by these three agencies is firmly 
rooted in the Coordinated Framework’s two principles, as well as the 
conclusion of the National Research Council (“NRC”) that because 
the same physical and biological laws govern genetically modified 
and non-modified organisms, genetically modified organisms do not 
present a greater risk to human health than unmodified organisms.71 
As a result, the FDA, EPA, and USDA all regulate the genetically 
modified items within their jurisdiction through their traditional 
procedures.72 Through this application of the Coordinated Framework 
and substantial equivalence doctrine, products subject to FDA 
regulation must comply with the same safety standards as their natural 
counterparts (i.e., unmodified organisms).73 For example, as 
previously discussed, corn that is produced by using genetic 
modification is regulated the same way as corn that has been 
produced without the use of genetic modification.74 While the 
                                                                                                                         
 
69. See Nunziato, supra note 9, at 474 (describing the EPA’s responsibilities under the 
Coordinated Framework); Francer, supra note 56, at 266 (citing the TSCA and FIFRA and 
describing the EPA’s duties with respect to biotechnology). 
70. See Lundquist, supra note 39, at 835 (describing the USDA’s role within the 
Coordinated Framework through the Federal Plant Protection Act); Nunziato, supra note 9, at 
478 (commenting on the USDA’s responsibilities under the Coordinated Framework). 
71. See Francer, supra note 56, at 266 (commenting on how the NRC’s conclusion that 
products developed through biotechnology do not entail greater risk “per se” compared to 
unmodified products served as the basis for the Coordinated Framework’s policy); see also 
Alison Peck, Leveling the Playing Field in GMO Risk Assessment: Importers, Exporters and 
the Limits of Science, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 241, 257 (2010) (describing some findings of the 
NRC with respect to GMOs). 
72. See Francer, supra note 56, at 267 (explaining how the three agencies regulate 
GMOs). See generally Lundquist, supra note 39, at 832 (discussing how the agencies operate 
when regulating GMOs or GE products). 
73. See Nunziato, supra note 9, at 479 (detailing how the FDA treats GMOs the same as 
their conventional counterparts). See generally Federici, supra note 39, at 537 (describing how 
GMOs are evaluated under the same laws as their conventionally produced counterparts by the 
FDA). 
74. See generally 1992 FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 25; Nunziato, supra note 9, 
at 479 (explaining how unmodified corn and genetically modified corn are treated as 
substantially equivalent to one another by the FDA, which generally recognizes both as safe). 
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substantial equivalence doctrine has its roots in the 1986 findings of 
the NRC, it was further solidified and incorporated into US regulation 
through the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy.75 
3. The 1992 FDA Statement of Policy 
The 1992 FDA Statement of Policy has had a major impact upon 
the regulation of GMOs in the United States.76 It has steered the 
regulatory system in a way that greatly lessened the burden on 
manufacturers to get GMO products approved for sale.77 Instead of 
regulating GMOs within the much stricter approach of FDCA Section 
409, the FDA announced that it would continue to mainly rely on 
Section 402(a)(1)—which only deals with substances that may be 
injurious to health—for the safety of whole foods and those derived 
from plants genetically modified by new techniques.78 Furthermore, 
the FDA decided that it was the responsibility of the producer of a 
new food to evaluate the safety of that food and to ensure that the 
safety requirements under Section 402(a)(1) are met.79 The FDA also 
stated that it encouraged producers to informally consult FDA 
scientists to ensure that safety concerns are resolved and that the 
producers are legally responsible for satisfying Section 402(a)(1) of 
                                                                                                                         
 
75. See generally Nunziato, supra note 9, at 479 (explaining how the FDA treats GMOs 
as substantially equivalent to their non-GMO counterparts); Bratspies, supra note 29, at 929 
(explaining how substantial equivalence was the central assumption guiding the Coordinated 
Framework). 
76. See generally supra Section I.A (demonstrating how the 1992 FDA Statement of 
Policy has shaped the US GMO regulatory system, specifically with respect to labeling). 
77. See generally Rebecca Jesada, Buyer Beware: An Exploration Of Health Risks And 
Legal Policies In Favor Of A Labeling Requirement For Genetically Modified Organisms, 14 
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y APPENDIX S-30, S-38-39 (2011) (explaining the voluntary 
consultation process for GMO approval with the FDA); Francer, supra note 56, at 269 (stating 
that the FDA allows manufacturers to determine whether genetically modified foods are 
GRAS). 
78. See 1992 FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 25, at 22990 (announcing that GMOs 
would be regulated under section 402(a)(1) of the FDCA); Francer, supra note 56, at 270 
(describing how the FDA relies on section 402(a)(1) of the FDCA to regulate genetically 
modified foods). 
79. See 1992 FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 25, at 22990 (showing that the FDA 
would not be relying on its own independent research, but rather on the food producers to 
evaluate the safety of the food and to make sure their foods meet the safety standards under 
section 402(a)(1)). 
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the act.80 With respect to Section 409, the FDA stated that it would 
not require genetically engineered foods to be regulated as food 
additives under this section.81 This, the FDA reasoned, was because 
GMOs are presumptively GRAS and therefore not subject to Section 
409, including the food additive approval process.82 The FDA further 
noted that it did not anticipate any serious questions about the GRAS 
status of transferred genetic material and therefore did not expect such 
transferred genetic material to be subject to food additive regulation.83 
It was from this viewpoint that the FDA put forth a policy that 
presumes that added genetic material from substances already in the 
food supply is GRAS.84 
This FDA policy has greatly affected the process of GMO 
regulation, as leading producers such as Monsanto are not required to 
submit their GMO products for FDA approval.85 As these products 
are protected by a presumption of safety, GMOs are not subject to 
FDA independent research, but are only regulated based upon 
information that such companies voluntarily give to the FDA.86 
                                                                                                                         
 
80. See id. (identifying the agency’s role in the GMO approval process). 
81. See id. (explaining the FDA’s reasoning behind its decision to not regulate GMOs 
under section 409 and its continued position that such materials are presumed to be GRAS). 
82. See id. (describing the FDA’s presumption that GMOs are GRAS and therefore not 
subject to regulation as food additives). 
83. See id. (asserting the FDA’s position that it does not anticipate that transferred 
genetic material would itself be subject to food additive regulation). 
84. See Francer, supra note 56, at 270 (summarizing the FDA’s viewpoint concerning 
added genetic material from substances that already exist in the food supply); see also 1992 
FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 25, at 22990 (“When the substance present in the food is 
one that is already at generally comparable or greater levels in currently consumed foods, there 
is unlikely to be a safety question sufficient to call into question the presumed GRAS status of 
such naturally occurring substances and thus warrant formal premarket review and approval by 
FDA.”). 
85. See Bratspies, supra note 29, at 938 (assessing how companies such as Monsanto are 
allowed to voluntarily consult with the FDA before marketing a new GE food product and how 
they are responsible for ensuring that the product is safe but are not required to prove safety to 
the FDA); Francer, supra note 56, at 269 (noting that consultation with the FDA regarding an 
ingredient’s regulatory status is not legally required). 
86. See Bratspies, supra note 29, at 938-39 (detailing how this “developer-driven 
consultation” process “imposes no obligation on the developer to share all its data, including 
negative or inconclusive results with the agency” and also explaining that the FDA does not 
conduct any independent testing of the GMO food products); see also Tiffany B. Wong, 
Comment, Playing Politics With Food: Comparing Labeling Regulations Of Genetically 
Engineered Foods Across The North Atlantic In The United States And The European Union, 
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Furthermore, since genetically engineered traits can be classified as 
“novel proteins,” companies are allowed to withhold all information 
about the properties of the proteins and are therefore not compelled to 
disclose this information to the FDA regardless of their potential harm 
to humans or animals.87 Before such GMO products are approved, the 
FDA does not conduct any independent testing.88 It therefore 
approves GMO products by relying solely on the information 
voluntarily provided to it by the companies seeking approval.89 
4. The Labeling of GMO Products in the United States 
In addition to its dramatic effect on the GMO approval process, 
the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy significantly influenced the way 
GMO products have been labeled for over twenty years in the United 
States.90 It is important to note that while the following information 
concerning GMO labeling has been accurate from 1992 to 2016, it is 
no longer the standard for GMO labeling in the United States as S. 
764 now mandates GMO labeling for products that are classified as 
“bioengineered food.”91 Even though GMO labeling is now 
mandatory under S. 764, the information below provides a crucial 
                                                                                                                         
 
23 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 243, 254 (2013-2014) (indicating that the FDA relies on food 
companies “to voluntarily conduct a premarket food safety assessment”). 
87. See Glasscock, supra note 35, at 236 (specifying how the “novel proteins” 
classification of genetically engineered traits permits biotech companies to withhold all 
information about the properties of the protein, “even their general nature, including potential 
toxicity to humans or other wildlife”); Bratspies, supra note 29, at 938 (detailing how 
companies are not obligated to share all their data with the FDA and how the FDA only 
reviews the information submitted by companies voluntarily). 
88. See Muller, supra note 11, at 520 (discussing this lack of independent testing); 
Francer, supra note 56, at 270 (describing the FDA’s guidance framework for manufacturers). 
89. See Muller, supra note 11, at 520 (indicating that the FDA does not conduct a safety 
assessment on genetically modified foods and shifts the responsibility to the producers who 
create the genetically modified crops to voluntarily disclose any studies that have been 
conducted on the product). See generally Francer, supra note 56, at 270 (giving an overview of 
the FDA’s guidance framework for manufacturers in which the agency suggests, but does not 
require, consultation as well as the included flowchart that is meant to help manufacturers to 
determine if they should engage in a formal consultation with the FDA). 
90. See Francer, supra note 56, at 272 (stating that the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy 
declined to mandate labeling of genetically modified foods); Muller, supra note 11, at 518-20 
(detailing how the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy has impacted the agency’s stance on GMO 
labeling). 
91. See infra notes 459-66 and accompanying text (discussing the mandates for products 
that are classified as “bioengineered food” under S. 764). 
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overview of the FDA policy that governed GMO labeling in the 
United States for over twenty years and which gave rise to the state 
movement for GMO labeling and the enactment of S. 764 as a 
compromise to calm public unrest.92 
Under FDCA Section 403(I), a producer of a food product is 
required to describe the product by its common name or appropriately 
descriptive term if there is no common name.93 Furthermore, the 
producer is required to reveal all facts that are material to the labeling 
of the products or the consequences that might result from the use of 
its product.94 If a food that is derived from a new plant variety differs 
from its traditional counterpart so much that the common name no 
longer applies to the food, consumers must be informed by 
appropriate labeling.95 Consumers must also be informed by such 
labeling if there is a safety issue that they must be made aware of.96 
In its 1992 Statement of Policy, the FDA used the example of a 
tomato, which had a peanut protein introduced into it, to illustrate its 
positioning on the labeling of GMOs.97 The FDA stated that it would 
require a label declaration for these tomatoes in order to alert peanut-
allergic consumers if there was not sufficient evidence to show that 
the introduced peanut protein could not cause an allergic reaction in a 
susceptible population.98 This is because the information is a material 
fact “whose omission may make the label of the tomato misleading 
under section 403(a) of the act.”99 In light of its findings, the FDA 
ruled that it had not considered the methods used in developing a new 
plant variety to be “material information” within FDCA Section 
                                                                                                                         
 
92. See infra notes 455-89 and accompanying text (analyzing S. 764 and the 
circumstances surrounding it). 
93. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(i) (2010) (stating the requirements for describing food either 
with its common name or an appropriately descriptive term); 1992 FDA Statement of Policy, 
supra note 25, at 22991 (detailing how foods must be described under section 403(i) of the 
FDCA). 
94. See 1992 FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 25, at 22991. 
95. Id. 
96. See id. (explaining these requirements under the Policy). 
97. Id. (using the example of a tomato that had a peanut protein introduced into it to 
explain its stance on GMO labeling). 
98. See id. (detailing how the FDA would require labeling of a tomato with peanut 
protein introduced into it since this would be a material fact whose omission would make the 
tomato label misleading under 403(a) of the FDCA). 
99. Id. (giving the FDA’s reasoning). 
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201(n).100 The FDA also noted that it was not aware of any 
information demonstrating that foods derived by such new methods 
differ from other foods in any meaningful or uniform way or that “as 
a class, food developed by the new techniques present any different or 
greater safety concerns than foods developed by traditional plant 
breeding.”101 Thus, the FDA did not believe that the method of 
development of a new plant variety, including those using 
recombinant DNA techniques, is material information within the 
meaning of the act and therefore did not require the information to be 
disclosed in the food label.102 Since the FDA has not modified its 
stance on GMOs or reinvestigated the issue, the 1992 FDA Statement 
of Policy has been the governing policy on GMO labeling until the 
enactment of S. 764 and is the reason why the United States has not 
required labeling of GMO products until 2016.103 
5. The FDA’s Decision Not to Define “Natural” 
In addition to its decision to not mandate GMO labeling, the 
FDA has also refused in the past to issue a formal definition of the 
word “natural.”104 While “natural” is the most widely used food label 
on US food products, the term has only been informally defined by 
the FDA.105 The Third Circuit held that the definition does not have 
the force of law.106 In Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., the US Court 
                                                                                                                         
 
100. Id. (describing the agency’s findings). 
101. Id. (stating the agency’s position on the method of genetic engineering with respect 
to labeling the final product). 
102. Id. (providing the FDA’s decision not to mandate GMO labeling based on methods 
of production). 
103. See Nunziato, supra note 9, at 479 (stating that the FDA has not changed its policy 
on GMOs since 1992). See generally Lundquist, supra note 39, at 831-34 (describing the 
GMO regulatory framework through 2015). 
104. See Muller, supra note 11, at 523 (stating that the FDA has never issued a formal 
definition of “natural”); April L. Farris, The “Natural” Aversion: The FDA’s Reluctance To 
Define A Leading Food-Industry Marketing Claim, And The Pressing Need For A Workable 
Rule, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 403, 404-07 (2010) (describing the history behind the FDA’s 
informal policy on defining “natural” and the agency’s refusal to formally define the term). 
105. See Muller, supra note 11, at 523 (explaining that while “natural” is the most 
widely used food label on US food products, the FDA has declined to formally define the 
term); Farris, supra note 104, at 403-08 (discussing the popularity of “natural” on food 
products and the history of the FDA’s stance on defining “natural”). 
106. See Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 342 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating the 
court’s belief that the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy regarding the use of the term “natural” 
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that the definition was not 
binding and therefore could not be imposed on manufacturers because 
the FDA stated its intention not to create a formal definition and 
because the FDA promulgated the informal definition without public 
notice and comment.107 
As a result of the FDA’s decision not to formally define 
“natural,” many consumers have sued companies for using the term 
“natural” on food products that contain GMOs or genetically 
modified based ingredients.108 By refusing to craft a formal definition 
of “natural,” the FDA has not decided whether foods containing 
genetically bioengineered ingredients can be labeled as “natural,” “all 
natural,” or “100% natural,” essentially leaving this issue to the 
federal courts.109 However, as the courts do not necessarily possess 
the requisite expertise to answer these questions, many have stayed 
the litigation pending FDA answers.110 During 2014, when two cases 
were pending in the district courts of California and one case was 
pending in New Jersey, the FDA wrote a letter to the three district 
court judges hearing the cases, stating that this issue would not be 
appropriate to decide in litigation since it is complex and concerns 
                                                                                                                         
 
does not have the force of law); Muller, supra note 11, at 523 (citing Holk, in which the Third 
Circuit held that the FDA’s informal definition of “natural” does not have the force of law). 
107. See Holk, 575 F.3d at 341-42 (detailing the court’s reasoning in its decision to rule 
that the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy regarding the use of “natural” did not have the force of 
law required to preempt conflicting state law). 
108. See Muller, supra note 11, at 524 (stating that many consumers have filed lawsuits 
against companies who are labeling their products as “natural” despite using GMOs and giving 
a general overview of some of the complications from this development); see also Nicole E. 
Negowetti, Food Labeling Litigation: Exposing Gaps in the FDA’s Resources and Regulatory 
Authority, BROOKINGS INST. 1 (June 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/06/Negowetti_Food-Labeling-Litigation.pdf (commenting that between 2011 and June 
2014, more than 150 food labeling class action lawsuits had been filed against food and 
beverage companies by consumer advocacy groups and plaintiffs). 
109. See Muller, supra note 11, at 524-25 (discussing the way in which the FDA’s 
refusal to formally define “natural” has resulted in dispute at the litigation level); Stephanie Jill 
Fogel, FDA declines to define “Natural”, DLA PIPER (Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.dlapiper. 
com/en/us/insights/publications/2014/01/fda-declines-to-define-natural/ (explaining the 
significant cases in which the FDA’s informal definition is a source of contention). 
110. See Muller, supra note 11, at 524-25 (describing how the courts do not have the 
necessary expertise in this area); Fogel, supra note 109 (discussing the courts’ belief that the 
“natural” claims require FDA expertise). 
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myriad interests.111 FDA Assistant Commissioner for Policy Leslie 
Kux explained that a discussion of using “natural” on GMO products 
would be better suited to a public proceeding, including an issuance 
of a regulation or formal guidance.112 
The FDA has responded to these lawsuits and the public outcry 
for labeling reform with respect to the use of “natural.”113 On 
November 10, 2015, the agency announced its request for public 
comments on the use of the term “natural” on food labeling.114 From 
November 12, 2015 until May 10, 2016, the FDA allowed the public 
to provide information and public comment on three questions: (1) 
whether it is appropriate to define the term “natural,” (2) if so, how 
the agency should define “natural,” and (3) how the agency should 
determine the appropriate use of the term on food labels.115 
Specifically, the FDA noted that it was taking this step in response to 
three Citizens Petitions that asked the agency to define “natural” for 
use in food labeling and one Citizen Petition that requested it to 
prevent parties from using “natural” on food labels.116 Additionally, 
the FDA indicated that it received requests for administrative 
determinations from some federal courts that had ongoing litigation 
between private parties regarding whether food products containing 
ingredients using genetic engineering or foods containing high 
fructose corn syrup can be labeled as “natural.”117 
                                                                                                                         
 
111. See Josh Long, FDA: Courts on Their Own in GMO “All Natural” Lawsuits, NAT. 
PRODUCTS INSIDER (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.naturalproductsinsider.com/news/2014/01/fda-
courts-on-their-own-in-gmo-all-natural-lawsui.aspx (describing the FDA letter to the three 
district court judges in which the FDA declined to decide on the issue in the litigation setting); 
Fogel, supra note 109 (examining the FDA letter and response to the lawsuits). 
112. See Long, supra note 111 (analyzing the FDA’s refusal to resolve this issue in the 
context of a lawsuit); Fogel, supra note 109 (highlighting the FDA’s statement that it declined 
to determine when a food may be labeled “natural” in the private litigation setting and that it 
would do so through formal administrative processes). 
113. See infra notes 114-21 and accompanying text (describing the agency’s response). 
114. See “Natural” on Food Labeling, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Food/Guidance  
Regulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutrition/ucm456090.htm 
(last visited Jan. 9, 2016) [hereinafter FDA Request]. 
115. See id. (setting forth the questions that the agency is asking the public to comment 
on). 
116. See id. (putting forth some of the main motivation behind the FDA’s request). 
117. See id. (explaining how the FDA is reacting to the requests from federal courts that 
are dealing with lawsuits concerning the use of “natural” on food products with respect to 
GMOs). 
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In its request, the FDA acknowledged that while it has never 
issued a formal definition for natural, it has maintained a longstanding 
policy concerning the use of this term in human food labeling in 
which “natural” means “nothing artificial or synthetic (including all 
color additives regardless of sources) has been included in, or has 
been added to, a food that would not normally be expected to be in 
that food.”118 More importantly, the FDA stated that this policy was 
not meant to address food production methods or manufacturing 
methods.119 This is clearly aligned with the Coordinated Framework, 
in which the Reagan administration argued that GMO food products 
were not to be analyzed by the processes by which they were made, 
but rather by the product’s safety with respect to human health.120 In 
its request, the FDA also stated that it did not consider whether the 
term “natural” should describe “any nutritional or other health 
benefit.”121 
6. The FDA’s Position On Labels Indicating A Product’s Non-GMO 
Status 
While the use of the word “natural” on products containing 
GMOs has been allowed for the last two decades, terms such as 
“GMO free” or “not genetically modified” have not been so greatly 
accepted by the FDA.122 Until 2016, producers wishing to advertise 
that their products were GMO free were required to comply with the 
regulations that the FDA had imposed on the labeling of non-GMO 
foods.123 According to the FDA, claims such as “GMO free” and “not 
genetically modified” are misleading and thus the food producer or 
                                                                                                                         
 
118. See id. (describing the informal definition that the agency has used in place of a 
formal definition). 
119. See id. (stating what the policy does not apply to). 
120. See id.; see also supra notes 39-44 (discussing the Coordinated Framework). 
121. FDA Request, supra note 114 (giving limitations to the request). 
122. See Neil D. Hamilton, Forced Feeding: New Legal Issues In The Biotechnology 
Policy Debate, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 44 (2005) (discussing the FDA’s negative view 
of such claims and stating that the FDA has ruled that using the terms “GM” or “GMO Free” is 
misleading); Glasscock, supra note 35, at 237 (explaining how the FDA has imposed “strict” 
limitations on the voluntary labeling of non-GM foods in the past). 
123. See Glasscock, supra note 35, at 237 (highlighting the difficulty of labeling non-
GM foods as such under the current FDA requirements); Hamilton, supra note 122, at 44 
(discussing the burden of proof placed upon manufacturers by the FDA concerning claims of 
GMO free). 
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manufacturer must substantiate such voluntary claims.124 Prior to S. 
764, it followed that while producers and manufacturers who wished 
to use the label “GMO free” or “not genetically modified” had to bear 
the cost to take the steps to substantiate such labels, producers or 
manufacturers were free to use the label “natural,” “all natural,” or 
“100% natural” on GMO products, despite the fact that most US 
consumers believe that such terms also mean “non-GMO.”125 
7. The 1992 FDA Statement of Policy Upheld by the Courts 
While the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy has not been altered 
since 1992, it has been challenged in court.126 In the District of 
Columbia in Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, a non-profit 
organization brought an action against the FDA for its labeling 
guidelines.127 Ultimately, the court upheld the 1992 FDA Statement of 
Policy since the decision to not mandate GMO labeling was not 
arbitrary or capricious.128 In this suit, plaintiffs argued that (1) the 
statement was not properly subjected to notice-and-comment 
procedures and (2) both the FDA’s presumption that genetically 
modified foods were GRAS and its decision not to require labeling 
was arbitrary and capricious, and therefore should be set aside by the 
court.129 The FDA argued that since its statement was a policy 
statement or an interpretive rule, it was not subject to formal notice 
and comment requirements.130 The United State District Court for the 
District of Columbia ruled that as evidenced by the name and plain 
                                                                                                                         
 
124. See Hamilton, supra note 122, at 44 (explaining how the FDA determined that 
using “GMO free” and “GM” is misleading); Glasscock, supra note 35, at 237 (stating that 
under the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy, manufacturers had to substantiate voluntary claims 
of “non-genetically modified” and “GMO free”). 
125. See Glasscock, supra note 35, at 237 (describing how the requirement prior to S. 
764 that manufacturers and producers substantiate claims of “not genetically modified” or 
“GMO free” could be cost prohibitive); Farris, supra note 104, at 405-06 (explaining the 
informal definition of “natural” by the FDA). 
126. See Nunziato, supra note 9, at 479 (stating that the FDA has not changed its 
position since 1992); Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F.Supp.2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(where the plaintiffs challenged the FDA’s stance on GMO labeling). 
127. See Shalala, 116 F.Supp.2d 166. 
128. Id. at 177 (explaining the court’s holding that the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy 
was not arbitrary or capricious). 
129. Id at 173 (explaining plaintiffs’ claims). 
130. Id. (detailing the FDA’s arguments). 
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language of the statement, the 1992 Statement of Policy creates a 
rebuttable presumption of GRAS and exists as a policy statement.131 
Thus, the court ruled, the FDA did not err in implementing its 1992 
Statement of Policy without formal notice and comment.132 
In deciding whether or not the agency acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in presuming that GMOs were GRAS and deciding not to 
label such products, the court used the Chevron analysis, which is a 
legislation and regulation tool that courts use to analyze agency action 
in a lawsuit against the agency.133 In performing this analysis, the 
court examined the Food Additives Amendment to the FDCA and 
found that though the 1958 Congress could not conceive of GMOs at 
the time the amendment was made, the statute exempts substances 
that are “generally recognized . . . to be safe under the conditions of 
its intended use” from regulations as additives.134 The court 
highlighted the fact that the plaintiffs were not disputing the FDA’s 
claim that nucleic acid proteins are generally recognized to be safe, 
but rather that the FDA presumed GMOs as GRAS in light of 
“significant disagreement” among scientists as to whether nucleic 
proteins are generally recognized as safe when used to alter organisms 
genetically.135 The court noted that it had to proceed with particular 
caution in order to avoid directing the agency in a choice between 
rational alternatives.136 Furthermore, the court ruled that in analyzing 
the agency’s determination of GRAS, its review is confined to the 
                                                                                                                         
 
131. Id. (explaining the court’s basis for determining the status of the statement). 
132. Id. (discussing the court’s ruling concerning the legality of the FDA’s 
administrative process in implementing its Statement of Policy). 
133. Id at 176 (describing how the court’s examination of the FDA’s interpretation is 
“framed by” the case Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984)). 
134. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2009); see Shalala, 116 F.Supp.2d at 177 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 
321(s) to describe the FDA’s inability to regulate substances that are recognized as GRAS as 
additives under the FDCA). 
135. See Shalala, 116 F.Supp.2d at 177 (explaining that the plaintiffs’ argument 
concerning disagreement among experts concerning the GRAS status of nucleic acid proteins 
was not the same as disputing the FDA’s claim that nucleic acid proteins are GRAS, which 
plaintiffs did not do). 
136. Id. (quoting Int’l Fabricare Inst. v. U.S.E.P.A., 972 F.2d 384, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
to describe the justification behind deferring to an agency when it is evaluating scientific data 
that is within its technical expertise, and Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 578 F.2d 337, 339 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) to explain how the court is supposed to judge the matter cautiously as to not 
direct the agency when a choice is made between rational alternatives). 
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record before the agency at the time it made its decision, and that 
while unanimity among scientists is not necessary, “a severe conflict 
among experts . . . precludes a finding of general recognition.”137 In 
light of all of these considerations, the court found that the plaintiffs 
did not show that the GRAS determination was inconsistent with the 
statutory requirements, and therefore it was not arbitrary and 
capricious.138 
Through this analysis, the court found that the FDA’s decision 
not to include consumer interests in the factors used to determine 
whether a change is “material” constituted a reasonable interpretation 
of the statute.139 The court reasoned that because the FDA found that 
rDNA modification does not “materially” alter food, the agency does 
not have a basis for legally requiring labeling, despite a level of 
consumer demand for it.140 Also, the court deferred to the FDA’s 
determination that foods produced with rDNA modification 
techniques do not present any different or greater safety concerns than 
foods that come from traditional plant breeding, and that mandatory 
labeling is not warranted.141 Since the court did not find this decision 
to be irrational, it ruled that the FDA’s decision not to require GMO 
labeling was not arbitrary and capricious and upheld the agency 
action.142 
Since the FDA has not reexamined the issue of requiring GMO 
labeling since 1992, the 1992 Statement of Policy that was upheld by 
                                                                                                                         
 
137. See Substances Generally Recognized as Safe, 62 Fed. Reg. 18938-01 (Apr. 17, 
1997); Shalala, 116 F.Supp.2d at 177 (quoting Substances Generally Recognized as Safe to 
describe how a GRAS finding is not permitted if there is a severe conflict among experts and 
also explaining how the court must only review the record before the FDA at the time it made 
its decision). 
138. See Shalala, 116 F.Supp.2d at 177 (stating that the court’s finding that the GRAS 
presumption is not inconsistent with the statutory requirements). 
139. See id. (explaining that the FDA’s interpretation of the statute with respect to 
excluding consumer choice as a factor that determines whether a change is “material” was 
reasonable). 
140. See id. (asserting that the FDA cannot legally require labeling without finding that 
rDNA modification materially alters food). 
141. See id. (explaining that the FDA’s determination that rDNA derived foods do not 
present any different or greater safety concern than foods developed by traditional plant 
breeding is entitled to deference unless it is irrational). 
142. See id. (setting forth the court’s ruling). 
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the Shalala court is still in effect.143 While the FDA’s position on 
GMOs has not substantially changed in over twenty years, the US 
attitude towards GMOs has dramatically shifted from neutrality 
towards skepticism.144 Three states, including Connecticut and 
Vermont, enacted their own labeling laws that essentially 
circumvented the FDA’s stance on GMO labeling laws.145 It appeared 
that this inconsistent dichotomy would continue in the absence of 
federal action, as more states looked to enact their own GMO labeling 
laws in opposition to the FDA’s position under its 1992 Statement of 
Policy.146 However, as discussed in Part II of this Note, the 
implementation of federal GMO labeling requirements under S. 764 
has resolved this conflict and avoided a patchwork system of state 
GMO labeling laws.147 While the 1992 Statement of Policy is still 
valid, the federal government has placed the regulation of GMO 
labeling in the hands of the USDA despite objection by the FDA.148 It 
is not clear how this system under S. 764 will exist in the shadow of 
the 1992 Statement of Policy, as the very requirement of GMO 
                                                                                                                         
 
143. See Nunziato, supra note 9, at 479 (stating that the FDA has not changed its 
position since 1992); Marden, supra note 17, at 756 (detailing how the decision “. . . made it 
clear that critics of the FDA’s policy had very little legal ground on which to stand”). 
144. See Kate Galbraith, Attitudes on Crops Are Modifying, NY TIMES (July 10, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/business/energy-environment/11iht-green11.html?_r=0 
(discussing the rise in consumer interest in food and dietary issues in recent years, which has 
led to the labeling initiatives). See generally Cary Funk & Lee Rainie, Chapter 6: Public 
Opinion About Food, PEW RES. CTR. (July 1, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/07/01/  
chapter-6-public-opinion-about-food/ (providing a Pew Research survey on public perception 
of GMOs in the United States). 
145. See Philip Brasher, FDA Refuses To Require GMO Labeling, AGRI-PULSE (Nov. 
19, 2015), http://www.agri-pulse.com/FDA-refuses-to-require-GMO-labeling-11192015.asp 
(explaining how the FDA still refuses to mandate GMO labeling); Mary Clare Jalonick, A 
Senate Committee Is Moving Forward On Legislation That Would Prevent States From 
Requiring Labels On Genetically Modified Foods, US NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 19, 2016, 
7:26 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2016-02-19/senate-bill-would-
block-mandatory-labeling-of-gmos (discussing the measures taken by these three states). 
146. See infra Section II.A (providing an overview of this state movement). 
147. See infra Section II.A.9 (discussing how S. 764 eliminated the patchwork system of 
GMO labeling laws by prohibiting state GMO labeling laws and preempting the laws of 
Connecticut, Maine, and Vermont). 
148. See infra Sections II.A.9 and II.A.10 (explaining how S. 764 places the GMO 
labeling system within the power of the USDA and the criticism facing this assignment). 
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labeling under the law conflicts with the FDA’s long held policy that 
GMOs should not be labeled due to their GRAS status.149 
B. EU Regulation of GMOs: Product, Labeling, and Marketing 
This Section explains EU regulation of GMOs and its foundation 
in the precautionary principle. Section I.B.1 explains the 
precautionary principle and EU environmental policy, while Section 
I.B.2 examines the fundamental ideas of the precautionary principle. 
Section I.B.3 examines how the Commission applies the 
precautionary principle and Sections I.B.4 and I.B.5 discuss two 
crucial cases that elaborate on the precautionary principle. Section 
I.B.7 details the regulatory system prior to 2001 through the 1990 
Deliberate Release Directive and the problems associated with the 
Directive, including a de facto moratorium on GMOs in the European 
Union in 1998 and the public’s intense demand for mandatory GMO 
labeling.150 Sections I.B.8 and I.B.9 describe EU GMO regulation 
after 2001 under the 2001 Deliberate Release Directive and the 
Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation, while Section 
I.B.10 sets out the GMO labeling requirements under the Traceability 
and Labeling Regulation.151 Finally, Section I.B.11 summarizes and 
compares the GMO regulatory systems of the United States and the 
European Union. 
Citizens of the European Union have been wary of the effects of 
GMOs on human health and the environment since the agricultural 
product industry began genetically engineering food.152 Despite 
                                                                                                                         
 
149. See supra Section I.A.3 (explaining the FDA position). 
150. See Council Directive 90/220//EEC on the Deliberate Release into the Environment 
of Genetically Modified Organisms, 1990 O.J. L 117/15 [hereinafter 1990 Deliberate Release 
Directive]. 
151. See Council Directive 2001/18/EC on the Deliberate Release into the Environment 
of Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EC, 2001 O.J. L 
106/1 [hereinafter 2001 Deliberate Release Directive]; Council Regulation 1829/2003/EC on 
Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 2003 O. J. L 268/1 [hereinafter Genetically Modified 
Food and Feed Regulation]; Council Regulation 1830/2003/EC on the Traceability and 
Labeling of Genetically Modified Organisms and the Traceability of Food and Feed Products 
Produced from Genetically Modified Organisms and Amending Directive 2001/18/EC, 2003 
O.J. 18/10/2003 [hereinafter Traceability and Labeling Regulation]. 
152. See The EU-US Dispute over GMOs: Risk Perceptions and the Quest for 
Regulatory Dominance, supra note 32 (describing the negative opinion of the EU public 
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having the second largest amount of arable land in the world, the 
European Union grows less than one percent of the world’s 
genetically modified crops.153 The EU GMO regulatory system has 
been described as among the strictest in the world and is known for 
providing a high level of scientific assessment, while simultaneously 
safeguarding the consumer’s right to choose.154 
1. The Precautionary Principle & EU Environmental Policy 
In sharp contrast to the United States’ decision to regulate 
GMOs within existing statutory systems under the Coordinated 
Framework, the European Union’s GMO regulatory system is based 
upon several specific legislative measures that monitor and restrict the 
growth, cultivation, and marketing of GMOs.155 As opposed to the US 
system that is based on the substantial equivalence doctrine, the EU 
regulatory system is founded upon the precautionary principle.156 The 
precautionary principle presumes that if an activity may have 
environmentally harmful consequences, it is better to take action 
before it is too late instead of waiting until complete scientific 
                                                                                                                         
 
regarding GMOs and genetic engineering); Wilinska, supra note 19, at 155-56 (highlighting 
the skepticism of EU consumers and their distrust in government food safety regulations). 
153. See Laura Moore Smith, Divided We Fall: The Shortcomings of the European 
Union’s Proposal for Independent Member States to Regulate the Cultivation of Genetically 
Modified Organisms, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 841, 841 (2011-2012) (stating the fact that the 
European Union grows less than one percent of the world’s genetically modified crops despite 
having the second largest amount of arable land in the world); Debra M. Strauss, Feast or 
Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision Favoring the U.S. Biotechnology Industry in the EU 
Ban of Genetically Modified Foods, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 775, 778 (2008) (giving the statistics of 
the EU land and GMO cultivation as of 2008). 
154. See Rachele Berglund Bailey, A Tale of Two Systems: A Comparison Between US 
and EU Labeling Policies of Genetically Modified Foods, 15 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 
193, 205 (2012) (highlighting this dichotomy of stringent scientific requirements and the 
protection of the consumer right to choose); see also Joss, supra note 16, at 147 (describing the 
strictness of the EU GMO regulatory system). 
155. See generally 2001 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 151; Genetically 
Modified Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 151; Traceability and Labeling Regulation, 
supra note 151. 
156. See Elizabeth G. Hill, Nature’s Harvest Or Man’s Profit: Environmental Shortcuts 
In The Deregulation Of Genetically Modified Crops, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 353, 360 (2012) 
(stating that the European Union adopted an approach to GMOs based on the precautionary 
principle); Marden, supra note 17, at 735 (explaining how the European Commission has 
taken a precautionary approach towards the technology of genetically modified foods). 
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evidence can indisputably prove the causal connection.157 The major 
difference in policy provides the explanation for the stark differences 
between the two regulatory systems and explains why the European 
Union has such strict labeling requirements for GMOs.158 
On July 1, 1987, the Single European Act (“SEA”) became 
effective and amended the European Economic Community Treaty 
(“EEC”), which established the European Economic Community in 
1957.159 Among the amendments found in the SEA, Article 130r 
provided the basis for environmental action taken by the 
Community.160 According to Article 130r, the objectives of 
Community action relating to the environment were to preserve, 
protect, and improve the quality of the environment, as well as 
contribute towards protecting human health and ensure a prudent and 
rational utilization of natural resources.161 Specifically, Community 
action relating to the environment was to be based on the principles 
that preventive action should be taken, environmental damages should 
be rectified at the source, and that the polluter should pay.162 In order 
to achieve these goals, the Community had to take into account four 
pieces of information, some of which included available scientific 
data and the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action.163 
                                                                                                                         
 
157. See JAN H. JANS & HANS H.B. VEDDER, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER 
LISBON 41 (4th ed. 2012) (describing the presumption of the precautionary principle that taking 
preventative action and avoiding damage is better than not taking such action in order to wait 
until complete scientific evidence becomes available that demonstrates the causal connection); 
ALBERTO ALEMANNO, TRADE IN FOOD: REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES IN THE EC 
AND THE WTO 106 (2007) (claiming that under the precautionary principle, it is preferable to 
not wait for a risk to materialize before examining and withdrawing a product whose safety is 
uncertain from the market). 
158. See Debra M. Strauss, Genetically Modified Organisms in Food: A Model with 
Positive Implications for International Trade, 40 INT’L L. 95, 115 (2006) (noting the 
contrasting approaches to GMO regulation of the United States and European Union); see also 
Bailey, supra note 154, at 208-09 (analyzing the differences between the US and EU 
regulatory systems, specifically in approaches to labeling requirements, and the reasons behind 
such differences). 
159. See Single European Act, 1987 O.J. L 169/1, [hereinafter SEA] (amending Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 
[hereinafter EEC Treaty]). 
160. Id. art. 130r. 
161. Id. at 1. 
162. Id. at 2. 
163. Id. at 3. 
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Under the Treaty of Maastricht, which was effective on 
November 1, 1993, the EEC Treaty was revised and renamed the 
European Community Treaty (“ECT”).164 Expanding upon the SEA 
requirements for environment action, the new provisions provided 
that Community policy on the environment shall be based on the 
precautionary principle, in addition to the previous policies that were 
provided in Article 130r of the SEA.165 Article 130r of the Treaty of 
Maastricht also provided that environmental protection requirements 
were to be integrated into other Community policies’ definition and 
implementation.166 Finally, it stated that in this context, harmonization 
procedures with respect to these requirements needed to include a 
safeguard clause that allowed the Member States to take provisional 
measures for non-economic environmental reasons where 
appropriate.167 These measures were also required to be subject to a 
Community inspection procedure.168 
The next major revision of the basic treaties occurred on 
November 1, 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty on European Union came 
into effect, which modified the Maastricht Treaty.169 The EEC Treaty 
was renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of European the Union 
(“TFEU”) and all references to the European Community were 
replaced with the “European Union.”170 It is under Article 191 of the 
TFEU that the current instructions for EU policy on the precautionary 
principle are found.171 According to Article 191, EU policy on the 
environment shall be based upon the precautionary principle, in 
addition to the principles of prevention, that environmental damage 
should be rectified at the source, and that the polluter should pay.172 
                                                                                                                         
 
164. See Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1 
[hereinafter Maastricht TEU]. 
165. Id. art. 130r, at 2 (requiring Community environmental policy to be based on the 
precautionary principle). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, 2008 O.J. C 115/47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
170. See generally id. 
171. Id. art. 191. 
172. Id. at 2. 
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2. The Fundamentals Of The Precautionary Principle 
The idea behind the precautionary principle is that governments 
should be able to take preventative action in order to prevent 
potentially serious environmental harms when the scientific findings 
concerning a possible causal connection are not completely certain.173 
The precautionary principle presumes that if there is a strong 
suspicion that an activity may be environmentally harmful, it is better 
to take action before it is too late instead of waiting to act for 
scientific evidence to become available that shows a causal 
connection.174 While a causal link has not been clearly formed based 
on available scientific evidence, an action that is taken in order to 
prevent damage in this instance can be supported by the precautionary 
principle.175 
Risk assessment is the key to the precautionary principle.176 In 
view of risk assessment, not all preventative actions are completely 
justified by the precautionary principle.177 Instead, the precautionary 
                                                                                                                         
 
173. See JANS & VEDDER, supra note 157, at 43 (articulating the precautionary principle 
and what it requires of government with respect to preventing environmental harms in the face 
of uncertain scientific findings); ALEMANNO, supra note 157, at 105 (characterizing the 
precautionary principle as allowing the adoption of protective measures in circumstances 
where there is scientific uncertainty). 
174. See JANS & VEDDER, supra note 157, at 43 (describing the presumption of the 
precautionary principle that taking preventative action and avoiding damage is better than not 
taking such action in order to wait until complete scientific evidence becomes available that 
demonstrates the causal connection); ALEMANNO, supra note 157, at 106 (claiming that under 
the precautionary principle, it is preferable to not wait for a risk to materialize before 
examining and withdrawing a product from the market whose safety is uncertain). 
175. See JANS & VEDDER, supra note 157, at 43 (showing a possible justification under 
the precautionary principle for taking action without scientific certainty concerning a causal 
connection); ALEMANNO, supra note 157, at 106 (“ . . . recourse to the precautionary principle 
presupposes that scientific evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient 
certainty.”). 
176. See JANS & VEDDER, supra note 157, at 43 (specifying that the Commission 
guidelines indicate that the precautionary principle is all about risk management); Joss, supra 
note 16, at 147 (stating that the precautionary principle “necessitates” that risk assessment be 
conducted when introducing biotechnology). 
177. See Council Regulation 178/2002/EC on Laying Down The General Principles And 
Requirements Of Food Law, Establishing The European Food Safety Authority and Laying 
Down Procedures In Matters Of Food Safety, 2002 O.J. L 31/1, art. 7, at 2 [hereinafter 
General Principles and Requirements of Food Law Regulation] (explaining the boundaries of 
the precautionary principle); JANS & VEDDER, supra note 157, at 43 (discussing how the 
precautionary principle justifies actions taken). 
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principle calls for proportion between the measures taken and the 
chosen level of protection that is determined when action is deemed 
necessary.178 
Because the precautionary principle is applied when scientific 
uncertainty exists, a proper risk assessment is paramount and must be 
performed as part of a correct application of the principle.179 A correct 
application of the precautionary principle requires, first, that the 
potentially negative health consequences of a proposed use of the 
substance be identified and that a comprehensive risk assessment 
based on the most reliable scientific data be conducted.180 Under the 
precautionary principle, a hypothetical risk will not be an adequate 
basis for action.181 Rather, action is only justified if it is deemed 
necessary in order to ensure that there is no danger for the 
environment and human health as shown by a prior complete risk 
assessment.182 
                                                                                                                         
 
178. See General Principles and Requirements of Food Law Regulation, supra note 177, 
art. 7, at 2 (stating that measures adopted on the basis of the precautionary principle that are 
necessary to ensure the high level of health protection “. . . shall be proportionate and no more 
restrictive of trade than is required to achieve the high level of health protection chosen in the 
Community, regard being had to technical and economic feasibility and other factors regarded 
as legitimate in the matter under consideration”); JANS & VEDDER, supra note 157, at 43 
(detailing how measures taken under the precautionary principle should be proportional to the 
chosen level of protection). 
179. See Joss, supra note 16, at 147 (explaining how risk assessment is necessary under 
the precautionary principle); General Principles and Requirements of Food Law Regulation, 
supra note 177, art. 6 (describing the necessity of risk assessment). 
180. See JANS & VEDDER, supra note 157, at 44 (detailing the viewpoint of the Court of 
Justice of what constitutes a correct application of the precautionary principle); see also infra 
Section II.B.3 (setting forth the parameters for the precautionary principle as set forth by the 
Commission). 
181. See Ruby R. Fernandez, Monsanto And The Requirement For Real Risks In GM 
Food Regulation, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 335, 338 (2006) (detailing how risk 
assessments must be conducted on real, perceived risks and not hypothetical risks); JANS & 
VEDDER, supra note 157, at 44 (highlighting the need for risk assessment to be conducted on 
real risks as opposed to hypothetical risks). 
182. See JANS & VEDDER, supra note 157, at 45 (explaining the prohibition of justifying 
action based on a hypothetical risk); Fernandez, supra note 181, at 345 (discussing the 
requirements of the precautionary principle); Claudio Mereu, Schizophrenic Stakes of GMO 
Regulation in the European Union, 3 EUR. J. RISK REG. 202, 207 (2012) (explaining how a 
complete risk assessment must be conducted before a Member State can impose a ban). 
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3. The Precautionary Principle As Explained By The Commission 
As discussed by the Commission of the European Communities 
in its Communication on the Precautionary Principle, the issue on 
when and how to use the precautionary principle is a contentious 
topic and has led to some mixed views concerning the principle.183 
Through the Commission Communication, the Commission outlined 
its approach to using the precautionary principle and established 
guidelines for its application.184 The Commission desired to craft a 
common understanding on how to manage risks that have not been 
fully evaluated by science and to avoid the use of the principle as a 
disguised form of protectionism.185 Within this approach, the 
precautionary principle should be considered within a structured 
approach to risk analysis, which is made up of risk assessment, risk 
management, and risk communication.186 The precautionary principle 
is specifically relevant to the management of risk.187 In this risk 
analysis, the precautionary principle should be resorted to when 
potentially dangerous effects of a phenomenon, process, or product 
have been identified and the risk cannot be determined with sufficient 
certainty under a scientific evaluation.188 Specifically, the 
precautionary principle is only relevant in the situation of a potential 
risk, even if the risk is not fully demonstrable because of insufficient 
or inclusive scientific data.189 In order to determine if measures are 
necessary to protect human, animal, or plant health, as well as the 
environment, an evaluation of the potential negative effects using 
available data is required.190 The Commission Communication gives 
guidance on how to perform this evaluation.191 Determining what is 
an acceptable level of risk for society and what an appropriate 
                                                                                                                         
 
183. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission 
on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000) 1 Final [hereinafter Commission 
Communication]. 
184. Id. at 2, ¶ 1. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 2, ¶ 4. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 3, ¶ 4. 
189. Id. at 13, ¶ 5.1. 
190. Id. at 13, ¶ 5.1.2.  
191. Id. at 13-15. 
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response might be are both political determinations.192 Those making 
these political determinations may either adopt measures to respond 
or decide to do nothing in response and leave things status quo.193 
According to the Commission Communication, once action is 
deemed necessary, measures taken based on the precautionary 
principle should be (1) proportional to the chosen level of protection, 
(2) non-discriminatory in their application, (3) consistent with similar 
measures already taken, (4) based on an examination of the potential 
benefits and costs of action or lack of action, (5) subject to review in 
light of new scientific data, and (6) capable of assigning responsibility 
for producing the scientific evidence necessary for a more 
comprehensive risk assessment.194 Particularly important is the 
proportionality requirement, as a total ban of something may be the 
only possible response to a certain risk, but also may not be 
proportional to a potential risk in every case.195 
4. The Precautionary Principle & Monsanto 
In Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA v. Presidenza del Consiglio 
dei Ministri, the European Court of Justice (“Court of Justice”) 
closely examined the application of the precautionary principle and 
how the principle can be used to justify Member State actions.196 At 
the time of this case, genetically modified foods and food derived 
from GMOs were regulated as novel foods and had to be authorized 
under the Novel Foods Regulation (described in more detail later in 
this Note).197 Under the second recital of the Novel Foods Regulation, 
a simplified procedure existed for the authorization of foodstuffs that 
were produced from GMOs but did not contain them in the final 
product.198 All that was required under this simplified procedure was 
                                                                                                                         
 
192. Id. at 15, ¶ 5.2.1. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 3, ¶ 5. 
195. Id. 
196. Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei 
Ministri and Others v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministi and Others, Case C-236/01 [2003] 
E.C.R. I-8166. 
197. See Council Regulation No 258/97/EC Of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 January 1997 Concerning Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients, 1997 O.J. L 
43/1 [hereinafter Novel Foods Regulation]. 
198. Id. recital 2. 
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notification to the Commission.199 This procedure could be used when 
the products were substantially equivalent to similar conventional 
foods with regard to their intended use, composition, nutritional 
value, and the level of undesirable substances contained within 
them.200 
Between December 1997 and October 1998, Monsanto and other 
companies submitted three notifications to the Commission under the 
simplified procedure for food produced from different genetically 
modified maize lines on the market.201 Along with the notifications 
was an opinion of the UK scientific assessment body that found that 
the products at issue were substantially equivalent to traditional maize 
and safe for use in food, such as corn flour.202 Italy objected several 
times about the use of the simplified procedure to the Commission, 
arguing that the products were not substantially equivalent to their 
traditional counterparts.203 Despite the correspondence with the 
Commission, Italy adopted a Decree based on the safeguard clause of 
the Novel Foods Regulation that suspended the trading and use of 
certain transgenic products within its national territory.204 Under this 
safeguard clause, a Member State could temporarily restrict or 
suspend the trade in and use of a food or food ingredient in question 
in its territory if it had detailed grounds for considering it to endanger 
human health or the environment based on new information or a 
reassessment of existing information.205 The Commission responded 
by consulting with the Scientific Committee on Food in accordance 
with Article 11 of the Novel Foods Regulation to inspect the opinions 
submitted by Italy when it objected to the simplified procedure.206 
The Scientific Committee on Food found that Italy’s information did 
not provide specific scientific grounds for considering that the use of 
the novel foods in question endangered human health.207 While the 
                                                                                                                         
 
199. Id. art. 3, at 4 (setting forth the simplified procedure). 
200. Id. 
201. Monsanto, supra note 196, at ¶ 18. 
202. Id. ¶ 19. 
203. Id. ¶ 32-33. 
204. Id. ¶ 31. 
205. Id.; Novel Foods Regulation, supra note 197, art. 12, at 1 (providing the safeguard 
clause). 
206. Monsanto, supra note 196, ¶ 34. 
207. Id. ¶ 35. 
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Commission presented a draft decision contesting the Italian decree to 
the Standing Committee on Foodstuffs, the Commission did not go to 
a formal vote (largely because of the de facto moratorium on GMOs 
that was ongoing in the European Union).208 Companies such as 
Monsanto challenged the Italian Decree before the Tribunale 
amministrativo regionale del Lazio (“TAR”).209 They claimed that it 
violated Community law and that Italy inadequately relied on the 
safeguard clause under Article 12 of the Novel Foods Regulation.210 
The TAR stayed its proceedings and referred questions to the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling concerning the invoking of the 
safeguard clause, the validity of the simplified procedure, and 
whether a GMO-derived novel food could be regulated by the 
simplified procedure as substantially equivalent.211 
The court held that under Article 12 of the Novel Foods 
Regulation, Member States could not submit a general risk 
assessment.212 Rather, a Member State could only meet the burden of 
proof if it relied on the evidence that showed the existence of a 
specific risk of the novel food at question.213 Additionally, the 
safeguard clause was interpreted as giving specific expression to the 
precautionary principle and, as such, the application of the clause was 
required to have “due regard to this principle.”214 Under the 
precautionary principle, when there is uncertainty about the existence 
or amount or risk to human health, protective measures can be taken 
without having to wait for the reality and seriousness of such risks to 
become fully apparent.215 Thus, under Article 12 of the Novel Foods 
Regulation and the precautionary principle, protective measures could 
be taken even if it was impossible to carry out a full risk assessment 
with respect to a specific food because of the inadequate nature of the 
available scientific data.216 However, the court specifically held that 
                                                                                                                         
 
208. Id. ¶¶ 35-37 
209. Id. ¶¶ 40, 48 (explaining the procedural history and giving the questions posed by 
TAR). 
210. Id. ¶¶ 44-49. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. ¶ 108. 
213. Id. ¶ 109. 
214. Id. ¶ 110. 
215. Id. ¶ 111. 
216. Id. ¶ 112. 
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under the safeguard clause, protective measures could not be adopted 
based on a purely hypothetical approach to risk.217 Under the clause, a 
Member State had to perform a risk assessment that was complete as 
possible and find that the implementation of such measures was 
necessary to ensure that novel foods did not present a danger to the 
consumer.218 
Ultimately, the court rejected Italy’s argument that the simplified 
procedure resulted in a relaxation of the safety requirements for novel 
foods that had been justified as substantially equivalent.219 This, the 
court reasoned, was because there were many other procedures within 
Community law to ensure the safety of novel foods, such as the 
Safeguard Clause and re-assessment of the status of a GMO product 
at the Community level.220 The court also found that the simplified 
procedure complied with the idea of proportionality.221 
5. The Precautionary Principle & Commission v. Denmark 
The fundamental ideas behind the precautionary principle were 
demonstrated by the Court of Justice in Commission v. Denmark, 
when Denmark partly relied on the principle to support its 
administrative practice that only allowed enriched foodstuffs lawfully 
produced or marketed in other Member States to be marketed in 
Denmark if it was shown that the nutritional enrichment met a need in 
the Danish population.222 The Court of Justice found that the Danish 
administrative practice violated Article 28 EC, which prohibits any 
quantitative restrictions on imports between Member States and all 
measures having equivalent effect.223 The court addressed whether the 
administrative practice could be justified on the basis of Article 30 
EC, which allowed for a trade restriction if this would protect human 
                                                                                                                         
 
217. Id. ¶ 106. 
218. Id. ¶ 114. The court also addressed whether the novel foods at issue could be 
considered substantially equivalent to their traditional counterparts and what precludes a 
finding of substantial equivalence. However, this discussion will not be addressed by this 
Note. 
219. Id. ¶ 80. 
220. See generally id. ¶ 130-32. 
221. Id. 
222. See Commission v. Denmark, Case C-192/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-9724, ¶ 1 (describing 
the factual background of the actions that led to the case). 
223. Id. ¶ 39, 41. 
666 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
health.224 The Court of Justice held that depending on any 
uncertainties in modern scientific research, it is up to the Member 
States to decide their level of protection for human health and life.225 
Furthermore, it is up to the Member State’s discretion as to require 
prior authorization for the marketing of foodstuffs, subject to 
considering the requirements of free movement of goods within the 
Community.226 The Court of Justice determined that within this 
discretion, Member States have to comply with the principle of 
proportionality.227 This means that the methods chosen by such a 
Member State have to be restricted to what is actually necessary to 
protect public health and also that such protection cannot be attained 
by means less restrictive of Community trade.228 Under the strict 
exception under Article 30 EC to the rule of free movement of goods 
within the Community, a Member State is required to show that its 
rules are necessary and that the marketing of the product is a risk to 
public health, in light of national nutritional habits and international 
scientific research.229 The Court of Justice stated that the decision to 
prohibit marketing can only be adopted if the most current scientific 
data sufficiently established the real risk.230 
In examining Denmark’s administrative action, the Court of 
Justice clearly stated that “ . . . a proper application of the 
precautionary principle presupposes, in the first place, the 
identification of the potentially negative consequences for health of 
the proposed addition of nutrients, and, secondly, a comprehensive 
risk assessment of the risk to health based on the most reliable 
scientific data available and the most recent results of international 
research.”231 The Court of Justice went further and addressed the 
permissible justification of action based on the precautionary 
principle and ruled that “where it proves to be impossible to 
determine with certainty the existence or extent of the alleged risk 
because of the insufficiency, inconclusiveness, or imprecision of the 
                                                                                                                         
 
224. Id. ¶ 42. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. ¶ 45. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. ¶ 46. 
230. Id. ¶ 48. 
231. Id. ¶ 51. 
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results of studies conducted, but the likelihood of real harm to public 
health persists should the risk materialise, the precautionary principle 
justifies the adoption of restrictive measures.”232 The Court of Justice 
also added that such measures are not allowed unless they are 
objective and non-discriminatory.233 Ultimately, the Court of Justice 
found that the Danish administrative practice was disproportionate 
since it prohibited the marketing of foodstuffs with added vitamins 
and minerals without distinguishing among different vitamins and 
minerals added or according to the level of risk that their addition 
may pose to public health.234 
6. The 1990 Deliberate Release Directive 
As previously discussed, provisions for Community policy on 
the environment were provided in Article 130r of the SEA in 1987.235 
As these measures were in effect until 1993, the Council adopted the 
1990 Deliberate Release Directive consistent with these provisions as 
well the precautionary principle.236 As a Directive, the 1990 
Deliberate Release Directive was binding on all Member States.237 
But Member States had the ability to choose the forms and methods 
used to implement the Directive.238 Applicable to all GMOs, this 
Directive pertained to then-modern biotechnology techniques, such as 
microinjection of foreign genetic material and cell fusion that does 
                                                                                                                         
 
232. Id. ¶ 52. 
233. Id. ¶ 53. 
234. Id. ¶ 55. 
235. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text (discussing the environmental 
policy under SEA). 
236. See Ruth MacKenzie & Silvia Francescon, The Regulation of Genetically Modified 
Foods In The European Union: An Overview, 8 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 530, 533 (1999-2000) 
(arguing that while the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive does not specifically mention the 
precautionary principle, the approach taken in the Directive “ . . . is consistent with a 
precautionary approach insofar as the Directive as a whole addresses the uncertain nature and 
the extent of risks to the environment and human health associated with the use and release of 
GMOs.”); Mereu, supra note 182, at 205 (articulating that the 1990 Deliberate Release 
Directive was based on the precautionary principle). 
237. See 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150, art. 23, at 1 (requiring 
Member States to bring laws, regulations, and administrative provisions necessary to comply 
with the Directive into force before October 23, 1991). 
238. See 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150; see also Francer, supra 
note 56, at 278 (stating that the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive was binding on all Member 
States as a directive). 
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not occur from natural processes.239 In order to comply with the 1990 
Deliberate Release Directive, Member States were required to pass 
conforming legislation within eighteen months.240 The first part of 
this Directive was a premarket notification, in which a manufacturer 
wishing to place a food containing a GMO into the market was 
required to submit a notification to the “competent authority” of the 
Member State where the GMO would be released.241 It required the 
manufacturer to include in its notification information that was 
necessary to evaluate any immediate or delayed foreseeable risks that 
the GMO may have posed to human health or the environment.242 
Thus, while the FDA relies on manufacturers of GMO products to 
ensure that their products comply with the agency’s safety standards, 
the European Union required that the manufacturer provide the 
information necessary for a proper third-party risk assessment.243 
Some of the required notification data included methods used for 
modification, allergencity, antibiotic resistance, and potential for 
genetic transfer and exchange with other organisms.244 
                                                                                                                         
 
239. See 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150, art. 2, at 2 (defining 
“genetically modified organism (GMO)”); Francer, supra note 56, at 279 (detailing the broad 
scope of the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive). 
240. See 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150, art. 23 (setting forth the 
time span in which the Member States had to pass legislation in order to conform with the 
Directive as eighteen months); Francer, supra note 56, at 279 (stating the eighteen-month 
deadline for Member States under the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive). 
241. See 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150, art. 5, at 1 (mandating the 
notification for manufacturers to be submitted to the competent authority of the Member State 
where the GMO would be released); Francer, supra note 56, at 280 (introducing the premarket 
notification under the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive). 
242. See 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150, art. 5, at 2(a) (setting forth 
the requirements of the notification with respect to risk assessment); Francer, supra note 56, at 
279-80 (setting forth the requirements of the notification with respect to risk assessment). 
243. See Francer, supra note 56, at 279-80 (describing the independent risk assessment 
conducted by the competent authority of the Member State that received the notification); see 
also 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150, annex II (some of the required 
notification data included methods used for modification, allergencity, antibiotic resistance, 
and potential for genetic transfer and exchange with other organisms). See generally Terrence 
P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, Policy in Flux: The European Union’s Laws on Agricultural 
Biotechnology and Their Effects on International Trade, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 243 (1999) 
(giving an overview of the foundation of the EU regulatory system).  
244. See 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150, annex II; Francer, supra 
note 56, at 280 (discussing the required notification data). 
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The second part of this Directive required review by the 
competent authority in the Member State.245 After the competent 
authority of a Member State received a GMO notification, it had to 
submit a summary of the notification to the European Commission, 
which was responsible for immediately giving the summary to the 
competent authorities of each Member State.246 Within ninety days, 
the Member State that received the notification from the manufacturer 
could either approve or reject the notification.247 As part of this 
review, the competent authority in the Member State was required to 
determine if the notification fulfilled the requirements under the 1990 
Deliberate Release Directive, while giving particular attention to the 
environmental risk assessment.248 If the competent authority found 
that introducing the GMO into the environment was too high of a risk 
to human health and the environment, it was allowed to reject the 
application for use in the European Union.249 However, if it found that 
the release of the GMO into the environment would be safe to human 
health and the environment, it was required to send the dossier of 
notification and its recommendation to the Commission and other 
Member States.250 
Under the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, GMO labeling 
was not required.251 While Article 11.1 stated that the notifying party 
must include a proposal for labeling or packaging a product approved 
for the market, it also clearly indicated that the party could also 
choose not to comply with one or more of the labeling rules.252 
                                                                                                                         
 
245. See 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150, art. 5, at 1 (setting forth the 
notification procedure); Francer, supra note 56, at 280 (explaining that manufacturers needed 
to provide the competent authority in the Member State where the GMO would be released). 
246. See 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150, art. 9, at 1-2 (requiring the 
creation and distribution of the summary). 
247. See id. art. 6, at 2 (stating what the Member State that received the notification 
could do). 
248. See id. art. 12, at 1 (describing what the Member State had to do with respect to the 
notification). 
249. See id. art. 12 (explaining how a competent authority could reject the application for 
use in the European Union). 
250. See id. 
251. See id. art. 11, at 1 (detailing the procedure for labeling GMOs); Stewart & 
Johanson, supra note 243, at 258 (stating that GMO labeling was not mandated under the 1990 
Deliberate Release Directive). 
252. See 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150, art. 11, at 1 (explaining 
how applicants could propose not to comply with the labeling requirements in Annex III.B); 
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According to the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, after approval of 
a GMO notification, other Member States had sixty days to object to 
the GMO being introduced into the environment.253 If no such 
objection was made, then the Member State that reviewed the 
notification would give written consent to the use of the GMO.254 If a 
Member State did object within the sixty days and the competent 
authorities of the two Member States could not reach an agreement, 
the Commission was responsible for deciding whether to consent to 
the use of the GMO through a procedure under Article 21.255 
The Commission was then required to draft and submit a 
proposal to a Committee made up of representatives from the Member 
States for review.256 If the measures were in accordance with the 
opinion of the Committee, then the Commission would adopt the 
measures.257 However, the Commission had to forward the proposal 
to the Council if they were not in accordance with the opinion of the 
Committee or if the Committee did not give an opinion.258 The 
Council would then vote on the measures, either rejecting them 
unanimously or endorsing them by a qualified majority.259 The 
Commission had to adopt the proposed measures if the Council failed 
to vote upon the proposal within three months.260 If the Commission 
adopted the proposed measures, then the Member State that initially 
received the notification was required to consent to the placing of the 
                                                                                                                         
 
see also Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 258 (explaining the labeling aspects of the 
1990 Deliberate Release Directive). 
253. See 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150, art. 13, at 2 (giving 
instructions if no Member States objected within sixty days). 
254. See id. (explaining how written consent was given if no Member States objected); 
Francer, supra note 56, at 280-81 (explaining the procedure if no Member States objected 
within sixty days). 
255. See 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150, art. 13, at 3 (explaining the 
role of the Commission in this situation); see also Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243 
(describing the protocol under the Directive when the competent authorities of two Member 
States could not come to an agreement). 
256. See 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150, art. 21 (describing the 
responsibility of the Commission). 
257. See id. (setting forth the action to be taken if the measures were in accordance with 
the opinion of the Committee). 
258. See id. (explaining what the Commission was required to do in this situation). 
259. See id. (putting forward the voting requirements). 
260. See id. (describing what the Commission would do if the Council did not vote 
within three months). 
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GMO onto the market in writing and to notify other Member States of 
its consent.261 After the initial Member State consented to the 
marketing of the GMO, it may have been used in the European Union 
without any further notification required and Member States could not 
“restrict or impede” the placing on the market of products containing 
or consisting of GMOs that comply with the 1990 Deliberate Release 
Directive.262 
While Member States could not prevent an approved GMO from 
being placed on the market, Article 16 of the Directive provided an 
important exception to this rule that proved to be a problem in 
1997.263 Even if a product has been approved for the market under the 
1990 Deliberate Release Directive, a Member State could 
provisionally restrict the product from its borders if it had justifiable 
reasons to believe that the GMO posed risks to human health or the 
environment.264 If a Member State chose to restrict the product under 
Article 16, it was required to notify the Commission and the other 
Member States.265 Within three months, the Commission was required 
to make a decision concerning the State’s action under procedures set 
out in Article 21.266 This created a significant loophole for the 
Member States to restrict approved GMOs in their territories.267 This 
proved to be a significant international problem in 1998, when a de 
facto moratorium on GMOs occurred in the European Union and 
significant reform was undertaken that resulted in the current GMO 
regulatory system of the European Union.268 
                                                                                                                         
 
261. See id. art. 20 (explaining the notification process once the Commission adopted the 
proposed measures). 
262. See id. (detailing the conditions of the use of the approved GMO). 
263. See id. art. 16, at 1 (providing the Safeguard Clause of the Directive). 
264. Id. (explaining under what conditions a Member State could restrict an approved 
GMO from its territory). 
265. Id. 
266. See id. art. 16, at 2 (giving the procedures for the Commission to follow). 
267. See Mereu, supra note 182, at 206 (explaining how several Member States relied on 
the Safeguard Clause under Article 16 in order to refuse the implementation of the 
authorization of a particular GMO); MacKenzie & Franceson, supra note 236, at 538-39 
(detailing Article 16 and how it was used by several Member States in 1997). 
268. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 261-62 (discussing the crisis in the 
European Union when certain Member States used this loophole to ban approved Bt-maize 
from their territories in 1997); Mereu, supra note 182, at 206 (explaining this part of the 1990 
Deliberate Release Directive). 
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In the years following the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, the 
Commission indicated that the European Union was lagging in 
biotechnology advancements and progress in the 1992 White Paper 
on Growth, Competiveness, and Employment and the 1994 
Communication on Biotechnology.269 In 1996, a review conducted by 
the Commission called for reform to the EU regulatory system, 
including more streamlined approval procedures for GMOs that posed 
a lower or nonexistent risk and a possible reform to the labeling 
requirements under the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive.270 In 1996, 
the President of the Commission expressed concerns over a lack of 
competition in the European Union and the trend of European 
companies that were seeking to invest in places outside of the 
European Union.271 In fact, much of these remarks included 
comparisons of the European Union to the United States and concerns 
over the United States’ advantage in the field of biotechnology.272 
In 1997, France sent a favorable opinion on the approval of a 
GMO product named Bt-maize to the Commission, which then 
received objections from Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Italy, 
and Sweden after it forwarded the notification to the other Member 
                                                                                                                         
 
269. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 263-64 (analyzing the viewpoint of the 
Commission that greatly contrasted public opinion at the time concerning the need for more 
involvement in the advancement of biotechnology); see also DAVID BISSONNETTE, IT’S ALL 
ABOUT NUTRITION: SAVING THE HEALTH OF AMERICANS 162 (2013) (explaining the hostile 
public opinion towards genetic engineering during 1997); MacKenzie & Francescon, supra 
note 236, at 530-31 (discussing the unpopular views of the Commission that biotechnology 
was a key for future competitive development and the expressed concern of the Commission 
regarding the European Union’s lack of involvement in the field). 
270. See Commission Press Release, IP 96/1148 (Dec. 10, 1996); Stewart & Johanson, 
supra note 243, at 263-64 (discussing the Commission’s position on the EU GMO regulatory 
system in 1996). 
271. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 264 (quoting the President of the 
Commission’s statement concerning the position of the European Union in the biotechnology 
sector and the trend of European companies investing outside of the European Union). See 
generally MacKenzie & Francescon, supra note 236, at 530-31 (discussing the general 
concerns about the negative impacts of EU avoidance of biotechnology). 
272. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 264-65 (describing some of the 
comparisons made with respect to biotechnology). See generally MacKenzie & Francescon, 
supra note 236, at 530-31 (highlighting the concerns of the Commission that involvement in 
biotechnology would determine if Community industries would remain world leaders in 
developing products that were innovative). 
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States.273 Under the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, the 
Commission sought the opinion of the Regulatory Committee on the 
Commission’s draft decision, which wanted consent to put the 
product on the market for all uses.274 Many Member States that 
opposed the drafted proposal were concerned with the fact that the 
proposal did not include labeling the product as a GMO.275 They were 
also worried about the long-term environmental risks that the GMO 
product might cause.276 After the Regulatory Committee did not 
approve the draft decision due to the lack of a qualified majority, it 
sent a proposal to the Council under Article 21 of the 1990 Deliberate 
Release Directive for it to decide whether the GMO maize would be 
allowed on the market.277 According to this proposal, no label would 
be required if the GMO was not a threat to humans or the 
environment.278 
                                                                                                                         
 
273. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 260-61 (explaining the favorable 
opinion sent by France to the Commission and listing the Member States who had objected to 
the proposal). See generally Association Greenpeace France and Others v. Ministère de 
l’Agriculture et de la Pêche and Others, Case C-9/99 [2000] E.C.R. I-1676 (providing a 
summary of these developments); Commission Decision No. 97/98/EC (Zea mays L.), 1997 
O.J. L 31/69 (giving a history). 
274. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 261 (detailing how the Commission 
sought the opinion of the Regulatory Committee); EXPLORING CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE’S BIOTECHNOLOGY LANDSCAPE 189 (Peter T. Robbins & Farah Huzair eds., 2011) 
(discussing this Committee and its role). 
275. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 261-62 (explaining the expressed 
concerns of the Member States); MARIA LEE, EU REGULATION OF GMOS: LAW AND 
DECISION MAKING FOR A NEW TECHNOLOGY 2 (Han Somsen ed., 2008) (discussing these 
attitudes). 
276. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 261-62 (detailing the environmental 
concerns of several Member States); Lee, supra note 275, at 2 (highlighting the Member 
States’ arguments concerning the environment). 
277. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243 (detailing the actions of the Commission); 
EXPLORING CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE’S BIOTECHNOLOGY LANDSCAPE, supra note 
274, at 189 (explaining that after the Article 21 committee of representatives of the Member 
States failed to reach a majority opinion, the Commission took the decision to the European 
Environment Council). 
278. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243 (describing the proposal); EXPLORING 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE’S BIOTECHNOLOGY LANDSCAPE, supra note 274, at 189 
(explaining that after the Article 21 committee of representatives of the Member States failed 
to reach a majority opinion, the Commission took the decision to the European Environment 
Council). 
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Before the three-month deadline ended, Austria brought new 
information concerning the safety of the Bt-maize.279 A month before 
the deadline, the Commission decided to have three scientific 
committees review the new information.280 Upon review, all three 
committees gave favorable opinions concerning the proposal that 
denied the presence of risk to humans, the environment, or animals.281 
After the favorable opinions were released, the Commission adopted 
Commission Decision 97/98/EC and France was allowed to place the 
GMO on the market without requiring labeling of the product as 
genetically modified.282 
The beginning of this movement towards further approval of 
GMOs was not accepted well by the public in 1997, as public 
opposition to GMOs remained significantly high.283 Additionally, not 
all bodies of the European Union were in agreement with the approval 
decision, as the Parliament issued a resolution that heavily opposed 
the Commission for not considering new scientific evidence on the 
risks posed by the GMO and for acting in the face of disapproval of 
most Member States and the Parliament.284 Specifically, the 
Parliament demanded that the authorization procedure be reopened 
and that the procedures to authorize GMOs be revised in order to 
                                                                                                                         
 
279. See Commission Press Release, IP/98/358 (Apr. 16, 1998) (discussing the 
information submitted by Austria concerning the safety of this GMO); Stewart & Johanson, 
supra note 243 (explaining Austria’s actions). 
280. See Commission Press Release, IP/98/358 (Apr. 16, 1998) (explaining how the 
Commission responded to the actions of Austria by requesting the opinion of the three 
Scientific Committees); Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243 (detailing this development). 
281. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243 (discussing the opinions regarding the 
proposal); Zea mays L., 1997 O.J. 31/69 (explaining the conclusions of the Commission that 
there was no reason to believe that the maize would adversely affect human health or the 
environment). 
282. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 263 (discussing the approval of the Bt-
maize in 1997); THE YEAR IN TRADE (1997): OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
PROGRAM, 49TH REPORT 104 (Arona Butcher ed., 1997) (stating that in 1996, the Commission 
authorized the sale of a particular strain of corn that was genetically modified). 
283. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 263-71 (discussing the contentious 
response to the Commission’s actions and the belief that the European Union should take a 
larger role in the advancement of biotechnology); see also BISSONNETTE, supra note 269, at 
162 (stating that during 1997, there was an uneasiness among Europeans and that public 
opinion in the European Union rose against GM crops with protests becoming more common). 
284. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 265-66 (detailing the Parliament’s 
scathing reaction to the Commission); Lee, supra note 275, at 2 (stating that the Commission 
authorized the product despite a European Parliament resolution against authorization). 
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mirror the clear opinions of the Member States and the Parliament.285 
Instead of responding to the Parliament’s resolution, the 
Commission’s spokesman dismissed the thought of suspending the 
Bt-maize from the market unless new scientific evidence was 
presented on the product’s dangers and stated that the Parliament’s 
resolution was based on factual errors.286 
Because Member States were allowed to object to the placement 
of approved GMOs on the market under the 1990 Deliberate Release 
Directive, a crisis erupted when several Member States refused to 
implement the authorization.287 Under Article 16 of the Directive, 
Austria issued a decree that prohibited the marketing of Bt-maize in 
its borders because it believed research that showed that an antibiotic-
resistant gene named ampicillin could be passed to animals and 
humans through the Bt-maize.288 Citing the same reasons, 
Luxembourg also banned the GMO product shortly after.289 In an 
attempt to solve this issue, the Commission proposed a “fast-track” 
procedure to require labeling by amending the 1990 Deliberate 
Release Directive. The 1997 Adapting Directive altered Annex III of 
the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive to require labeling of products 
that contained GMOs.290 The Directive also stated that if GMO 
                                                                                                                         
 
285. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 265-66 (quoting the Parliament’s 
resolution); Lee, supra note 275, at 2 (summarizing the reaction of the Parliament). 
286. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 266 (explaining how the Commission 
did not change its trajectory in response to the Parliament’s resolution). See generally Lee, 
supra note 275, at 2 (describing how the Commission continued with the authorization despite 
the Parliament resolution against authorization). 
287. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 266 (analyzing the response of several 
Member States to prohibit the marketing of Bt-maize in their territories); THE YEAR IN TRADE, 
supra note 282 (explaining how Austria, France, Italy, and Luxembourg announced bans on 
the planting and use of genetically modified corn and how some Member States eventually 
lifted their bans in the fall of 1997). 
288. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 266 (outlining Austria’s response to the 
authorization of Bt-maize); THE YEAR IN TRADE, supra note 282, at 104 n.180 (stating that 
Austria banned Bt-maize after it was authorized). 
289. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 267 (explaining how Luxembourg 
similarly reacted to the approval of Bt-maize); THE YEAR IN TRADE, supra note 282, at 104 
n.180 (stating that Luxembourg was one of the Member States that banned Bt-maize). 
290. See Commission Directive 97/35/EC Adapting to Technical Progress For the 
Second Time Council Directive 90/220/EEC On The Deliberate Release Into The Environment 
Of Genetically Modified Organisms, 1997 O.J. L 169/72 (hereinafter 1997 Adapting 
Directive); Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 270-71 (describing the adoption and 
content of the 1997 Adapting Directive). 
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products placed in the market were mixed with non-GMO products, it 
was sufficient to state the possibility that GMOs may be present in 
such products.291 
Despite attempts to change the authorization procedure, a de 
facto moratorium occurred in the European Union, as no new GMOs 
were authorized in the European Union and no new GMOs were 
placed on the market until 2004.292 When the United States, Canada, 
and Argentina brought cases against the European Union in the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”), the WTO panel declared that the 
European Union unacceptably delayed processing GMO applications 
by the members and that the moratorium could not continue because 
it conflicted with the European Union’s international commitments.293 
In the midst of these upheavals, the European Union formed the three-
part GMO regulatory system still used today, made up of the 2001 
Deliberate Release Directive, the Genetically Modified Food and 
Feed Regulation, and the Traceability and Labeling Regulation.294 
                                                                                                                         
 
291. See 1997 Adapting Directive, supra note 290, Annex III(C) (explaining how to deal 
with this possible mix); Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 269-70 (explaining the 
requirements under the 1997 Adapting Directive). 
292. See BALANCING BETWEEN TRADE AND RISK 109 (Marjolrin B.A. van Asslet, 
Esther Versluis, & Ellen Vos eds., 2013) (explaining how the Member States suspended all 
authorizations of GMOs and imposed a de facto moratorium “. . . until the framework could be 
reformed in such a way as to apply stricter rules, in particular on the labeling and traceability 
of GMOs”); Mereu, supra note 182, at 207 (explaining how the de facto moratorium ensued in 
1998, leading there to be no new GMOs placed on the market again until 2004). 
293. See generally Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting the 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS291/R (adopted Sept. 9, 
2006); Meureu, supra note 143, at 206-07 (detailing how the WTO found that the de facto 
moratorium was not compatible with the international commitments of the European Union); 
Andrea L. Stephenson, Germany’s Ban Of Monsanto’s Genetically Modified Maize 
(MON810): A Violation Of International Law, 2 TRADE L. & DEV. 292, 300 (2010) (analyzing 
how the WTO dispute panel decided that the European Union breached its legal obligations 
under the WTO with its unacceptable delay of processing GMO applications by the Members). 
294. See David E. Sella-Villa, Gently Modified Operations: How Environmental 
Concerns Addressed Through Customs Procedures Can Successfully Resolve the US-EU GMO 
Dispute, 33 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 971, 982-83 (2008-2009) (summarizing the 
current regulatory system in the European Union made up of these measures); Carrau, supra 
note 21, at 1185-86 (outlining the European Union’s GMO regulatory system). 
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7. The 2001 Deliberate Release Directive 
After realizing many problems associated with the 1990 
Deliberate Release Directive, the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union repealed it and replaced it with the 
2001 Deliberate Release Directive.295 This Directive applies to all 
attempts to grow or sell GMOs in the European Union, except those 
with a strict scientific purpose, and thus covers placing GMO 
products or products containing GMOs on the market within the 
European Union.296 The precautionary principle is heavily 
emphasized throughout the document.297 
The Directive states that in order to protect human health and 
environmental demands, a state regulatory agency must control risks 
that may come from deliberately releasing GMOs into the 
environment, especially because their effects may irreversibly and 
adversely affect the environment of neighboring Member States.298 In 
Article 1, the Directive states that in accordance with the 
precautionary principle, the objective of the Directive is to 
approximate the laws and regulations of the Member States and to 
protect human health and the environment.299 Prior to a deliberate 
release of a GMO into the environment, a “case-by-case” 
environmental risk assessment must always be conducted that 
considers the potential cumulative long-term effects of the interaction 
of the GMO with the environment.300 More importantly, this 
environmental risk assessment is to be made based on independent 
                                                                                                                         
 
295. See generally 2001 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 151; Fernandez, supra 
note 181, at 339 (stating that the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive was amended in 2001 and 
renamed Directive 2001/18/EC). 
296. See 2001 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 151, art. 2, at 4 (defining 
“placing on the market” and listing the three operations that were not to be regarded as 
“placing on the market”); Sella-Villa, supra note 294, at 986 (explaining the scope of the 2001 
Deliberate Release Directive). 
297. See 2001 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 151, recital 8 (stating that the 
precautionary principle was taken into account when the Directive was being drafted and must 
be taken into account when implementing it). 
298. See id. recital 4 (noting the possibly irreversible effects of GMOs). 
299. See id. art. 1 (detailing the objective of the Directive). 
300. See id. art. 19 (setting out the idea that a case-by-case environmental risk 
assessment should always be carried out before a release and how this assessment should 
appropriately consider the potential cumulative long-term effects associated with the 
interactions with other GMOs and the environment). 
678 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
scientific advice through a common methodology, rather than the 
patchwork system consisting of independent Member State actions 
that had been created under the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive.301 
Part B of this Directive applies to the deliberate release of 
GMOs for any other purpose than for placing on the market, while 
Part C covers the placing on the market of GMOs as or in products.302 
Because this Directive applies to both the release and the placing on 
the market of products containing GMOs, this Directive applies to 
both the farming of GMOs and the importation of such products.303 
Furthermore, independent researchers should be given access to all 
relevant material when the Commission is considering a GMO for 
approval.304 The Directive also indicates that a step-by-step system 
must be applied to the GMO approval process, in which a specific 
GMO becomes systematically less contained when evaluations show 
that its release does not threaten human health and the environment.305 
Furthermore, the Directive asserts that every GMO being considered 
for placement on the market must have undergone satisfactory field 
testing in the ecosystems that could be affected by its release.306 For 
purposes of this Note, Part C will be discussed to demonstrate the 
approval process for GMOs for the purpose of placing them on the 
market.307 
While the Directive does not apply to organisms that have been 
obtained through certain GE techniques that have conventionally been 
used and have a long safety record, it does set out a very specific 
                                                                                                                         
 
301. See id. recital 20 (describing the necessity of having a common methodology for the 
environmental risk assessment, which is based on independent scientific advice). 
302. See id. Parts B-C; Margaret Rosso Grossman, Traceability and Labeling Of 
Genetically Modified Crops, Food, and Feed In The European Union, 1 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 
43, 56 (2005) (explaining what is governed by Parts B and C of the 2001 Deliberate Release 
Directive). 
303. See 2001 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 151, art. 1 (describing how the 
Directive applies to both). 
304. See id. (stating that while the Commission is considering a GMO for approval, 
independent researchers should have access to all relevant material). 
305. Id. recital 24 (detailing the step-by-step process). 
306. Id. recital 25 (describing how no GMOs may be considered for placing on the 
market without having gone through a satisfactory field testing at the stage of research and 
development in ecosystems that can be affected by their use). 
307. See infra notes 308-21 and accompanying text (detailing Part C of the 2001 
Deliberate Release Directive). 
2017] GMO LABELING IN THE US AND EU 679 
procedure for approving all remaining GMOs.308 As part of this case-
by-case analysis, an applicant wishing to place a GMO on the market 
must first submit a notification to the national competent authority 
that contains a technical dossier of information that includes a full 
environmental risk assessment and appropriate safety and emergency 
responses.309 As part of this assessment, applicants are required to 
evaluate potential risks to human health and the environment 
associated with the release of the GMOs in question.310 The 
assessment is broad, as it applies to risks that are direct or indirect and 
immediate or delayed.311 Applicants are required to include in their 
application a plan for monitoring the effects and impact of the GMO 
release under Article 13.312 
After the applicant submits the application to the competent 
authority in a Member State, the authority evaluates the notification 
for compliance with the Directive and then makes an independent 
assessment.313 Within sixty days from the date of the circulation of 
the assessment report, a competent authority or the Commission may 
make comments, present reasoned objections to the placing on the 
market of the GMO, and ask for further information.314 The Member 
State’s competent authority that received the notification can either 
reject the application or approve the GMO for entry into the 
                                                                                                                         
 
308. See 2001 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 151, recital 17 (excluding 
organisms that have been obtained through certain genetic modification techniques that have 
been conventionally used in a number of applications and that have a long safety record from 
the Directive). 
309. Id. recitals 32-33 (stating the requirements under the Directive for the notification); 
id. art. 13 (setting forth the specific procedure for this notification). 
310. Id. art. 2, at 8 (defining “environmental risk assessment” and what is required to be 
addressed under this evaluation). 
311. Id.; Paula Rey Garcia, Directive 2001/18/EC on the Deliberate Release into the 
Environment of GMOs: An Overview and the Main Provisions for Placing on the Market, 3 J. 
EUR. ENV’T & PLAN. L. 3, 8 (2006) (explaining the types of risks to be examined during this 
analysis). 
312. See 2001 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 151, art. 13, at 2(e) (stating the 
requirement that applicants include a plan for monitoring the effects and impact of the GMO 
release). 
313. See id. art. 14 (detailing the process for the competent authority once it receives the 
application). 
314. Id. art. 15, at 1 (describing the ability of competent authorities to submit comments 
or reasoned objections, which are circulated to all competent authorities by the Commission). 
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market.315 Under Article 15, if the competent authority approves the 
GMO and there is no reasoned objection from another Member State 
or the Commission within sixty days of the date of circulation of the 
assessment report or if outstanding issues are resolved within the 105 
day period referred to in Paragraph 1, the competent authority is 
required to give written consent and transmit it to the applicant, the 
Member States, and the Commission within thirty days.316 This 
approval for the introduction into the EU market lasts for ten years, 
starting on the date the consent was given.317 The Directive also gives 
specific procedures for the renewal of consent, which include the 
applicant filing an abbreviated notice packet to the competent 
authority of the Member State.318 The competent authority has to 
complete another assessment of the GMO to determine if it should 
remain on the market and must consider the well-reasoned objections 
from other Member States and the Commission.319 Perhaps the most 
important part of this segment of the Directive is the Safeguard 
Provisions, under which any Member State can ban a GMO in its 
territory.320 A Member State can only act under this provision if it has 
new or additional scientific knowledge with detailed grounds for 
believing that an approved GMO constitutes a risk to human health or 
the environment.321 
8. The Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation 
Under the “one door, one key” principle, applicants can a file a 
single application to be authorized for placement on the market as a 
food or feed under the Genetically Modified Food and Feed 
                                                                                                                         
 
315. See id. art. 15, at 2-3 (stating that if the competent authority decides that the GMO 
should not be placed on the market, the notification shall be rejected, and giving the procedure 
for approval by the Member State’s competent authority). 
316. See id. art. 15, at 3 (providing instructions for the competent authority which has 
approved a GMO and has not received a reasoned objection from other Member States or the 
Commission within sixty days after the date of circulation of the assessment report referred to 
in Article 14). 
317. See id. art. 15, at 4 (establishing the ten-year limit on the authorization of a GMO). 
318. See id. art. 17 (detailing the procedure for renewal of consent). 
319. See id. (stating these requirements under the renewal procedure). 
320. See id. art. 23 (providing the Safeguard Clause, which allows Member States to 
refuse to allow future circulation of a GMO in their borders). 
321. See id. at 1 (detailing the only way a Member State can invoke the Safeguard 
Clause). 
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Regulation and for release into the environment under the 2001 
Deliberate Release Directive.322 Relying on the principles of the 2001 
Deliberate Release Directive, the Genetically Modified Food and 
Feed Regulation further refined the application process.323 Under 
Article 3, these requirements apply to (a) GMOs for food use, (b) 
food containing or consisting of GMOs, and (c) food produced from 
or containing ingredients produced from GMOs.324 
According to Article 4 of the Genetically Modified Food and 
Feed Regulation, no person can place any of the products described in 
Article 3 on the market unless the specific product has been 
authorized under the Section and the relevant conditions of the 
authorization are satisfied.325 While applicants are still required to 
submit detailed applications to the competent Member State authority, 
this authority is now required to work with other Member States and 
the European Food Safety Authority (“EFSA”), a body established by 
the General Principles and Requirements of Food Law Regulation.326 
The Member State that has received an application forwards it to the 
EFSA.327 This specialized body reviews each application and sends 
                                                                                                                         
 
322. While the Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation applies to both food and 
foodstuffs, this Note will only be addressing the food authorization requirements governed by 
Chapter II of the Regulation. See Bernd van der Meulen, The EU Regulatory Approach to GM 
Foods, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 286, 307 (2007) (stating that under the “one door one key” 
principle, a single application can be filed to obtain authorization under the 2001 Deliberate 
Release Directive for release into the environment and authorization for placement on the 
market as a food or feed under the Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation); Garcia, 
supra note 311, at 11 (explaining how these applications can be filed under either the 2001 
Deliberate Release Directive and the Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation). 
323. See Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 151, recital 9 
(stating that the new authorization procedures for genetically modified food and feed should 
include the principles introduced in the 2001 Deliberate Release Directive); Grossman, supra 
note 295, at 61 (explaining how the Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation 
incorporates the principles introduced in the 2001 Deliberate Release Directive). 
324. See Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 151, art. 3, at 1 
(explaining what the Section applies to). 
325. See id. art. 4, at 2 (setting forth this requirement). 
326. See id. arts. 3-7 (highlighting the more significant part of the ESFA in the 
regulation of GMOs); Sella-Villa, supra note 294, at 988 (discussing the increased role of the 
EFSA in the EU regulatory system). 
327. See Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 151, art. 5, at 2 
(setting forth the requirements for the competent authority that receives an application under 
this Regulation). 
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the dossier to the other Member States, which are allowed to make 
their own evaluations and give their opinions to the EFSA.328 
It is important to note that the EFSA is not a regulatory authority 
with its own powers, but rather serves as an “independent source of 
advice.”329 As a specialized body, the EFSA is required to make a 
scientific risk assessment that addresses both environmental risks and 
risks to human and animal health safety, which it can do itself or 
assign to a national food assessment body.330 According to the 
Regulation, the EFSA is also required to submit the elements 
necessary to test and validate the method of detection and 
identification of the GMO proposed by the applicant to the 
Community Reference Laboratory, which is aided by the European 
Network of GMO laboratories.331 The Community Reference 
Laboratory is responsible for validating the applicant’s methods for 
detecting and identifying the transformation event in the GMO food, 
as well as the applicant’s data concerning sampling and detection.332 
After receiving a full evaluation report from the Community 
Reference Laboratory, the EFSA publishes the opinion to the public 
within six months of receiving the original application from the 
Member State and sends this opinion to the Commission.333 At this 
time, the public is also allowed to submit opinions to the EFSA on the 
                                                                                                                         
 
328. See id. art. 4, at 2(b) (charging the ESFA with the responsibility of informing the 
Commission and the other Member States about the application). 
329. See Vesco Paskalev, Can Science Tame Politics: The Collapse of the New GMO 
Regime in the EU, 3 EUR. J. RISK REG. 190, 193 (2012) (detailing the function of the ESFA); 
van der Meulen, supra note 322, at 301 (explaining how the EFSA is an independent entity 
that provides scientific advice and technical support for the Community’s legislation and 
policies). 
330. See Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 151, art. 6, at 3(b) 
(stating that the EFSA may ask the appropriate food assessment body of a Member State to 
carry out a food safety assessment); van der Meulen, supra note 322, at 308 (detailing the 
responsibilities of the EFSA with respect to human health and the environment). 
331. See Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 151, art. 6, at 3(d) 
(stating what the EFSA must submit to the Community Reference Laboratory). 
332. See id. art. 6, at 3(d) (explaining that the Community Reference Laboratory must 
test and validate the method of detection and identification that the applicant has proposed); 
see also van der Meulen, supra note 322, at 308 (describing the role of the Community 
Reference Laboratory). 
333. See Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 151, art. 6, at 7 
(giving the requirements for the opinion of the ESFA); van der Meulen, supra note 322, at 
308-09 (giving the procedure that the ESFA must undergo once it has received an evaluation 
report from the Community Reference Laboratory). 
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pending GMO application within thirty days from the publication.334 
The opinion must include a scientific assessment conducted by a 
committee of independent scientific experts that checks and evaluates 
data from the safety research that the applicant has presented.335 
Within three months of receiving the EFSA’s opinion, the 
Commission must draft and submit a proposal for granting or refusing 
authorization to the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and 
Animal Health, which is comprised of representatives of the Member 
States.336 These representatives have expertise in areas including 
GMOs, food supply safety, and animal health, and are nominated by 
Member States.337 If the decision is different from the EFSA’s 
opinion, it must explain the difference in detail.338 If the Committee 
approves the proposal by a qualified majority, then the Commission 
adopts the Decision.339 If the Committee does not give a favorable 
                                                                                                                         
 
334. See Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 151, art. 6, at 7 
(explaining the public’s opportunity to submit opinions); CAOIMHIN MACMAOLAIN, EU FOOD 
LAW 248 (2007) (providing the specific requirements concerning the publication of the 
EFSA’s opinion and the public’s opportunity to respond). 
335. See Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 151, art. 6, at 7 
(requiring the ESFA to make its opinion public and allowing the public to make comments 
within thirty days); van der Meulen, supra note 322, 308-09 (discussing this requirement); 
MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 249 (stating that the ESFA must give an opinion on the 
merits of the application within six months of receiving it). 
336. See Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 151, art. 7, at 1 
(requiring the Commission to submit a proposal for granting or refusing authorization to the 
Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health within three months of receiving 
the EFSA’s opinion); see also van der Meulen, supra note 322, at 309 (explaining what the 
Commission must do in response to the EFSA’s opinion and describing the makeup of the 
Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health). 
337. See General Principles and Requirements of Food Law Regulation, supra note 177, 
art. 58, at 1 (describing and establishing the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and 
Animal Health); Sella-Villa, supra note 294, at 988 (describing the expertise and nomination 
of those on the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health). 
338. The Commission’s decision must be based on the opinion of the Authority, relevant 
provisions of Community Law, and any other relevant factors. See Genetically Modified Food 
and Feed Regulation, supra note 151, art. 7, at 1 (stating that the Commission must explain 
any differences when the draft decision is not in accordance with the opinion of the ESFA); 
MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 249 (explaining how the Commission must note any 
differences when its decision diverges from the ESFA’s opinion). 
339. See Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 151, art. 35 
(describing the Committee Procedure); van der Meulen, supra note 322, at 309 (describing 
how the Commission adopts the Decision if the Committee approves the proposal by a 
qualified majority). 
684 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
opinion, the draft Decision is then sent to the Council of Ministers, 
who can adopt or reject it by a qualified majority.340 Finally, the 
Commission must adopt the decision if the Council fails to act within 
three months.341 
If a GM food is authorized, the decision is addressed to the 
applicant and therefore only the applicant is permitted to bring it into 
the market in any and all of the Member States.342 The market 
authorization of a GM food is valid for ten years throughout the 
European Union.343 Specific details about the decision are published 
in the Official Journal of the European Union and the product is 
entered into a public register of GM food and feed.344 
9. The Labeling of GMOs in the European Union Under the 
Traceability and Labeling Regulation 
In sharp contrast to the previous labeling system under the FDA 
Statement of Policy, the European Union requires that Member States 
take steps to ensure traceability and labeling of authorized GMOs at 
all stages of their placing on the market under the 2001 Deliberate 
Release Directive.345 According to the Traceability and Labeling 
Regulation, which serves as the foundation of the current EU GMO 
labeling system, traceability requirements for GMOs should facilitate 
the withdrawal of products whose unforeseen adverse effects on 
                                                                                                                         
 
340. See van der Meulen, supra note 322, at 309 (explaining how the Council of 
Ministers can either adopt or reject the draft Decision by a qualified majority if the Committee 
has not given a favorable opinion); see also Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation, 
supra note 151, art. 7 (giving instructions for this process). 
341. See van der Meulen, supra note 322, at 309 (stating that if the Council does not act 
within three months, the Commission must adopt the decision); see also Genetically Modified 
Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 151, art. 7 (setting the parameters of this process). 
342. See generally Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 151, art. 
7, at 1-5 (detailing the procedure once a GMO is authorized); van der Meulen, supra note 322, 
at 309 (outlining the process after a GMO is approved in relation to the applicant). 
343. See Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 151, art. 7, at 5 
(limiting the approval of a GMO to ten years). 
344. See van der Meulen, supra note 322, at 309 (detailing the notification process); see 
also MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 249 (explaining how applicants are notified). 
345. Traceability and Labeling Regulation, supra note 151, recital 1 (detailing the 
requirements with respect to traceability of authorized GMOs). 
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human health, the environment, or animal health become apparent.346 
More importantly, the Regulation states that traceability should also 
facilitate the implementation of risk management measures in 
accordance with the precautionary principle.347 The Regulation also 
puts emphasis on consumers, as it states that traceability requirements 
for food produced from GMOs are implemented to ensure that 
accurate information is available to operators and consumers to 
enable them to use their freedom of choice in an effective manner.348 
It further states that it is necessary to ensure that consumers are 
completely and reliably informed about GMOs.349 
In the Traceability and Labeling Regulation, the Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union set a GMO threshold “de 
minimis” amount of 0.9% of the ingredients, which gives some 
leniency to manufacturers and producers for certain traces of GMOs 
that may be technically unavoidable.350 If an operator wishes to place 
a product on the market that contains an amount of GMOs over the 
threshold of 0.9%, he or she is required to indicate in writing (1) each 
food ingredient that is produced with GMOs, (2) each of the feed 
materials or additives that are produced from GMOs, and (3) that the 
product is produced from GMOs on products where there is no list of 
ingredients.351 
10. Comparison of GMO Regulation Between the United States and 
the European Union 
As demonstrated throughout Part I of this Note, the US and EU 
GMO regulatory systems differ greatly.352 The source of the 
                                                                                                                         
 
346. Id. recital 3 (explaining how the traceability requirements under the Traceability 
and Labeling Regulation should improve the removal of such products from the market). 
347. Id. (emphasizing the continuing importance of the precautionary principle in EU 
regulation of GMOs). 
348. Id. at 4 (highlighting the European Union’s recognition of consumers’ ability to 
freely choose what they consume and the important role that traceability and labeling 
requirements play in this ability). 
349. Id. art. 1, at 11 (emphasizing the importance of informed consumer choice). 
350. Id. art. 1, at 10 (setting forth the threshold level that triggers the requirements of 
GMO labeling under this regulation). 
351. See id. art. 5, at 1 (describing the requirements for operators who want to sell 
products containing GMO levels over the threshold in the European Union). 
352. See generally supra Part I (discussing the regulatory systems of both). 
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difference is the opposite nature of these systems, namely the United 
States’ substantial equivalence doctrine and the European Union’s 
precautionary principle.353 Because the FDA views GMOs as GRAS, 
it does not require that companies submit specific information 
concerning the safety of their GMO products, as the European Union 
does.354 While the FDA does not conduct independent research for 
each GMO seeking approval, the European Union requires an 
independent body to do its own research for each application.355 And 
finally, since the FDA presumes GMOs are safe under the substantial 
equivalence doctrine, it has not required any labeling of GMOs, as it 
does not consider GMOs to be materially different from their 
traditional counterparts.356 In contrast, the European Union requires 
traceability at every step for approved GMOs under the precautionary 
principle, as future risks may become visible at some point.357 
 
II. THE PRESSURE FOR MANDATORY GMO LABELING 
MEASURES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
This Part will introduce the current status of the GMO labeling 
debate in the United States and will examine a similar debate that 
occurred in the European Union that led to a crisis in 1997. Section 
II.A explains the now preempted GMO labeling laws of Connecticut, 
Maine, and Vermont and compares the requirements of each. Section 
II.A also discusses the response to these state labeling laws, including 
legal action against the state of Vermont and the US House of 
Representatives’ opposition to the laws through H.R. 1599. Finally, 
Section II.A also examines the federal compromise of S. 764, which 
                                                                                                                         
 
353. See generally supra Part I (showing how the substantial equivalence doctrine serves 
as the basis of the US GMO regulatory system, while the precautionary principle is the 
foundation of the EU GMO regulatory system). 
354. See generally supra Part I (explaining the contrasting requirements of the US and 
EU GMO regulatory systems). 
355. See generally supra Part I (providing an overview of the different application 
procedures for the United States and the European Union). 
356. See generally supra Section I.A (discussing the view of the FDA under the 1992 
FDA Statement of Policy and the Coordinated Framework). 
357. See generally supra Section I.B.10 (discussing the traceability requirements and 
their justifications). 
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established national GMO labeling requirements in the United States 
and preempted the state GMO labeling laws. Section II.B details how 
the European Union faced similar opposition from its public over the 
lack of mandatory GMO labeling requirements in 1997 and how it 
resolved the crisis by mandating GMO labeling based on threshold 
amounts to allay public fears. 
A. The Current US Debate Over Mandatory GMO Labeling 
Section II.A.1 introduces the current US debate over mandatory 
GMO labeling while Sections II.A.2 and II.A.3 discuss the Consumer 
Right to Know Policy. Sections II.A.4, II.A.5, and II.A.6 explain and 
contrast the now preempted GMO labeling laws of Connecticut, 
Maine, and Vermont while Section II.A.7 highlights some of the 
backlash to these state laws from companies opposing mandatory 
GMO labeling. Section II.A.8 describes the initial federal reaction to 
these state laws through H.R. 1599, while Section II.A.9 explains S. 
764, which nationalized GMO labeling requirements based on the 
presence of bioengineered substance in final food products. Section 
II.A.10 presents an overview of the reaction to S. 764. Section II.B 
explains how the critical dispute between the Member States and the 
European Union Commission over the approval of Bt-maize in 1997 
was resolved through the adoption of stricter mandatory labeling 
requirements under the current Traceability and Labeling Regulation. 
Section II.B also explains what is required under the Traceability and 
Labeling Regulation for approved GMOs in the European Union. 
While the overwhelming majority of US citizens desire 
mandatory GMO labeling, the United States long resisted requiring 
labeling for GMOs and consistently refused to address the concerns of 
such individuals.358 This incongruence led several states to take action 
and respond to their citizens’ dissent by taking steps to require GMO 
labeling within their own borders.359 As this movement spread across 
the United States at a fast pace, it prompted the US Congress to 
quickly respond and eventually led to the implementation of national 
                                                                                                                         
 
358. See generally supra Section I.A (explaining the US federal policy on GMOs under 
the Coordinated Framework and the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy). 
359. See infra Sections II.A.3-4, 6 (describing the actions of the states of Connecticut, 
Maine, and Vermont). 
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GMO labeling requirements under S. 764 that brought about the 
demise of the state GMO labeling laws of Connecticut, Maine, and 
Vermont.360 However, before examining this revolutionary movement 
and federal reaction, it is important to understand why so many 
individuals desire GMO transparency.361 The Consumer Right to 
Know Policy contains many of the justifications for mandatory GMO 
labeling and presents a consistent platform for individuals who argue 
for GMO labeling generally and for those who continue to argue for 
stricter measures than those provided for in S. 764.362 
1. The Consumer Right to Know Policy 
As previously discussed, the FDA considers GMOs to be GRAS 
and does not require independent testing of such products before 
placement on the market.363 However, many argue for labeling of 
GMOs despite the FDA’s determination based on the Consumer Right 
to Know Policy, which supports GMO labeling laws based on the 
rights of consumers to be able to choose whether or not they purchase 
and consume food products containing GMOs.364 The right does not 
depend on whether or not fears concerning GMOs have scientific 
foundation or if the FDA finds a material difference between GMO 
foods and their traditional counterparts.365 It instead addresses the 
                                                                                                                         
 
360. See infra Sections II.A.8-9 (giving an overview of the federal response). 
361. See infra Section II.A.1 (providing arguments for GMO transparency under the 
Consumer Right to Know Policy). 
362. See infra Section II.A.1 (describing these justifications, which are used by many 
GMO labeling proponents). 
363. See supra Section I.A.3 (detailing the FDA’s policy on these issues). 
364. See Gary Hirshberg, Mandatory GMO Labeling—It’s Your Right to Know, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 21, 2015, 11:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-
hirshberg/mandatory-gmo-labeling—i_b_7841144.html (detailing some of the motivations 
behind the Consumer Right To Know policy, including inadequate research on the long-term 
effects of GMOs, increased herbicide use, and religious and ethical views); Jon Entine, Anti-
GMO ‘Big Lie’: Is Labeling Really About Our “Right to Know?”, GENETIC LITERACY 
PROJECT (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/2015/10/16/anti-gmo-big-lie-
labeling-really-right-know/ (citing the many national and international organizations that have 
concluded that genetically engineered crops are as safe as any other and that they pose no 
special risks to the environment or humans). 
365. See generally James Hamblin, No One Is Denying A ‘Right To Know What’s In My 
Food’”, ATLANTIC (July 24, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/07/no-
one-is-denying-a-right-to-know-whats-in-my-food/399536/ (articulating that the majority of 
Americans currently believe that any and all genetically modified foods are “inherently 
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concerns of a majority of the US public who desire GMO labeling and 
allows citizens to make informed decisions as to whether they wish to 
consume foods containing GMOs and those produced through genetic 
engineering.366 
There are a myriad of reasons why consumers do not want to 
consume GMOs or foods made using genetic engineering, including 
religious and ethical reasons, that are independent of human safety 
concerns.367 For example, a Jewish person observing religious dietary 
laws might be primarily concerned with avoiding foods made with 
certain meats or animal products in order to keep his or her strict 
Kosher diet.368 Furthermore, many believe that genetic engineering 
allows corporations to “play God,” which violates their religious 
beliefs.369 Other reasons might be that people may choose to avoid 
certain foods for ethical reasons, while others may want to eat an “all 
natural” diet without consuming any food that has been modified or 
                                                                                                                         
 
unhealthful” in spite of the “assurances to the contrary” from bodies such as the FDA, The 
World Health Organization and the American Medical Association); Steve Keane, Can a 
Consumer’s Right To Know Survive The WTO?: The Case of Food Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT’L 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 302 (2006) (stating that the concept of the Consumer Right to 
Know is not always grounded in health and safety concerns). 
366. See David Alan Nauheim, Food Labeling and the Consumer Right to Know: Give 
the People What They Want, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 97, 103-04 (2009) (describing many of the 
reasons for consumer alarm regarding GMOs and stating that thirty-seven percent object to 
GMOs on religious grounds); Keane, supra note 365, at 302 (describing some of the 
justifications under the Consumer Right To Know policy, including religious or ethical dietary 
restrictions, environmental concerns, or opposition to production methods). 
367. See Sarah L. Kirby, Genetically Modified Foods: More Reasons To Label Than Not, 
6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 351, 357 (2001) (giving the example of Jewish individuals who might 
violate their religious beliefs by consuming certain GMOs); Emmanuel B. Omobowale, Peter 
A. Singer, & Abdullah S. Daar, The Three Main Monotheistic Religions and GM Food 
Technology: An Overview Of Perspectives, BIOMED CENTRAL (Aug. 22, 2009), 
http://bmcinthealthhumrights.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1472-698X-9-18 (providing 
for some of the concerns specific to Jewish individuals with respect to consuming GMOs). 
368. See Omobowale, Singer, & Daar, supra note 367 (describing many of the religious 
arguments concerning GMOs). See generally Nauheim, supra note 366, at 103 (explaining 
some of the concerns about GMOs with respect to Judaism). 
369. See Nauheim, supra note 366, at 103 (explaining these religious arguments under 
the Consumer Right To Know policy); Omobowale, Singer, & Daar, supra note 367 
(analyzing the religious concerns of those who believe that biotechnology interferes with 
God’s role as the Creator). See generally Amaru, supra note 19, at 580 (stating that there 
might be religious reasons why individuals wish to avoid GMOs). 
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altered by scientific technology.370 Another group of individuals who 
might wish to avoid GMOs are individuals with allergies who need to 
avoid certain allergens that might be present in genetically modified 
foods.371 To all of these groups, the potential safety concerns might be 
secondary to their commitment to eating food that has not been 
genetically modified or contains GMOs.372 
2. The Consumer Right to Know Policy & The Courts 
In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, the court found that the 
Consumer Right to Know Policy was not a sufficient basis for a food 
labeling law on its own when the FDA did not find a material 
difference between GE foods and their traditional counterparts.373 The 
court also held that a consumer’s right to know could only be 
considered once a material difference was found between GMO and 
non-GMO products.374 Since the Consumer Right to Know Policy 
was not an adequate basis for mandating GMO labeling, the court 
dismissed the case.375 
The Consumer Right to Know Policy was also rejected in 
International Dairy Food Association v. Amestoy as a sufficient basis 
for a Vermont statute that mandated labeling for milk products 
containing rBST, a genetically modified hormone.376 The US Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that because the FDA found that 
dairy products derived from cows treated by rBST were 
                                                                                                                         
 
370. See Keane, supra note 365, at 302 (stating some of the ethical and moral reasons for 
consumer demand to know the GMO status of the food they are consuming); Amaru, supra 
note 19, at 580 (noting that many people might have ethical or moral objections to genetic 
engineering that are not dependent on whether or not GMOs have been proven safe); Kirby, 
supra note 367, at 357 (providing examples of those who morally and ethically oppose 
GMOs). 
371. See Kirby, supra note 367, at 357 (discussing concerns that genetically modified 
foods may set off allergies); Strauss, supra note 158, at 109 (explaining that allergies are a 
major concern with genetically modified foods). 
372. See Kirby, supra note 367, at 357 (describing some of the interests at issue as much 
deeper than mere consumer concern); Amaru, supra note 19, at 580 (citing many examples of 
individuals who wish to avoid GMOs despite how safe they have been proven to be). 
373. See Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F.Supp.2d at 179. 
374. Id. (finding that the FDA could consider consumer demand once materiality has 
been established). 
375. Id. 
376. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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“indistinguishable” from products from untreated herds, the Vermont 
consumers’ desire to know if the product contains rBST was 
insufficient to allow Vermont to force dairy manufacturers to speak 
against their will.377 Specifically, the court stated that it knew of no 
case where consumer interest by itself was enough to justify requiring 
a product’s manufacturers to make public a statement about a 
production method that has no discernable impact on a final 
product.378 
While these cases do not involve the GMO regulations that are 
discussed in this Note, they are important to consider with respect to 
mandating GMO labeling based on the Consumer Right to Know 
Policy.379 As will be discussed below, three states passed GMO 
labeling laws based on this Policy, as state legislatures listened to the 
demands of their citizens for greater GMO transparency.380 While 
these state laws would later be preempted by the new federal national 
standard under S. 764, the Consumer Right to Know Policy continues 
to be a strong argument for those arguing for stricter labeling 
requirements and those who oppose the new federal national standard 
under S. 764 for various reasons.381 
3. Connecticut’s GMO Labeling Law 
In June 2013, Connecticut passed the nation’s first state GMO 
labeling law, which began the state movement towards mandatory 
labeling for GMOs.382 Connecticut General Statutes §21a-92c state 
                                                                                                                         
 
377. Id. at 74 (detailing the court’s rationale for ruling that the consumers’ desire to 
know about the GMO status of their food was not sufficient to overcome the First Amendment 
rights of the manufacturers); see also Nauheim, supra note 366, at 122 (discussing the court’s 
finding that consumer interest was not sufficient and that the Vermont legislature did not 
satisfy the second prong of the Central Hudson test by having a substantial interest in 
regulating the commercial speech at issue). 
378. See Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 74 (discussing the non-existence of such a case). 
379. See supra Section II.A.1 (explaining the Consumer Right to Know Policy). 
380. See infra Sections II.A.3-4, 6 (describing how the states of Connecticut, Maine, and 
Vermont enacted laws mandating GMO labeling in response to high public demand for such 
legislation). 
381. See infra Section II.A.9 (stating that S. 764 preempts these state laws). 
382. See 2013 Conn. Acts 777 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at scattered sections of Conn. Gen. 
Stat. Ann. §21a); Connecticut passes first GMO labeling law in US, RT (June 5, 2013, 3:46 
AM), https://www.rt.com/usa/connecticut-first-gmo-labeling-law-241/ (describing how 
Connecticut was the first state to pass a mandatory GMO labeling law); see also Michele 
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that seed or seed stock intended to produce food for human 
consumption and food intended for human consumption that was 
introduced or delivered for introduction into commerce in the state of 
Connecticut that was entirely or partially genetically engineered had 
to be labeled.383 Particularly, items contained in a package for retail 
sale were to be labeled with the clear and conspicuous words 
“Produced with Genetic Engineering.”384 In addition to requiring such 
labeling, the state of Connecticut circumvented the FDA and defined 
“natural food” in General Statutes Ann. §21a-92(17) as food “(A) that 
has not been treated with preservatives, antibiotics, synthetics 
additives, artificial flavoring or artificial coloring; and (B) that has not 
been processed in a manner that makes such food significantly less 
nutritive; and (C) . . . that has not been genetically engineered.”385 
Thus, the Connecticut legislature agreed with the public’s view that 
food that has been genetically engineered should not be labeled as 
“natural” and should instead be labeled as genetically engineered.386 
The burden of compliance with the law rested on the party that 
was selling, offering for sale, or distributing any product in 
Connecticut that was required to be labeled under the law.387 
Genetically engineered products exempted from the law included 
processed food intended for immediate consumption, food sold in a 
restaurant or similar food facility, alcoholic beverages, farm products 
sold at a pick-your-own farm stand, and food consisting of or derived 
from an animal that was injected with or fed any genetically 
engineered food or drugs.388 Furthermore, it is important to note 
                                                                                                                         
 
Simon, Connecticut Makes History as First State to Pass GMO Food Labeling Law, FOOD 
DEMOCRACY NOW (June 4, 2013, 3:45 PM), http://www.fooddemocracynow.org/blog/2013/  
jun/4/connecticut_1st_state_2_pass_gmo_labeling_bill (assessing how Connecticut became 
the first state to pass a GMO labeling law). See generally Muller, supra note 11, at 526-27 
(discussing Connecticut’s GMO labeling law). 
383. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21a-92c (2015) (describing what items the law applied 
to); Nunziato, supra note 9, at 484 (discussing this part of the statute). 
384. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §21a-92c(a)(ii) (setting forth the labeling requirements 
for items on the market in a package for retail sale). 
385. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §21a-92(17) (defining “natural”). 
386. See supra Section I.A (discussing the public attitude in the United States towards 
GMO labeling and the use of “natural” on products that have been genetically engineered). 
387. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21a-92c(c) (explaining who had the burden to ensure 
compliance with the law). 
388. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21a-92c(b) (exempting certain products from the Act). 
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Connecticut’s choice of label.389 Instead of looking at only the end 
product and whether it contained a threshold amount of GMOs—as 
the European Union does—the Connecticut Act focused more on the 
procedure used to produce the food and used a label that indicated the 
method with which the food was produced (instead of a specific 
breakdown of any GMO components).390 
4. Maine’s GMO Labeling Law 
Less than six months after Connecticut passed its labeling law, 
Maine enacted its own bill titled “An Act To Protect Maine Food 
Consumers’ Right To Know about Genetically Engineered Food and 
Seed Stock.”391 The Maine law also required genetically engineered 
food and seed stock to be conspicuously labeled as “[p]roduced with 
Genetic Engineering.”392 While Maine’s law did not define “natural” 
as Connecticut’s law did, the law prohibited foods that were subject to 
the labeling requirements from being described as “natural” or with a 
similar identification.393 Among the foods exempted from the law 
were products that had been produced without knowledge that the 
products or ingredients used were genetically engineered and animal 
products derived from an animal that was not genetically engineered 
but was fed genetically engineered food.394 
                                                                                                                         
 
389. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21a-92c (requiring labeling for products made through 
genetic engineering, not based on a threshold amount of GMO in the final product). 
390. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21a-92c (mandating labeling of products made through 
genetic engineering). 
391. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2591 (2013); Muller, supra note 11, at 527 
(introducing the Maine bill mandating GMO labeling); Ross H. Pifer, Mandatory Labeling 
Laws: What Do Recent State Enactments Portend for the Future of GMOs?, 118 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 789, 804 (2013-2014) (explaining the Maine bill). 
392. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2593; Muller, supra note 11, at 527 (noting the 
similarities between the two laws and describing Maine’s labeling requirements); Pifer, supra 
note 391, at 804 (describing how food offered for retail sale that was genetically engineered 
had to be labeled). 
393. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §21a-92(17) (defining “natural”); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 
22, § 2593; Muller, supra note 11, at 528 (noting that while the Connecticut law defined 
“natural,” the Maine bill did not). 
394. See generally Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2593 (listing the exemptions). 
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5. Connecticut and Maine’s Trigger Clauses 
While Connecticut and Maine were the first two states to pass 
GMO labeling laws, the laws did not have a set date to go into effect 
because of trigger clauses that constrained both acts.395 The 
Connecticut Act had three requirements.396 The first requirement was 
that four states (not including Connecticut) enact a mandatory 
labeling law for GE foods similar to its own.397 For this requirement, 
the list of states that could have fulfilled this requirement was Maine, 
New York, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Vermont, and 
Pennsylvania.398 Secondly, one of the states that passed similar 
legislation had to border Connecticut.399 Third, the aggregate 
population of such states located in the northeast region of the United 
States that enacted a mandatory GMO labeling law had to be more 
than twenty million based on the 2010 census.400 Under the Maine 
trigger clause, substantially similar legislation had to be adopted in at 
least four contiguous states.401 If this requirement was not fulfilled 
before January 1, 2018, the act would have been repealed.402 These 
trigger clauses were incorporated into the Connecticut and Maine 
GMO labeling laws as a means of protection.403 Specifically, they 
                                                                                                                         
 
395. See Nunziato, supra note 9, at 485-86 (discussing the similar trigger clauses of 
Connecticut and Maine); Muller, supra note 11, at 527-28 (explaining how both laws did not 
go into effect due to their trigger clauses). 
396. See Muller, supra note 11, at 527 (detailing the requirements under the Connecticut 
trigger clause); Nunziato, supra note 9, at 485-86 (analyzing the trigger clause for the 
Connecticut law). 
397. See Nunziato, supra note 9, at 526-27 (detailing the first requirement under the 
Connecticut trigger); Muller, supra note 11, at 527 (setting forth what was first required). 
398. See Nunziato, supra note 9, at 485-86 (listing the states that could have fulfilled the 
first requirement). See generally Muller, supra note 11 (explaining the geographic 
specifications of this requirement). 
399. See Muller, supra note 11, at 527 (putting forth the requirement that one of the 
states must border Connecticut); Nunziato, supra note 9, at 485-86 (explaining this second 
requirement). 
400. See Muller, supra note 11, at 527 (noting the second requirement under the trigger 
clause); Nunziato, supra note 9, at 485-86 (discussing the aggregate population requirement). 
401. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2595 (2013) (explaining the circumstances 
surrounding the trigger clause). 
402. Id. (setting this deadline). 
403. See infra note 404 and accompanying text (discussing the justifications for the 
trigger clauses).  
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were meant to ensure that no single state would be targeted if a state’s 
GMO labeling law became the center of a lawsuit.404 
6. Vermont’s Labeling Law 
The most recent state GMO labeling law to be enacted was the 
Vermont Labeling Act, known as Act 120, which was signed on May 
8, 2014.405 Similar to the laws of Connecticut and Maine, Act 120 
required that food offered for sale by a retailer to be labeled as 
produced entirely or in part from genetic engineering if it was a 
product (1) offered for retail sale in Vermont and (2) entirely or 
partially produced with genetic engineering.406 When the product was 
a packaged raw agricultural commodity, the manufacturer would have 
to label the package that was offered for retail sale with the clear and 
conspicuous words “produced with genetic engineering.”407 If the 
product was a raw agricultural commodity that was not separately 
packaged, the retailer would be required to post a label on the retail 
store shelf or bin where the commodity was displayed for sale with 
the clear and conspicuous words “produced with genetic 
engineering.”408 And finally, if a processed food contained a product 
or products of genetic engineering, the manufacturer would need to 
label the package with the words “partially produced with genetic 
engineering,” “may be produced with genetic engineering,” or 
“produced with genetic engineering.”409 
                                                                                                                         
 
404. See Amaru, supra note 19, at 592 (explaining that the trigger clauses were intended 
to ensure that no single state would be targeted if the legislation was the subject of a lawsuit); 
Muller, supra note 11, at 527 (explaining that the stipulations were “put in place in order to 
protect small businesses and farmers from suffering at the hands of out-of-state competitors” 
who were not required to label food products that were genetically engineered). 
405. See No. 120. An Act Relating To The Labeling Of Food Produced With Genetic 
Engineering, 2014 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 120 [hereinafter Act 120], available at 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2014/Acts/ACT120.pdf. 
406. See Act 120, supra note 405, §3043(a) (mandating when a food be labeled as 
produced with genetic engineering). 
407. Id. §3043(b)(1) (setting forth requirements for packaged raw agricultural 
commodities). 
408. Id. §3043(b)(2) (giving instructions for raw agricultural commodities that are not 
separately packaged). 
409. Id. §3043(b)(3) (stating the requirements for processed foods that contain a product 
or products of genetic engineering). 
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While Act 120 was similar to the Connecticut law in many ways, 
it differed in one important aspect.410 Like the Maine law, Act 120 did 
not define the term “natural” in the text of the Act.411 Act 120 clearly 
forbade manufacturers of foods produced entirely or in part from 
genetic engineering from labeling their products as “natural,” 
“naturally made,” “naturally grown,” “all natural,” or “any word of 
similar import” that would have a tendency to mislead a consumer.412 
Act 120 also specifically stated that the law should not be construed 
to require a list or identification of any ingredient or ingredients that 
were genetically engineered or the placement of the term “genetically 
engineered” immediately preceding any common name or primary 
product descriptor of a food.413 
The purpose of Act 120 was to establish a system by which 
people make informed decisions regarding the potential health effects 
of the food they purchase and consume.414 The Statute was also 
intended to inform the purchasing decisions of consumers who are 
concerned about the potential effects on the environment of GE 
foods.415 The Act was also meant to reduce consumer confusion and 
deception by prohibiting the labeling of GE products as “natural.”416 
In addition to promoting the disclosure of factual information on food 
labels, the Act was meant to provide data to consumers in order to 
make informed decisions for religious reasons, such as keeping 
Kosher for observant Jewish individuals.417 
                                                                                                                         
 
410. See Muller, supra note 11, at 526-28 (describing Connecticut’s GMO law); Davis, 
supra note 35, at 46-48 (detailing the requirements of Act 120). 
411. See Muller, supra note 11, at 527-28 (stating that unlike the Connecticut law, 
Maine’s law did not define “natural”).  
412. See Act 120, supra note 405, §3043(c) (setting forth the restrictions on the use of 
“natural” with respect to foods produced using genetic engineering in Vermont); Davis, supra 
note 35, at 47-48 (explaining that products manufactured with GMOs could not be labeled as 
“natural” under Act 120). 
413. See Act 120, supra note 405, §§3041(1-2) (explaining how neither of these labels 
are required under the Act). 
414. See id. §3041(1) (setting forth the Act’s Legislative Purpose). 
415. See id. § 3041(2) (stating this statutory purpose). 
416. See id. §§3041(1-3) (recognizing consumer choice in the Act’s Legislative 
Purpose). 
417. See id. §3041(4) (addressing the religious concerns of people who wish to avoid 
GMOs). 
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Perhaps the most crucial part of Act 120 that distinguished it 
from the labeling laws of Connecticut and Maine was that it did not 
contain a trigger clause.418 The ramifications of excluding a trigger 
clause became costly when the Grocery Manufacturer’s Association 
(“GMA”) sued the state of Vermont a month after the bill was signed, 
claiming that the law violated its right to free speech and would cost 
too much to comply with.419 Despite this immediate backlash, 
Vermont Governor Peter Shumlin signed the bill to go into effect in 
July of 2016.420 While Vermont’s law counted toward fulfilling the 
trigger requirements of the Connecticut and Maine laws, it was not 
constrained by any state requirement or population requirement in 
order to go into effect.421 Furthermore, as opposed to the Connecticut 
and Maine laws, the Vermont Law was not subject to repeal if other 
states in the Northeast United States failed to enact similar laws.422 As 
                                                                                                                         
 
418. See James J. Gormley, GMO-Labeling Laws: Why The Trigger Clause?, 
NUTRITIONAL OUTLOOK (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.nutritionaloutlook.com/articles/gmo-
labeling-laws-why-trigger-clause (stating that unlike Maine and Connecticut, Vermont’s GMO 
labeling law did not contain a trigger clause); Dan Flynn, State Legislatures Pass On Adopting 
GMO-Labeling Policies This Year, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (June 24, 2015), http://www. 
foodsafetynews.com/2015/06/states-pass-on-opportunities-to-jump-ahead-of-feds-on-gmo-
labeling-policy/#.Vrve18ac8UV (stating that while Act 120 was to go into effect in July 2016, 
Maine and Connecticut’s laws are contingent upon the actions of bordering states). 
419. See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F.Supp.3d 583 (D. Vt. 2015). 
420. See Vermont Governor Signs First In US GMO-Labeling Law To Go Into Effect, 
RT (May 8, 2014, 7:14 PM), https://www.rt.com/usa/157744-vermont-gmo-labeling-signed/ 
(announcing that despite threats from Monsanto legal action against the state, Vermont’s 
Governor signed the bill into law to go into effect in July 2016); Dave Gram, After Vermont 
Passes GMO Labeling Law, Food Industry Announces Plans To Sue, CORNUCOPIA INST. 
(May 9, 2014), https://www.cornucopia.org/2014/05/vermont-passes-gmo-labeling-law-food-
industry-announces-plans-sue/ (discussing the action taken by GMA shortly after Governor 
Shumlin signed the bill into law). 
421. See Nunziato, supra note 9, at 485-86 (stating that Vermont was one of the states 
that was included in the trigger clauses of the Connecticut and Maine GMO labeling laws); 
Jeff Daniels, GMOs: Congress May Block States From Requiring Labeling, CNBC (July 22, 
2015, 12:31 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/22/gmos-congress-may-block-states.html 
(explaining how Act 120 was to go into effect in 2016 while Connecticut and Maine’s laws 
would only go into effect when the conditions of their trigger clauses were met); Cathy 
Siegner, Vermont Senate Approves GMO Labeling Bill, Sends It Back To House For Final 
Vote, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/04/ 
vermont-senate-approves-gmo-labeling-bill-sends-it-back-to-house/#.Vrv4I8ac8UU 
(distinguishing Vermont’s Law as not having a trigger clause as opposed to those of 
Connecticut and Maine). 
422. See Nunziato, supra note 9, at 485-86 (discussing how the laws of Connecticut and 
Maine were to be repealed if their trigger clauses were not fulfilled); see also Gormley, supra 
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will be demonstrated in Section II.A.9, Act 120 was a substantial 
factor in the passing of S. 764 and thus played a large role in the 
nationalization of GMO labeling requirements in the United States.423 
7. Backlash to State Labeling Laws 
While many anti-GMO and pro-labeling groups praised the 
passing of these labeling measures, these state laws were faced with 
immense opposition and were questioned by many as to their 
constitutionality, practicality, and legality.424 While Connecticut was 
able to enact GMO legislation in 2013, there was discussion that 
legislators were getting cold feet after Monsanto threatened to sue the 
state.425 Since many legislators believed that Monsanto would win 
this legal battle, there was much hesitation surrounding the 
Connecticut labeling law.426 After Monsanto similarly threatened to 
sue Vermont when Act 120 was being drafted, the Grocery 
Manufacturers Association sued the state.427 In this suit, GMA argued 
                                                                                                                         
 
note 418 (distinguishing Act 120 from the GMO laws of Maine and Connecticut, which have 
trigger clauses). 
423. See infra Section II.A.9 (demonstrating the importance of Act 120 and its impact on 
mandating federal GMO labeling under S. 764). 
424. See Liza Baertlein, U.S. Food Makers Sue to Stop Vermont’s GMO Labeling Law, 
REUTERS (June 12, 2014, 6:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/vermont-gmo-idUSL2 
N0OT20620140612 (announcing that GMA, the Snack Food Association, the International 
Foods Association, and the National Association of Manufacturers were opposing the Vermont 
GMO labeling law through a lawsuit); Vermont’s Landmark GMO-Labeling Law Target of 
Lawsuit By Food Trade Groups, RT (June 13, 2014, 11:57 PM), https://www.rt.com/usa/ 
165860-vermont-gmo-labeling-lawsuit/ (discussing the claims of the national trade 
organizations suing the state of Vermont). 
425. See Mat McDermott, Connecticut Fears Monsanto - Bill To Label GM Ingredients 
Dead Due To Lawsuit Worries, TREEHUGGER (May 8, 2012), http://www.treehugger.com/  
environmental-policy/connecticut-fears-monsanto-bill-label-genetically-modified-ingredients-
dead-lawsuit-worries.html (describing how legislators were getting cold feet in light of 
Monsanto lawsuit concerns); Analiese Paik, Connecticut’s GE Foods Bill Eviscerated By 
Lawyers, FAIRFIELD GREEN FOOD GUIDE (May 5, 2012, 10:06 AM), http://fairfieldgreenfood 
guide.com/2012/05/05/connecticuts-ge-foods-bill/ (explaining how legislators feared 
mandating labeling due to fears of a Monsanto lawsuit). 
426. See McDermott, supra note 425 (explaining the cause behind this hesitation); Paik, 
supra note 425 (discussing the effect of this threat from Monsanto). 
427. See Christina Sarich, Groups File Lawsuit Over Vermont’s New GMO Labeling 
Law, NAT. SOC’Y (June 18, 2014), http://naturalsociety.com/4-gma-groups-file-federal-
lawsuit-vermonts-new-gmo-labeling-law/ (giving an overview of the lawsuit); Nancy Remsen, 
Trade Groups Sue VT Over GMO Labeling Law, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (June 13, 2014, 
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that the state’s GMO labeling law violated the First Amendment 
protection of commercial speech as well as the dormant Commerce 
Clause.428 It is important to note that many other large and influential 
companies belong to this Association, including Monsanto, The 
Coco-Cola Company, Del Monte Foods Company, General Mills, 
Inc., Kraft Foods Group, The Proctor & Gamble Company, and S.C. 
Johnson & Son, Inc.429 While these companies have not individually 
sued any states or were named plaintiffs in any case, they do belong 
to the same GMA that sued the state of Vermont, demonstrating the 
strong resistance to such state laws.430 
Companies that oppose GMO labeling laws have also allocated 
their resources to defeat state labeling laws when such measures came 
to a vote.431 For example, California’s Proposition 37, which would 
have required labeling on raw or processed foods if they were made 
from plants or animals with genetic material changed in specific 
ways, was defeated by the “Vote No” campaign, which raised US$46 
                                                                                                                         
 
7:00 AM), http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/politics/2014/06/12/gma-sues-vt-
gmo-law/10389209/ (detailing the lawsuit filed by GMA, the Snack Food Association, the 
International Dairy Foods Association, and the National Association of Manufacturers against 
the state of Vermont). 
428. See GMA Files Lawsuit To Overturn Vermont’s Unconstitutional Mandatory GMO 
Labeling Law, GMAO ONLINE (June 13, 2014), http://www.gmaonline.org/news-events/  
newsroom/gma-files-lawsuit-to-overturn-vermonts-unconstitutional-mandatory-gmo-label/ 
(explaining the grounds for the lawsuit); Sarich, supra note 427 (explaining the arguments of 
GMA). 
429. See GMA Board of Directors, GMA ONLINE, http://www.gmaonline.org/forms/ 
committee/CommitteeFormPublic/viewExecCommittee?id=16E3DD0000014F (listing the 
Board of Directors, many of which belong to these companies); Ronnie Cummins, The Great 
Boycott: Monsanto And The GMA, ORGANIC CONSUMERS ASS’N (May 14, 2014), https://
www.organicconsumers.org/essays/great-boycott-monsanto-and-gma (stating that members of 
the GMA include Monsanto, Coca-Cola, and General Mills). 
430. See Cummins, supra note 429 (listing the members of GMA); GMA Files Lawsuit 
to Overturn Vermont’s Unconstitutional Mandatory GMO Labeling Law, GMA ONLINE (June 
13, 2014), http://www.gmaonline.org/news-events/newsroom/gma-files-lawsuit-to-overturn-
vermonts-unconstitutional-mandatory-gmo-label/ (providing the news release from GMA 
announcing its lawsuit against Vermont). 
431. See Kimbrell & Paulsen, supra note 38, at 345 (“[Lobbying disclosures] show 
expenditures specifically for opposing GE good labeling (as opposed to more general, related 
topics) of over US$80 million between 2012 and the first quarter of 2014 . . . .”); Libby Foley, 
Corporate Spending to Fight GMO Labeling Skyrockets, ENV’T WORKING GROUP (Apr. 23, 
2015), http://www.ewg.org/research/anti-label-lobby (explaining that in 2014, food and 
biotechnology companies that oppose mandatory GMO labeling have disclosed expenditures 
of US$63.6 million to lobby for legislation that reference to GMO labeling). 
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million from some of the biggest businesses in the industry, as 
opposed to supporters of the proposition that raised US$8 million.432 
This pattern occurred in states such as Washington and Oregon, 
where companies such as Monsanto were able to greatly outspend 
proponents of the GMO labeling bills and the voters rejected the 
initiatives.433 It is clear that in the states where the GMO labeling 
issue was brought to the voters, companies such as Monsanto and 
organizations such as the GMA put a great amount of money and 
effort into convincing voters not to support GMO labeling laws.434 
8. H.R. 1599 & The Federal Reaction to State GMO Labeling Laws 
Members of the US House of Representatives took action to 
oppose the state GMO labeling laws in July 2015 when the House 
passed H.R. 1599.435 Titled the “Safe and Accurate Food Labeling 
Act,” H.R. 1599 would have prohibited any state from enacting laws 
requiring the labeling of GMOs or GE foods.436 According to H.R. 
                                                                                                                         
 
432. See California Proposition 37, Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Engineered 
Food (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/ California_ Proposition_37,_Mandatory_ 
Labeling_of_Genetically_Engineered_Food_(2012) (last visited Jan. 9, 2016) (discussing 
generally California Proposition 37, including donors for the measure and donors against it); 
Organic Consumers Association Calls for Boycott of Organic Brand Parent Companies That 
Helped Defeat Prop 37, ORGANIC CONSUMERS ASS’N (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.organic  
consumers.org/press/organic-consumers-association-calls-boycott-organic-brand-parent-
companies-helped-defeat-prop (listing companies who donated to the NO on 37 campaign). 
433. See Jeff Mapes, Grocery Manufacturers Disclose Big Donors in GMO Labeling 
Campaign in Washington, OREGON LIVE (Oct. 18, 2013, 5:29 PM), http://www.oregonlive.  
com/mapes/index.ssf/2013/10/grocery_manufacturers_disclose.html (indicating that GMA 
revealed that PepsiCo, Nestle USA, and Coca-Cola each gave US$1 million to the campaign 
against the Washington initiative in hidden donations); Oregon Mandatory Labeling of GMOs 
Initiative, Measure 92 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA,  https://ballotpedia.org/ Oregon_Mandatory_  
Labeling_of_GMOs_Initiative,_Measure_92_ (2014) (last visited Feb. 7, 2016) (generally 
discussing the Oregon Mandatory Labeling of GMOs Initiative and the donors who supported 
the measure as well as those who opposed it). 
434. See Mapes, supra note 433 (discussing the efforts of several large companies to 
stop GMO labeling efforts at the state level); Kimbrell & Paulsen, supra note 38, at 345 
(discussing the amount of money spent on lobbying against GMO labeling measures). 
435. See Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2015, H.R. 1599, 114th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2015) [hereinafter H.R. 1599] (dating the passage of H.R. 1599 as July 24, 2015). 
436. Id. § 113 (prohibiting all states from directly or indirectly establishing as to any 
food in interstate commerce “any requirement with respect to the sale of offering for sale in 
interstate commerce of a genetically engineered plant for use or application in food that is not 
identical to the requirement of section 461 of the Plan Protection Act (as added by section 111 
of this Act)”). 
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1599, the fact that genetic engineering took place during the 
production of a food does not “by itself” serve as material information 
when assessing any possible differences between a food that is 
produced from, contains, or consists of a GE plant and one that does 
not.437 According to the bill, GMO labeling could only be required if 
there is a material difference in functional, nutritional, or 
compositional characteristics, allergenicity, or other attributes 
between the GMO and non-GMO foods.438 Furthermore, the 
disclosure of such a material difference would have to be necessary to 
protect public health or safety or to prevent the labeling of the food 
from being false or misleading.439 Thus, under the law, no GMO 
labeling laws could have been established until the US government 
changed its twenty-three year stance on GMOs and found that GMO 
foods present a material difference in the above listed categories.440 
This requirement reflected the ruling in District of Columbia in 
Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, where the court ruled that the 
FDA would have to find a material difference between GMO and 
non-GMO food in order to require such labeling under the FDCA.441 
Furthermore, this law would have meant that even if the FDA found 
that there was a material difference between GMO foods and non-
GMO foods, GMO labeling would still not be possible unless it was 
shown that such labeling would be necessary to prevent consumer 
confusion or falsity or harm to the public.442 
According to the Committee on Agriculture’s report, one of the 
biggest motivations behind the Bill was the concern over the possible 
“patchwork” system of GMO labeling that would result in the United 
                                                                                                                         
 
437. See id. § 101 (amending Chapter IV of the FDCA by adding section 424 titled 
“Food Derived from New Plant Varieties”). 
438. See id. § 101(2)(A) (asserting that there must be a material difference in one of 
these attributes in order to require labeling for GMO products). 
439. See id. § 101(2)(B) (requiring that the disclosure of this material difference be 
necessary to protect public health and safety or to prevent the label of the food from being 
false or misleading). 
440. See generally id. §§ 101(2)(A-B) (clearly indicating that without these two 
conditions met, products containing GMOs or derived from genetic engineering cannot be 
labeled as such). 
441. See Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F.Supp.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
442. See generally H.R. 1599, supra note 435, at § 101(2)(A-B) (explaining that in order 
for the Secretary to be able to require GMO labeling, both (A) and (B) must be fulfilled). 
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States if states were permitted to enact their own labeling laws.443 The 
Committee also focused heavily on the immense burden these state 
laws would impose upon producers and companies, including an 
estimate from a food industry association that claimed the strict 
liability scheme of Vermont’s Act 120 could result in fines as much 
as US$10 million per day due to inevitable slips in the system that 
would cause mislabeled GMO products to be put on the shelves.444 
According to the Committee, the solution was the Safe and Accurate 
Food Labeling Act, which would continue to administer the voluntary 
consultation process established by the 1992 FDA Statement of 
Policy.445 Specifically, the Committee intended H.R. 1599 to 
recognize the FDA 1992 Statement of Policy.446 With respect to 
consumers’ desire to know if they are purchasing foods made using 
genetic engineering, the bill provided for a voluntary genetically 
engineered certification program within the USDA that would 
nationally govern label claims regarding the use or non-use of genetic 
engineering in food production or processing.447 
In the report, the Committee asserted that it intended for this 
program to provide the sole standard by which all food producers, 
handlers, and processors may make claims regarding the use of 
genetic engineering in the production and processing of food.448 This 
would have included claims for foods that were within the definition 
of raw or processed agricultural products and for foods that were not, 
as well as for seeds.449 The legislation also required the Secretary of 
                                                                                                                         
 
443. See H.R. Rep. No. 114-208, at 11 (2015) (“[The Act will] ensure national 
uniformity regarding labeling of foods derived from genetically engineered plants by 
preventing a patchwork of conflicting State or local labeling laws which inherently interfere 
with interstate and foreign commerce.”). 
444. See id. at 12 (detailing a letter written to Vermont Governor Peter Shumlin from a 
food industry trade association explaining the massive potential costs of Act 120). 
445. See id. at 14 (describing the Committee’s intent to continue the voluntary 
consultation process established by the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy). 
446. See id. (asserting that the Committee intended to recognize the FDA 1992 
Statement of Policy and to reinforce its purpose to provide everyone with the assurance that 
foods regulated under the Policy are “as safe to eat as non-genetically engineered foods”). 
447. See id. at 17 (outlining the Committee’s solution to the desires of some consumers 
to know, via food product labeling, whether they are buying or eating food produced with 
genetic engineering). 
448. Id. at 18 (stating the Committee’s intent for this solution to be the single standard 
for food claims concerning genetic engineering). 
449. Id. at 18 (setting forth what types of claims were included in this framework). 
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Agriculture to establish national standards for labeling non-GE 
foods.450 Very specific procedures to apply for non-GMO and GMO 
certification were also listed in the bill.451 
As previously mentioned, this bill was passed in the House in 
July of 2015 in direct response to the state labeling laws passed in 
Maine, Vermont, and Connecticut, and would therefore have made 
such laws illegal as preempted by federal law.452 In addition to 
prohibiting state laws requiring GMO labeling, this bill clearly 
solidified the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy.453 This would have 
given the findings of the FDA much more legal power and deference 
than they currently have as a policy statement.454 
9. S. 764 and the Nationalization of GMO Labeling Requirements in 
the United States 
When President Obama did not pass H.R. 1599 as part of a 
spending bill at the beginning of 2016, many GMO labeling 
advocates celebrated as the state laws of Vermont, Maine, and 
Connecticut survived federal preemption.455 However, this celebration 
would be short-lived, as President Obama signed S.764 into law on 
                                                                                                                         
 
450. Id. 
451. See generally id. at 20 (describing AMA Sec. 291C. which sets forth national 
standards for labeling genetically engineered food). 
452. See supra notes at 437-40 and accompanying text (explaining how no state GMO 
labeling laws could be established unless the government departed from the 1992 FDA 
Statement of Policy and found that GMOs present a material difference from their traditional 
counterparts); Jenny Hopkinson, GMO Labeling Bill Would Trump States, POLITICO (Apr. 9, 
2014, 4:57 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/gmo-labeling-bill-105548 (explaining 
how H.R. 1599 affects state efforts to label GMOs). 
453. See supra notes 445-46 and accompanying text (upholding the 1992 FDA Statement 
of Policy). 
454. See supra notes 445-46 and accompanying text (examining how H.R. 1599 is meant 
to recognize and uphold the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy). 
455. See Congress Keeps Anti-GMO Labeling Rider Out of Spending Bill, ECOWATCH 
(Dec. 16, 2015, 10:59 AM), http://www.ecowatch.com/congress-keeps-anti-gmo-labeling-
rider-out-of-spending-bill-1882130060.html (discussing how the Senate Congress did not 
include H.R. 1599 in the spending bill at the end of 2015, preventing the preemption of state 
GMO labeling laws); Karlene Lukovitz, GMO Labeling Rider Left Out Of Omnibus Spending 
Bill,  MEDIADAILY (Dec. 16, 2015, 7:21 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/ publications/article/ 
264945/gmo-labeling-rider-left-out-of-omnibus-spending-bi.html (highlighting discussing two 
statements in the reaction to the failure of some to get H.R. 1599 not being included in the 
spending bill). 
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July 29, 2016 and implemented a federal GMO labeling system that 
eliminated any state law that mandated GMO labeling, including 
those discussed in this Note.456 The reaction to this federal legislation 
was mixed, as many praised the federal legislation for implementing 
the first mandatory GMO labeling system in the United States, while 
others highlighted defects that supposedly allow companies to avoid 
clearly labeling their food as genetically modified.457 Despite the 
diverse opinions about this federal regulation, it is clear that the state 
labeling laws of Connecticut, Maine, and Vermont and the general 
state movement towards GMO labeling laws made a severe impact on 
the US Congress and President, as these measures prompted the 
federal government to shift from a voluntary GMO labeling 
framework under H.R. 1599 to a mandatory GMO labeling regime 
that responded to public outcry for greater transparency about genetic 
engineering.458 
Known as S. 764, the new federal regulation establishes a 
national disclosure standard for bioengineered foods.459 Bio-
engineering is defined as food that “contains genetic material that has 
been modified through in vitro recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) techniques” and “for which modification could not otherwise 
be obtained through conventional breeding or found in nature.”460 The 
                                                                                                                         
 
456. See Mary Clare Jalonick, Obama Signs Bill Requiring Labeling of GMO Foods, AP 
(July 29, 2016, 6:07 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/65c61c63e3df4 b74bb90a 
2187122d744/obama-signs-bill-requiring-labeling-gmo-foods (reporting that President Obama 
signed a bill into law requiring genetically modified ingredients to be labeled for the first 
time); Jason J. Kim & Andrew J. Peterson, President Obama Signs Bill That Will Establish 
Federal GMO Labeling Standards, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www. 
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bb672dd0-b232-45c4-a876-e163ee66a849 (describing 
how the federal GMO labeling standards stating that  the law preempts state laws that 
“mandate the disclosure of GMO ingredients on product packaging”). 
457. See Agri-Pulse Communications, Obama Signs Historic GMO Labeling Bill, 
AGRICULTURE.COM (July 29, 2016), http://www.agriculture.com/news/crops/obama-signs-
historic-gmo-labeling-bill (discussing the opinions of those who supporters of the federal law); 
Stephen Dinan, Obama Signs Bill Overturning Vermont’s GMO Labeling Law, WASH. TIMES 
(Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/2/obama-signs-bill-over 
turning-vermonts-gmo-labeling/ (explaining the extreme opposition towards the new federal 
legislation). 
458. See supra Sections II.A.3-4, 6, 8 (giving an overview of the state movement and the 
response of the US federal government). 
459. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 1639 (2016). 
460. See id. §§ 1639(1)(A-B). 
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bill charges the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a national 
mandatory bioengineered food disclosure standard governing any 
bioengineered food and any food that may be bioengineered.461 It 
further instructs the Secretary of Agriculture to establish requirements 
and procedures that the Secretary deems necessary to carry out that 
standard within two years of the date of enactment.462 As part of this 
charge, the Secretary must determine “the amounts of a bioengineered 
substance that may be present in food, as appropriate, in order for the 
food to be a bioengineered food.”463 Furthermore, a bioengineered 
food will not be treated as safer than, or not as safe as, a non-
bioengineered counterpart of the food solely because that food is 
bioengineered or is produced or developed using bioengineering, so 
long as the food has successfully finished the premarket federal 
regulatory review process.464 Thus, the federal regulation of 
bioengineered foods will depend on the end product, and not solely on 
the process of genetic engineering used in production of the food.465 
The bill also prevents food derived from animals from being 
considered bioengineered food solely because the animals consumed 
feed that was produced from, contained, or consisted of a 
bioengineered substance.466 Finally, the bill excludes very small food 
manufacturers and food served in a restaurant or similar retail food 
establishment.467 
The bill also gives specific requirements for the labeling of such 
bioengineered foods and provides three options for compliance.468 
Food manufacturers may use text, a symbol, or an electronic or digital 
link to disclose the bioengineered status of their food.469 On-package 
language must accompany an electronic or digital link disclosure that 
demonstrates that the link will provide access to the information by 
stating “scan here for more food information” or other language that 
                                                                                                                         
 
461. See id. § 1639(a). 
462. See id. §§ 1639(a)(1-2). 
463. See id. § 1639(b)(2)(B).  
464. See id. § 1639(b)(3).  
465. See id. 
466. See id. § 1639(b)(2)(A). 
467. See id. § 1639(b)(2)(G). 
468. See id. § 1639(b)(2)(D). 
469. See id. 
706 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
only reflects technological changes.470 A telephone number that 
provides access to the disclosure must also be included with the 
electronic or digital link disclosure and such electronic or digital link 
disclosure must be of sufficient size to be effectively and easily read 
or scanned by a digital device.471 Furthermore, the electronic or 
digital link cannot have marketing or promotional information and 
must provide the disclosure on the first product information page that 
appears for the product on a mobile device, website, or other landing 
page.472 Consumer privacy is protected, as the electronic or digital 
link disclosure may not analyze, sell, or collect any personally 
identifiable information about consumers or their devices.473 If such 
information is necessary to comply with the regulation, it may not be 
used for any other purposes and must be deleted immediately.474 
The Secretary must provide alternative reasonable disclosure 
options for food contained in small or very small packages.475 Small 
manufacturers will have the option of choosing from additional on-
package options, which are a telephone number “accompanied by 
appropriate language to indicate that the phone number provides 
access to additional information” and a website that is maintained by 
the manufacturer in a manner consistent with section (d) as 
appropriate.476 Any telephone number disclosure must only state “call 
for more food information.”477 
There is a record-keeping requirement under S. 764, as each 
person that is subject to the mandatory disclosure requirement must 
maintain any records that the Secretary determines to be customary or 
reasonable in the food industry to establish compliance with the 
law.478 These records must also be available to the Secretary upon 
                                                                                                                         
 
470. See id. § 1639(d)(1)(A). 
471. See id. §§ 1639(d)(4-5). 
472. See id. § 1639(d)(2). 
473. See id. § 1639(d)(3)(A). 
474. See id. § 1639(d)(3)(B). 
475. See id. § 1639(b)(2)(E). 
476. See id. § 1639(b)(2)(F)(ii). 
477. See id. § 1639(d)(1)(B). 
478. See id. § 1639(g)(2). 
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request.479 The Secretary is also empowered to conduct an audit, 
examination, or similar activity to review any required records.480 
According to S. 764, the Secretary must conduct a study to 
identify possible technological challenges that may impact consumers 
accessing the bioengineering disclosure through digital or electronic 
methods under the regulation.481 As part of this study, the Secretary 
must consider public comments and certain factors on consumer 
access, including the availability of wireless Internet or cellular 
networks, challenges facing smaller retailers and rural retailers, and 
the costs and benefits of installing electronic or digital link scanners 
or other evolving technology that provide bioengineering disclosure 
information in retail stores.482 If the Secretary finds through this study 
that consumers would not have sufficient access to the bioengineering 
information through electronic or digital methods while shopping, the 
Secretary must consult with food manufacturers and retailers before 
providing additional and comparable options to access the 
bioengineering disclosure.483 
This federal regulation is meant to be the sole source of GMO 
labeling requirements, as shown by the explicit prohibition of state 
GMO labeling laws.484 According to the law, no state may establish or 
continue in effect any requirement relating to the labeling or 
disclosure of whether any food involved in interstate commerce is 
bioengineered, developed, or produced using bioengineering for a 
food that is subject of the national bioengineered food disclosure 
unless such requirement is identical to the mandatory disclosure 
requirement under S. 764.485 Under the heading of federal 
preemption, states are prohibited from establishing any requirement 
for food or seed in interstate commerce relating to the labeling of 
“whether a food (including food served in a restaurant or similar 
establishment) or seed is genetically engineered (which shall include 
such other similar terms as determined by the Secretary of 
                                                                                                                         
 
479. See id. 
480. See id. § 1639(g)(3)(A). 
481. See id. § 1639(c)(1). 
482. See id. §§ 1639(c)(2-3). 
483. See id. § 1639(c)(4). 
484. See id. § 1639(e). 
485. Id. 
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Agriculture) or was developed or produced using genetic 
engineering,” which includes any requirements for claims that “a food 
or seed is or contains an ingredient that was developed or produced 
using genetic engineering.”486 
Finally, the law also provides information about food that is 
considered non-GMO.487 If a food is certified under the national 
organic program established by the Organic Foods Production Act, 
the food manufacturer may make claims regarding the absence of 
bioengineering in the food, including “non-bioengineered” or “non-
GMO.”488 However, a food may not be regarded as “non-
bioengineered” or “non-GMO” only because the food is not required 
to have a disclosure that the food is bioengineered under this law.489 
10. Reaction to S.764 
As previously discussed, the reaction to the new national federal 
labeling standard has been mixed and much controversy surrounds the 
question of whether the law actually requires GMO labeling.490 Much 
of the food industry supported S. 764 and several food organizations 
voiced their opinions in the wake of the new law.491 According to the 
GMA, which vehemently opposed state GMO labeling laws, the 
legislation will “‘open a new era for transparency in ingredient 
information for consumers . . .’” and is a consistent national 
standard that is superior to a “‘costly and confusing patchwork of 
different state labeling,’” which has allegedly left consumers in the 
state of Vermont with fewer products available for purchase and 
                                                                                                                         
 
486. See id. § 1639(i)(b). 
487. See 7 U.S.C. § 6524 (2016). 
488. Id. 
489. See 7 U.S.C. § 1639(c). 
490. See supra note 457 and accompanying text (highlighting some of these opinions 
and controversy). 
491. See Congress Passes GMO Food Labeling Bill, NBC NEWS (July 14, 2016, 4:40 
PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/congress-passes-gmo-food-labeling-bill-n 
609571 (stating that the food industry supports the legislation); Dan Flynn, Compromise Bill 
On GMO Labeling Lands On President’s Desk, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (July 14, 2016), http:// 
www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/07/compromise-bill-on-gmo-labeling-lands-on-presidents-
desk/#.V-sYu8ac8UU (explaining that over 1,000 food and agricultural organizations were in 
favor of S. 764 and that many of these issued press statements following the vote). 
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raised compliance costs for small businesses.492 According to the 
Organic Trade Organization, while the measure has its flaws and the 
organization plans to advocate for further changes, the bill goes a long 
way to increase consumer clarification and covers thousands of more 
products than Vermont’s Act 120 did.493 
Despite the swelling support of the food industry, many 
organizations and commentators have strictly opposed the new law 
and have pointed out deficiencies that some argue allow companies to 
be less forthcoming about GMOs.494 A petition urging a veto with the 
100,000 signatures necessary to earn an official response was filed 
with the White House.495 However, the White House responded after 
President Obama signed the bill by discussing the bipartisan effort in 
Congress to pass the legislation.496 It is important to note that about 
half of the House Democrats and half of the Senate Democratic 
Caucus voted against the measure, as well as a small minority of the 
GOP in both the Senate and House of Representatives.497 
                                                                                                                         
 
492. See Agri-Pulse Communications, supra note 457; Flynn, supra note 491 (discussing 
the statements made by the GMA). 
493.  Letter from Leadership: GMO Labeling, Organic Trade Organization (Sept. 16, 
2016), https://www.ota.com/advocacy/gmos/gmo-labeling/letters-leadership-gmo-labeling; 
Organic Trade Organization: Lobby Group Under Activist Fire For Supporting Federal GMO 
Labeling, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.geneticliteracyproject.  
org/glp-facts/organic-trade-association-lobby-group-activist-fire-supporting-federal-gmo-
labeling/ (providing an analysis of the Organic Trade Association’s reaction to S. 764). 
494. See Dan Charles, Congress Just Passed A GMO Labeling Bill. Nobody’s Super 
Happy About It, NPR (July 14, 2016, 5:34 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections 
/thesalt/2016/07/14/486060866/congress-just-passed-a-gmo-labeling-bill-nobodys-super-
happy-about-it (analyzing the broad criticism of S. 764); Brenna Houck, President Obama 
Signs Controversial Bill Requiring GMO Labels, EATER (July 31, 2016, 2:17 PM), http:// 
www.eater.com/2016/7/31/12337356/us-passes-law-gmo-labels (explaining how critics claim 
that the law does not go far enough). 
495. See Veto the Dark Act (S. 764), WHITE HOUSE (July 9, 2016), https:// 
petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/veto-dark-act-s764; Dinan, supra note 457 (discussing this 
petition). 
496. See Veto the Dark Act (S. 764), supra note 495; Dinan, supra note 457 (examining 
the response of the White House). 
497. See Dinan, supra note 457 (giving the breakdown of the vote); Dianne Lugo, U.S. 
Senate Passes GM Food Labeling Bill, SCIENCEINSIDER (July 8, 2016, 3:45 PM), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/07/us-senate-passes-gm-food-labeling-bill (stating that 
half of Senate Democrats voted against S. 764). 
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Many have also criticized the legislative process behind the bill, 
or rather the supposed lack thereof.498 After H.R. 1599 did not pass in 
the Senate in March 2016, S. 764 was introduced to the Senate on 
June 23, 2016.499 The Senate passed the bill on July 7, 2016 and the 
House of Representatives passed it on July 14, 2016.500 Unlike 
Vermont’s Act 120, which had fifty hearings and two years of debate, 
the federal bill had less than a week of debate and no hearings.501 This 
lack of traditional legislative process has led some to criticize the 
motives of those behind the bill and characterize legislators as 
pandering to corporations, which increasingly pushed for federal 
legislative action in the wake of Vermont’s Act 120 that went into 
effect on July 1, 2016.502 
                                                                                                                         
 
498. See Andrew Kimbrell, Why The GMO ‘Labeling’ Bill That Obama Just Signed Into 
Law Is A Sham- And A National Embarrassment, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2016, 6:13 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-kimbrell/why-the-gmo-labeling-bill_b_11335918.html 
(criticizing the bill’s lack of hearings and expert testimony); Chris Morran, Congress Passes 
Bill Outlawing Vermont’s GMO Labels, Replacing Them With Barcodes, CONSUMERIST (July 
14, 2016), https://consumerist.com/2016/07/14/congress-passes-bill-outlawing-vermonts-gmo-
labels-replacing-them-with-barcodes/ (stating that the bill did no undergo the usual process of 
hearings, debate, and amending and marking up in committee). Morran also explains that the 
bill was fast tracked by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell “by simply copy/pasting its 
text into the empty shell of a bill that had already passed by the Senate, but not enacted into 
law.”  
499. See S. 764, 114th Cong. (2015-2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/senate-bill/764 [hereinafter S. 764 Timeline]; Tom Philpott, Congress Just Passed a 
Bill to Nix GMO Labeling, MOTHER JONES (June 27, 2016, 5:22 PM), http://www.  
motherjones.com/environment/2016/06/senate-deal-would-crush-vermonts-gmo-labeling-law 
(explaining how S. 764 was introduced after H.R. 1599 failed to pass the Senate in March 
2016). 
500. See S. 764 Timeline, supra note 499; Philpott, supra note 499 (providing a timeline 
of S. 764). 
501. See Jerry Hagstrom, Senate Passes GMO Label Bill, PROGRESSIVE FARMER (July 
8, 2016, 6:27 AM), https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/ag/perspectives/blogs/ag-policy-
blog/blog-post/2016/07/08/senate-passes-gmo-label-bill (stating that Vermont’s Law had fifty 
hearings, 130 witnesses, and two years of debate while the Senate bill had zero hearings and 
less than a week of debate time); Kimbrell, supra note 498 (stating the no hearings were 
conducted regarding S. 764). 
502. See Hagstrom, supra note 501 (“[A]gricultural lobbies had come together to create 
the Coalition for Safe Affordable Food specifically to preempt the Vermont Labeling law.”). 
Hagstrom also noted that this group praised the action of the Senate and characterized S. 764 
as a “‘common sense bipartisan legislation’ that will provide a consistent, disclosure 
framework.” See also Kimbrell, supra note 498 (characterizing the measure as a product of 
campaign corruption and organic industry “sellout”). 
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Some also argue that by allowing food manufacturers to use a 
bar code to disclose GMO information of the food they sell, the 
regulation allows companies to hide this information and makes it 
more difficult for consumers to find out information about GMO 
ingredients.503 According to Food & Water Watch Executive Director 
Wenonah Hauter, the options of QR codes, bar codes, or 1-800 
numbers are not transparent GMO labeling methods, but are instead 
“cumbersome, and elitist and above all—a giant hassle.”504 In 
addition to the supposed inconvenience of these options, many argue 
they disadvantage certain groups that do not have access to 
smartphones or the internet, including financially disadvantaged, 
elderly, and rural consumers who cannot access the information easily 
or at all.505 Another major argument against the law is that it provides 
no penalties for companies that fail to comply with the labeling 
requirements.506 The law also does not give any authority to recall 
products that are not correctly labeled, which has led many to 
question the law’s actual effect on companies.507 
                                                                                                                         
 
503. See Dinan, supra note 457 (highlighting these arguments); Kimbrell, supra note 498 
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CONSUMER (July 29, 2016), http://www.foodconsumer.org/newsite/Politics/32/signsdark_  
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Has Loopholes, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 1, 2016, 1:47 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/  
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(explaining Senator Sander’s opposition to S. 764 and the lack of penalties for companies who 
violate the law). 
507. See Lempert, supra note 506 (highlighting this inability); Riette van Laack & 
Ricardo Carvajal, GMO Labeling Bill Is A Pen Stroke Away From Becoming Law: What 
Comes Next?, FDA LAW BLOG (July 19, 2016), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_  
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Many also criticize the law as failing to establish measures as 
strong as the standard under Vermont’s Act 120, which went into 
effect on July 1, 2016.508 Others also oppose the federal preemption of 
state GMO labeling laws.509 While there was question of whether 
Vermont would sue the federal government if the law was passed, the 
Vermont Attorney General announced on August 2, 2016 that it 
would no longer enforce Act 120.510 As part of this announcement, 
the Vermont Attorney General’s office also stated its intention to 
“take an active role advocating for the federal regulations to give 
consumers the same access to information, in plain English, that they 
had under Vermont’s law.”511 
Perhaps one of the most interesting responses to the federal 
standard comes from the FDA, which has questioned the law’s scope 
and has flagged potential conflicts with the agency’s own 
regulations.512 In its comments to provide technical assistance on the 
draft bill, the FDA stated that the bill would give the USDA authority 
over food labeling that is “otherwise under FDA’s sole regulatory 
jurisdiction.”513 The FDA reiterated its “long-held policy position” on 
the safety concerns of GMOs and how it has previously not wanted to 
                                                                                                                         
 
what-comes-next.html (stating that the bill makes it evident that there is no authority for the 
USDA to recall a food that does not bear a required disclosure). 
508. See Sanders Vows to Defend Vermont’s GMO Labeling Law, SANDERS, http://  
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510.  As of August 2, 2016, Attorney General No Longer Enforcing Act 120, OFF. ATT’Y 
GENERAL, http://ago.vermont.gov/hot-topics/ge-food-litigation.php (setting forth the decision 
of Vermont’s Attorney General). 
511.  Id. 
512. See FDA/HHS Technical Assistance on Senate Agriculture Committee Draft 
Legislation To Establish A National Disclosure Standard For Bioengineered Foods 
(EDW16734) (June 27, 2016), available at http://src.bna.com/gnD [hereinafter FDA 
Comments On S. 764]. 
513. See FDA Comments On S. 764, supra note 512 (discussing the agency’s 
disagreement with this assignment). 
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be responsible for a regulatory program governing labeling of foods 
as bioengineered, as the public might consider it to be a reflection on 
the safety of such foods.514 The FDA expressed how the option of 
providing disclosures electronically is in tension with the FDA’s 
statute and regulations requiring disclosures on food labels.515 Most 
importantly, the FDA stated that the definition of “bioengineering” 
would result in a “somewhat narrow cope of coverage” and explained 
that the phrase “that contains genetic material” will exclude many 
foods from GE sources from labeling requirements, such as oil made 
from GE soy, starches, and purified proteins.516 The scope of 
coverage to foods where the genetic modification “could not 
otherwise be obtained through conventional breeding or found in 
nature” would be difficult to show.517 
As just demonstrated, there are several contrasting views of S. 
764 and the federal preemption of state GMO labeling laws.518 While 
there is a wide range of opinions on these issues, one idea remains 
undeniable: the United States has seen a dramatic shift in GMO 
regulatory policy as a result of the state movement towards GMO 
labeling.519 This causal relationship greatly mirrors the 
implementation of mandatory GMO labeling requirements in the 
European Union as result of Member State action that brought about 
the 1997 EU crisis, which is discussed below in Part Section II.B.520 
B. EU Opposition to GMOs 
This Section will describe how the European Union faced public 
opposition similar to what the United States has experienced 
                                                                                                                         
 
514. See FDA Comments On S. 764, supra note 512 (explaining and reiterating the 
FDA’s policy on GMOs under the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy). 
515. See FDA Comments On S. 764, supra note 512 (setting forth some of the agency’s 
objections to the disclosure methods under S. 764). 
516. See FDA Comments on S. 764, supra note 512 (highlighting one of the biggest 
concerns about S. 764 with regards to this definition). 
517. See FDA Comments on S. 764, supra note 512 (discussing the complications with 
the application of S. 764). 
518. See supra notes 490-517 and accompanying text (providing an overview of some of 
these views). 
519. See supra Sections I.A, II.A (explaining the history of GMO labeling in the United 
States). 
520. See infra Section II.B (providing an overview of the 1997 EU crisis). 
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concerning GMO labeling. Section I.B.1 will describe the labeling 
requirements before the crisis in the European Union and what led to 
public unrest about GMO labeling while Section I.B.2 will detail the 
actual crisis. Section I.B.3 will explain the reform of the labeling 
regime through the 2001 Deliberate Release Directive and the 
Traceability and Labeling Regulation. 
While the European Union has a much stricter GMO labeling 
regime than the United States, it has faced and still faces public 
opposition to its policies that call for even greater restrictions on the 
cultivation of GMOs and the use of these genetically engineered 
products on the market.521 As discussed in Part I of this Note, the 
precautionary principle is the foundation of the EU GMO regulatory 
system and thus the regulation of GMOs is based on a detailed risk 
assessment system that relies on current scientific evidence and 
independent assessments.522 While this detailed system has a main 
objective of protecting human health and the environment, the EU 
public still distrusts GMOs in general, including those that have been 
approved under the current regulatory system.523 And while the 
European Union has moved to a more streamlined approach to GMO 
approval since the 1998 de facto moratorium on GMOs, public 
opinion has not followed this shift and continues to oppose GMOs 
vehemently across the board.524 
                                                                                                                         
 
521. See generally supra Sections I.A-B (explaining the stark differences between the 
two regulatory systems); see also infra note 524 (highlighting the request of Member States to 
ban cultivation of GMOs in their territories). 
522. See generally supra Section I.B. (explaining the precautionary principle and the risk 
assessment procedures in the EU regulatory system). 
523. See Wilinska, supra note 19, at 155-56 (explaining how European consumers are 
extremely skeptical of GM foods and exhibit a lack of trust in their governments’ food safety 
regulations); Sella-Villa, supra note 294, at 973 (stating that as opposed to US citizens, 
Europeans are deeply skeptical about GMO’s environmental impact and do not trust 
government food regulations since the 1990s Mad Cow scare). 
524. See Federici, supra note 39, at 542 (describing how a majority of Europeans do not 
support GM foods, as they are not considered useful but risky to society, even after much 
stricter regulations have been imposed on GMOs in the European Union); Wilinska, supra 
note 20, at 155 (stating that genetic research and development of GM foods have been at the 
center of hot debate and vehement resistance in Europe). 
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1. Labeling Requirements in the European Union Before the 1998 De 
Facto Moratorium on GMOs and the 1997 EU Crisis 
Public opinion has been a strong factor in EU GMO regulation 
and has greatly influenced the European Union’s mandatory labeling 
regime.525 As discussed in Part I of this Note, there was a de facto 
moratorium on GMOs being cultivated or approved in the European 
Union, which led to an international dispute at the WTO.526 Before 
this de facto moratorium occurred, the European Union did not 
require labeling of GMOs and did not require manufacturers to 
include a plan for labeling in their approval applications.527 Due to the 
lack of a labeling regime, a crisis erupted in the European Union 
when Bt-maize was approved without any labeling requirements and 
was set to enter the EU market without any indication that it 
contained the approved GMO.528 As previously discussed, GMO 
regulation went through a series of reforms and changes as a result of 
this crisis, including the introduction of a more streamlined approach 
that focuses heavily on independent risk assessment conducted by the 
EFSA and input from the Member States.529 
                                                                                                                         
 
525. See generally Wilinska, supra note 19, at 541-46 (giving an overview of the way in 
which public opinion in the European Union concerning GMOs has greatly influenced the 
regulation of such products); Sella-Villa, supra note 294, at 973-74 (detailing how the 
differences between the legal regimes of the United States and European Union with respect to 
GMOs reflect different social and cultural approaches to GMOs). 
526. See generally supra Section I.B. (discussing the de facto moratorium). 
527. See 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 150, art. 11, at 1 (detailing how 
a notifier “may propose not to comply” with one or more of the requirements of Annex III B, 
which set out the requirements for a proposal of labeling and packaging, if the notifier 
considered either on the basis of the results of any release notified under Part B of the 
Directive or on substantive reasoned scientific ground that the placing on the market and use 
of the product did not pose a risk to the environment or human health); see also Stewart & 
Johanson, supra note 243, at 258 (describing how there was no labeling requirement under 
1990 Deliberate Release Directive, since notifying parties could propose not to comply to the 
requirements of Annex III.B, which set forth rules for labeling). 
528. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 260-78 (giving a detailed explanation of 
the crisis that took place in the European Union and its roots in the controversial approval of 
Bt-maize in 1997); see also Mereu, supra note 182, at 206 (describing the problems resulting 
from the approval of Bt-maize over the objection of most Member States and the de facto 
moratorium stemming from the Member States’ reliance on the Safeguard Clause of the 1990 
Deliberate Release Directive and desire for transparency and traceability). 
529. See generally supra Section I.B. (explaining these reforms). 
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Part of this reform included an expansion of subject matter 
covered by the regulation.530 Under the 1990 Deliberate Release 
Directive, the development of GM crops and placing of live GMOs 
including fruit, seeds, and other products “containing viable GMOs” 
were included in the Directive because it specifically applied to raw 
materials.531 However, this did not include processed products that 
contained GMOs.532 This narrow application ceased under the Novel 
Foods Regulation, which regulated novel foods and novel food 
ingredients.533 According to the Novel Foods Regulation, novel foods 
included foods containing GMOs that were further processed and 
were the finished products that consumers bought in stores.534 
Specifically, novel foods were foods that “had not been used for 
human consumption to a significant degree within the Community 
before May 1997” and fell into one of six categories.535 This 
sometimes made it difficult for manufacturers to determine if their 
products were included in the Regulation and were thus required to 
obtain premarket authorization.536  
                                                                                                                         
 
530. See generally Federici, supra note 39, at 543-46 (highlighting the scope of the 
reform, specifically regarding GMO labeling); Sella-Villa, supra note 294, at 982-91 
(explaining the changes in the EU regulatory system from the 1990s through 2003). 
531. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 256 (discussing the 1990 Deliberate 
Release Directive as “[concerning] the placing in the market of GMO products that may be 
described as raw materials”); Hilary Ross, Genetically Modified Food: The EU Regulatory 
“Maize”, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 9, 9 (2003-2004) (discussing the types of GMOs that 
were covered under the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive). 
532. See Ross, supra note 531, at 9 (explaining the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive’s 
failure to regulate processed products containing GMOs as the Directive’s “major failing”); 
see also Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 256 (distinguishing raw foods, which were 
covered by the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, from novel foods, which would be covered 
under a separate Regulation). 
533. See Novel Foods Regulation, supra note 197; see also DEBRA HOLLAND & HELEN 
POPE, EU FOOD LAW AND POLICY 112 (2004) (explaining the Novel Foods Regulation). 
534. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 256 (explaining novel foods and how 
they compare to raw foods). See generally Ross, supra note 531, at 9 (introducing the Novel 
Foods Regulation). 
535. Ross, supra note 531, at 9 (defining novel foods and describing the category system 
under the Novel Foods Regulation); Novel Foods Regulation, supra note 197, art. 1, at 2 
(stating what the Regulation applies to and the six categories). 
536. See Ross, supra note 531, at 10 (highlighting a difficulty faced by manufacturers 
under the Novel Foods Regulation). See generally GERALD C. NELSON, GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED ORGANISMS IN AGRICULTURE: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 112 (2001) (discussing 
market uncertainty that resulted from the Novel Foods Regulation). 
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As part of the Novel Foods Regulation, manufacturers of novel 
foods were required to have their goods authorized before bringing 
them to market and the Regulation mandated labeling for novel foods 
or food ingredients if they fit certain requirements.537 Under the Novel 
Foods Regulation, novel foods or food ingredients had to be labeled if 
(1) they were no longer equivalent to a conventional food or 
ingredient, (2) raised health implications for certain sections of the 
population, (3) contained material which gave rise to ethical concerns, 
or (4) contained live GMOs.538 If a manufacturer determined that his 
product had not been used for human consumption to a significant 
degree before May 15, 1997 and that it fell into one of the six 
categories found in Article 1, he then had to apply for premarket 
approval and fulfill labeling requirements as part of the application.539 
For any characteristics of a food that made it no longer equivalent to a 
conventional food or ingredient, the label had to give details to inform 
consumers of such characteristics.540 One of the main deficiencies of 
this labeling requirement was that since it did not include specific 
guidelines, but rather gave general principles, there was not a set 
framework to use in order to determine if a product required labeling 
under the Regulation.541 A second problem was that it was not 
retroactive and thus only applied to “novel foods” that were seeking 
market approval after May 1997.542 
                                                                                                                         
 
537. See generally Novel Foods Regulation, supra note 197 (applying rules and 
requirements to manufacturers of novel foods). 
538. See id. art. 8, at 1 (setting forth the requirements for labeling). 
539. See id. art. 1, at 2 (providing the six categories to which this regulation applied); 
Ross, supra note 531, at 10 (discussing the requirements under the Novel Foods Regulation). 
540. See Novel Foods Regulation, supra note 197, art. 8, at 1 (detailing how a product 
had to be labeled in this situation); Ross, supra note 531, at 10 (giving the requirements 
regarding these characteristics). 
541. See HOLLAND & POPE, supra note 533, at 113 (stating that since the provisions 
were only general principles, it was extremely difficult to predict whether they would apply in 
practice); Ross, supra note 531, at 9-10 (explaining some of the complications with the Novel 
Foods Regulation, such as manufacturer confusion). 
542. See HOLLAND & POPE, supra note 533, at 112-13 (stating that this regulation only 
applied to foods that were not used to a significant degree before May 1997); Ross, supra note 
531, at 10 (discussing the May 15, 1997 date). 
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2. A Temporary Solution to the 1997 European Union Crisis 
While the implementation of the Novel Foods Regulation 
attempted to allay the fears of the public, consumers were still 
concerned with GMO products that had been authorized under the 
1990 Deliberate Release Directive that were not under this labeling 
requirement since the Novel Foods Regulation was not retroactive.543 
Thus, Regulation 259/97, which took effect as of January 27, 1997, 
did little to avoid the crisis that occurred as a result of the 
Commission’s approval of Bt-maize, which granted France the 
authority to place Ciba-Geigy’s GMO maize on the market without a 
labeling requirement since the product did not “present safety 
concerns.”544 As discussed in Part I of this Note, Austria and 
Luxembourg banned Bt-maize from their territories based on Article 
16 of the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, which allowed Member 
States to ban an approved GMO if they had justifiable reasons to 
believe that the product might adversely affect human health or the 
environment.545 In addition to the Novel Foods Regulation, other 
regulatory changes were attempted in order to rectify the situation and 
to quench the public’s desire for GMO labeling.546 On April 2, 1997, 
the Commission proposed to amend the 1990 Deliberate Release 
Directive so that products that contained or may have contained 
GMOs would be labeled.547 While this was not the permanent solution 
                                                                                                                         
 
543. See Ross, supra note 531, at 10 (stating that the Novel Foods Regulation was not 
retrospective in its application); Sella-Villa, supra note 294, at 983 (explaining how this 
regulation defined “novel foods” as foods and ingredients that had not been used for human 
consumption to a significant degree within the Community before May 15, 1997). 
544. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 263 (discussing the authorization of Bt-
maize and the rationale behind the lack of mandatory labeling of the product); Ross, supra 
note 531, at 9-11 (explaining how the crisis still occurred despite efforts to calm public unrest 
through these measures). 
545. See generally supra Section I.B (explaining the Member State response to the 
approval of Bt-maize); Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 267 (discussing the Member 
State reaction to the authorization of Bt-maize). 
546. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 269 (explaining these attempted 
measures and their purposes). See generally Ross, supra note 531, at 10 (giving an overview of 
the attempts to settle the public dissent). 
547. See European Commission Press Release, IP/97/259, The European Commission 
Has Decided to Propose Further Labelling of Genetically Modified Organisms (Apr. 2, 1997) 
(proposing to amend the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive); Stewart & Johanson, supra note 
243, at 269 (discussing this proposal). 
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to the labeling issue in the European Union, it was a transitional 
repair that was made in anticipation of the Commission’s review of 
the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive.548 The main reason behind this 
change was the Member State demand for labeling, as most Member 
States objected to placing Bt-maize on the market without labeling.549 
Another reason was the clear stance that Austria and Luxembourg 
took in banning the approved product, as they too demanded labeling, 
in addition to further regulation of GMO products.550 
The Regulatory Committee approved the Commission’s proposal 
to amend the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive on May 29, 1997 and 
the Commission adopted the labeling amendment, the 1997 Adapting 
Directive, on June 18, 1997.551 Under this new Directive, Member 
States had to conform to the decision by July 31, 1997.552 Products 
that contained GMOs now required labeling and when GMO products 
were mixed with non-GMO products, the label had to indicate that 
genetically modified organisms “may be present.”553 
A crucial part of this Directive is the way in which it was 
adopted.554 Because of the crisis in the European Union, the 
Commission decided to act quickly in order to calm public outrage 
over the authorization of GMOs such as Bt-maize and to bring 
                                                                                                                         
 
548. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 268 (discussing this temporary 
solution). See generally Ross, supra note 531, at 10 (explaining one of the temporary solutions 
to the unrest of the EU public). 
549. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 268-69 (“[A]ccording to Ritt 
Bjerregaard, the European Union’s Environmental Commissioner, the strong support of the 
Member States for labeling was a major impetus behind the Commission’s decision.”); Nelson, 
supra note 536, at 112 (stating that shortly after Bt-maize was approved by the Commission, 
the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive was amended by the 1997 Adapting Directive to require 
labeling products that contained or may have contained GMOs). 
550. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 268-69 (discussing these demands). See 
generally Nelson, supra note 536, at 112 (stating that the Commission amended the 1990 
Deliberate Release Directive to mandate GMO labeling). 
551. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 270 (explaining the directive); GERALD 
C. NELSON, GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS IN AGRICULTURE: ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICS 112 (2001); Nelson, supra note 536, at 112 (explaining 1997 Adapting Directive). 
552. See 1997 Adapting Directive, supra note 290, art. 2 (giving this deadline). 
553. See id. Annex III (C) (setting these requirements); Stewart & Johanson, supra note 
243, at 270-71 (discussing the changes under the 1997 Adapting Directive). 
554. See Patrick Chalmers, EU Gene-Produce Label Rules Possible Within Weeks Plans 
Mandatory GMO Labeling, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 1997) (covering the sudden movement 
towards reform); Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 270 (explaining the special way in 
which the directive was adopted). 
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consistency back to GMO regulation.555 Specifically, the Commission 
was concerned that the Member States’ refusal to adopt its decision 
concerning Bt-maize frustrated the purpose of the 1990 Deliberate 
Release Directive and would lead to a total halt to authorization of 
GMOs (which it did during the de facto moratorium on GMOs from 
1998-2004).556 To amend the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, the 
Commission proposed a “fast track” to make it a technical process 
that would eliminate the involvement of the Council and the 
Parliament.557 This process would only require the Commission’s and 
Regulatory Committee’s approval, which would allow the amendment 
to be adopted within weeks, as opposed to between a year or two 
under the traditional process.558 It was through this fast track approach 
that the Commission adopted the 1997 Adapting Directive and 
mandated GMO labeling.559 While the Directive could not be 
retroactive, as this is not within the Commission’s authority, most 
companies that had submitted notifications voluntarily agreed to label 
their products to indicate that they contained GMOs.560 
3. GMO Labeling Reform Through The 2001 Deliberate Release 
Directive and the Traceability and Labeling Regulation 
As previously discussed, the 1997 Adapting Directive was only a 
temporary solution to settle the 1997 crisis in the European Union that 
led to the de facto moratorium, which lasted until 2004.561 As early as 
                                                                                                                         
 
555. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 270 (discussing this method); 
Chalmers, supra note 554 (covering the sudden movement towards reform). 
556. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 269 (discussing the motivation behind 
the Commission’s actions); Ross, supra note 531, at 10-11 (describing that no efforts worked 
to prevent the de facto moratorium in 1998). 
557. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 269-70 (detailing this method). 
558. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 270 (explaining how the Commission 
expedited the process). See generally Chalmers, supra note 554 (discussing the process). 
559. See European Commission Press Release, IP 97/528, EU Commission Press 
Release on GMO Labeling (June 18, 1997) [hereinafter Commission Press Release, IP 
97/528]; Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 270-71 (stating that the Commission used this 
fast-track process to adopt the Novel Foods Regulation). 
560. See Commission Press Release, IP 97/528, supra note 559; Stewart & Johanson, 
supra note 243, at 271 (stating that most companies agreed to comply with the directive). 
561. See Ross, supra note 531, at 10-11 (stating that nothing prevented the de facto 
moratorium that took place in 1998); Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 268 (explaining 
how this was a temporary solution); Mereu, supra note 182, at 206 (describing the de facto 
moratorium). 
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1996, the Commission was anticipating a review of the 1990 
Deliberate Release Directive, which ultimately resulted in the 
formation of the current GMO regime in the European Union under 
the Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation and the 
Traceability and Labeling Regulation.562 First came the 2001 
Deliberate Release Directive, which sought to resolve consumer 
concerns about GMOs and was an attempt to solve the problems of 
the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, placing greater emphasis on 
the precautionary principle and a case-by-case analysis of each 
proposed product.563 Furthermore, the 2001 Deliberate Release 
Directive clearly required that any application must give the proposed 
packaging of the product, including a section of the label or an 
accompanying document that clearly states that the product contains 
genetically modified organisms.564 
Though the 2001 Deliberate Release Directive was a much more 
detailed and clear set of requirements concerning the approval and 
labeling of GMO products, it was not until the Traceability and 
Labeling Regulation amended the 2001 Deliberate Release Directive 
that a threshold requirement was set for labeling GMO food 
products.565 Even though the labeling requirements were largely 
brought about due to public dissent, these further requirements under 
the Traceability and Labeling Regulation were also meant to ensure 
                                                                                                                         
 
562. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 268 (explaining how the Commission 
anticipated adding a GMO labeling provision to the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive); 
MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 246 (discussing the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive). 
563. See MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 246 (analyzing the shift from the 1990 
Deliberate Release Directive to the 2001 Deliberate Release Directive and how the 2001 
Deliberate Release Directive was “largely moulded by a vastly increased consideration for 
consumer concern”); see also Carrau, supra note 21, at 1181 (explaining that a moratorium 
occurred because the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive was not sufficient to assure 
confidence among citizens in the European Union). 
564. See 2001 Deliberate Release Directive, supra note 151, art. 13, at 2(f) (stating the 
application requirements for labeling); MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 247 (summarizing 
the labeling requirements under the directive’s premarket approval process). 
565. See MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 250-51 (giving an overview of the 
traceability requirements under the Traceability and Labeling Regulation, including the 
threshold level); Sella-Villa, supra note 294, at 990 (explaining how the Traceability and 
Labeling Regulation set a threshold standard in order to enhance traceability). 
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further traceability and to promote the precautionary principle.566 
Specifically, the justifications for these new traceability requirements 
were to facilitate the removal of products whose unforeseen negative 
effects on human health, animal health, and the environment are 
established, and to also allow for the implementation of other 
precautionary risk management measures when necessary.567 This 
traceability is twofold, as it mainly allows for unsafe GMO products 
to be efficiently removed from the market by allowing food operators 
to identify who supplied the product and which other businesses have 
been supplied with the product by the same source.568 Also, the 
traceability requirements permit consumers to receive accurate 
information about the foods they are eating, as the food is able to be 
tracked in all stages of production, processing, and distribution.569 
Specifically, the Regulation states that this accurate information 
should be made available to operators and consumers to allow them to 
use their freedom of choice in an effective manner.570 
In order to ensure traceability, Article 4 of the Traceability and 
Labeling Regulation requires traceability at the first stage of placing a 
product consisting of or containing GMOs on the market.571 The 
operator that is sending the product to another operator must state in 
                                                                                                                         
 
566. See MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 250 (explaining the purposes of the 
Traceability and Labeling Regulation); Traceability and Labeling Regulation, supra note 151, 
recital 3 (stating the goals of traceability requirements under the regulation). 
567. See MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 250 (discussing the motivation behind the 
Traceability and Labeling Regulation); see also Traceability and Labeling Regulation, supra 
note 151, recital 3 (setting forth the objectives of the regulation). 
568. See Alemanno, supra note 157, at 153 (discussing the dichotomy of traceability 
requirements); MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 250 (stating that one of the reasons behind 
the traceability requirements is to make the removal of harmful products from the market more 
efficient). 
569. See Traceability and Labeling Regulation, supra note 151, recital 4 (articulating 
that the traceability requirements should be put into place in order to allow consumers to freely 
choose with accurate information); Alemanno, supra note 157, at 154 (discussing the general 
principle of traceability in the European Union). 
570. See Traceability and Labeling Regulation, supra note 151, recital 4 (describing the 
relationship between accurate information and consumer choice); see also Alemanno, supra 
note 157, at 153 (stating that traceability enables consumers to be provided with targeted and 
accurate information regarding a certain product). 
571. See Traceability and Labeling Regulation, supra note 151, art. 4, at 1 (stating the 
requirements of operators at the first stage of placing on the market). See generally 
MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 250 (explaining how the regulation is meant to ensure 
traceability at all stages of the food production process). 
2017] GMO LABELING IN THE US AND EU 723 
writing that the product contains or consists of GMOs and must also 
include a “unique identifier” assigned to those GMOs in accordance 
with Article 8.572 Under the Traceability and Labeling Regulation, 
this information must continue down the chain to operators at all 
subsequent stages of the production and marketing process.573 This 
traceability requirement extends longer than the supply chain, as all 
operators that are a part of the marketing chain and food production 
chain must have systems and standardized procedures in place to keep 
that information for five years after each transaction.574 
Under Article 4, operators of products containing or consisting 
of GMOs must include labels stating “this product contains 
genetically modified organisms” or “this product contains genetically 
modified [name of organism(s)]” on the label.575 If the product is not 
pre-packaged, the phrases “this product contains genetically modified 
organisms” or “this product contains genetically modified [name of 
organism(s)]” must appear on or in connection with the display of the 
product.576 As discussed in Part I of this Note, these requirements do 
not apply to traces of GMOs in products in levels under a threshold 
                                                                                                                         
 
572. See Traceability and Labeling Regulation, supra note 151, art. 4, at 1 (providing 
different requirements for products consisting of or containing mixtures of GMOs to be used 
only and directly as food, feed, or for processing); MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 250 
(explaining the unique identifier). 
573. See Traceability and Labeling Regulation, supra note 151, art. 4, at 2 (requiring 
operators to ensure that the information received is transmitted in writing to the operators 
receiving the products “at all subsequent stages of placing on the market of product”); see also 
MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 250 (describing Article 4(2) of the Traceability and 
Labeling Regulation). 
574. See Traceability and Labeling Regulation, supra note 151, art. 4, at 4 (stating that 
operators must have systems and standardized procedures in place to hold the information for 
five years from each transaction); MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 250 (detailing this 
requirement for all operators in the chain). 
575. Traceability and Labeling Regulation, supra note 151, art. 4, at 4(B)(6) (detailing 
how products consisting of or containing GMOs must be labeled); MACMAOLAIN, supra note 
334, at 250 (explaining how operators at the initial stage of production must clearly state in 
writing that the product consists of or contains a GMO). 
576. See Traceability and Labeling Regulation, supra note 151, art. 4, at 4(B)(6) 
(mandating how products consisting of or containing GMOs that are not pre-packaged are to 
be labeled); MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 251 (describing the requirements for products 
that are not pre-packaged). 
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amount prescribed by the 2001 Deliberate Release Directive and 
Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation.577 
The European Union’s current GMO labeling requirements went 
through many important changes and served as a significant part of 
the solution in calming public unrest about the safety of GMOs.578 
While many other changes were made to the European Union’s 
regulatory system, the labeling reforms were a temporary fix that 
addressed the 1997 crisis by meeting the desires of the majority of the 
Member States and the public.579 This greatly parallels the public 
unrest that has existed across the United States concerning the FDA’s 
refusal to require GMO labeling and the state movement to enact 
GMO labeling laws in the face of the US House of Representatives 
and the FDA.580 Due to the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy on GMOs 
that does not mandate GMO labeling, the states took it upon 
themselves to defy the agency and create their own laws.581 Likewise, 
in 1997, EU Member States took it upon themselves to ban an 
approved GMO in their territories despite the Commission’s 
approval.582 While the European Union’s structure is different from 
that of the United States, the complications of the push for GMO 
labeling laws are quite similar and bring about another issue with 
respect to GMO labeling, which is uniformity.583 
As discussed previously in this Note, the Commission was 
greatly concerned with the lack of uniformity in the European Union 
as a result of the Member States’ refusal to adopt the Commission’s 
                                                                                                                         
 
577. See generally Traceability and Labeling Regulation, supra note 151, art. 4 
(exempting products that contain a trace amount of GMOs); MACMAOLAIN, supra note 334, at 
251 (discussing the trace exemption and the threshold levels found in the 2001 Deliberate 
Release Directive and the Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation). 
578. See supra notes 505-60 and accompanying text (detailing these changes). 
579. See generally supra Section II.B (explaining this temporary solution). 
580. See generally supra Part II (detailing the increasing public demand for GMO 
labeling and the reaction of the FDA and the US House of Representatives). 
581. See generally supra Section I.A (discussing the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy); 
supra Section II.A (explaining the state movement towards mandatory GMO labeling). 
582. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 243, at 266-67 (giving an overview of the 
Member State reaction to the authorization of Bt-maize and their reliance on Article 16 of the 
1990 Deliberate Release Directive); THE YEAR IN TRADE, supra note 282, at 104 n.180 
(explaining the actions of several Member States in reaction to the approval of Bt-maize). 
583. See supra notes 362-63 and accompanying text (highlighting concerns over a 
“patchwork” system that might arise as a result of different state GMO labeling laws). 
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decision to allow Bt-maize to be marketed in the European Union 
without labeling.584 Because of these concerns, GMO labeling in the 
European Union would be regulated under one system, instead of 
allowing the Member States to craft their own rules and legislation to 
require labeling.585 Specifically, the Traceability and Labeling 
Regulation states that differences between national laws, 
administrative provisions, and regulations that concern traceability 
and labeling of GMOs as products or in products may hamper their 
free movement and therefore create unequal and unfair 
competition.586 Furthermore, the Regulation says that in order to 
contribute to the effective functioning of the internal market, there 
should be a “harmonized” Community framework for labeling and 
traceability of GMOs.587 Thus, according to the Traceability and 
Labeling Regulation, the labeling requirements for GMOs within the 
Community framework have to be uniform in order to allow GMOs to 
be unhindered in the market and to allow the EU market to function in 
an effective and harmonized way.588 It is clear from this determination 
that a uniform labeling system under the Traceability and Labeling 
Regulation was a key component of GMO labeling reform in the 
European Union and a preferred solution to differing national laws 
and regulations.589 
4. Member States Cultivation Directive 
The European Union’s stance on labeling and traceability has 
not changed since 2003, as the labeling of GMOs is still governed by 
the Traceability and Labeling Regulation and no major changes have 
been made to the requirements, including the 0.9% threshold limit.590 
                                                                                                                         
 
584. See supra note 480 and accompanying text (explaining the Commission’s position). 
585. See Traceability and Labeling Regulation, supra note 151, recital 2 (explaining the 
need to have uniform rules concerning this area of GMO regulation). 
586. Id. (explaining the possible complications of non-uniform traceability and labeling 
requirements). 
587. Id. (stating the need for uniform labeling and traceability standards). 
588. Id. (discussing how the harmonized Community framework in this area contributes 
to the effective functioning of the internal market). 
589. Id. (highlighting the need for uniform traceability and labeling requirements for the 
benefit of the internal market). 
590. See Sella-Villa, supra note 294, at 983 (stating that the Traceability and Labeling 
Regulation is a part of the reform and highlighting the need for uniform traceability and 
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The same cannot be said concerning the cultivation of GMOs in 
Member State territories.591 After thirteen Member States requested 
the Commission to give them the ability to make decisions on GMO 
cultivation in their territories, the request was granted under the 
Member States Cultivation Directive, which gives Member States two 
different options to restrict GMO cultivation in their territories.592 
Before a GMO is authorized, a Member State can demand that part or 
all of its territory be exempt from the geographical scope of the 
application with the agreement of the applicant.593 There are nuances 
to this option that this Note does not cover, but one important point is 
that it does not require the Member State to include a justification for 
its exclusion.594 
The second option allows a Member State to opt out.595 Here, a 
Member State can adopt measures to restrict or ban GMO cultivation 
on part or all of its territory at any time after the GMO has been 
authorized.596 However, unlike the first option, the Member State 
must justify its decision based on reasoned grounds that do not 
conflict with the EU assessment of risks on health or the 
environment.597 These include land use, socio-economic impacts, 
public policy, environmental/agricultural policy objectives, and town 
and country planning.598 As part of the Directive, special attention 
must also be paid to the prevention of cross-border contamination 
                                                                                                                         
 
labeling requirements for the benefit of the internal market); Federici, supra note 39, at 543 
(discussing the transition from the old guidelines to the current instructions under the 
Traceability and Labeling Regulation). 
591. See infra notes 592-99 and accompanying text (discussing the new directive that 
allows Member States to restrict GMO cultivation in their territories). 
592. See generally Directive (EU)2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 2015 Amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards The Possibility For 
The Member States To Restrict Or Prohibit The Cultivation Of Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs) In Their Territory, 2015 O.J. L 68/1 [hereinafter Member States 
Cultivation Directive]. 
593. See Member States Cultivation Directive, supra note 592, art. 1, at 2 (giving 
Member States this option before a GMO is authorized). 
594. See id. (failing to list a requirement for a justification). 
595. See id. (allowing Member States to opt out). 
596. See id. (stating what Member States that did not demand exemption before 
authorization may do with respect to the cultivation of authorized GMOs). 
597. See id. (explaining the different requirement for the Member State under this 
option). 
598. See id. (listing the justifications upon which the measures must be based). 
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from a Member State that permits cultivation of a GMO to a Member 
State that prohibits it.599 In accordance with EU general public 
opinion, many Member States have taken advantage of the Member 
States Cultivation Directive.600 As of October 2015, two-thirds of 
Member States have chosen the opt-out option under the Directive 
and have requested opt-outs from the cultivation of genetically 
modified crops for all or part of their territory.601 
As shown by the Member States Cultivation Directive, the 
European Union continues to address issues with respect to GMOs by 
changing existing procedures to better deal with specialized issues 
within GMO regulation.602 According to the Directive, experience 
shows that cultivation is addressed more thoroughly at the Member 
State level, while issues related to the placing on the market and the 
import of GMOs should remain regulated at the Union level in order 
to preserve the internal market.603 Therefore, measures governing the 
labeling and traceability of GMOs remains at the Union level 
because, unlike cultivation, the uniform regulation of GMO labeling 
is still considered to be paramount to the internal market and therefore 
is not left to Member State discretion.604 
                                                                                                                         
 
599. See id. recital 10 (explaining how particular attention must be paid to preventing 
cross-border contamination among Member States who have made different cultivation 
decisions). 
600. See infra note 601 and accompanying text. 
601. See Two Thirds of EU States Reject GMO Crops, File Cultivation Opt-Out 
Requests, RT (Oct. 5, 2015, 3:11 AM), https://www.rt.com/news/317638-eu-gmo-cultivation-
opt-out/ (stating that two thirds of EU Member States have requested to be allowed to ban 
growing GMO crops in their territories by using the “opt-out” clause of the directive); 
Jonathan Stearns, Most EU Countries to Ban Cultivation of 8 GMOs Using New Rules, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 5, 2015, 2:42 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
10-05/most-eu-countries-to-ban-cultivation-of-8-gmos-using-new-rules (announcing that more 
than half of the EU Member States demanded that all or part of their territory be shielded from 
eight pending applications to grow GMO crops in their countries); Lorraine Chow, It’s 
Official: 19 European Countries Say ‘No’ To GMOs, ECOWATCH (Oct. 5, 2015, 10:32 AM), 
http://ecowatch.com/2015/10/05/european-union-ban-gmos/ (explaining how the Member 
States “specifically targeted” the cultivation of Monsanto’s MON 810 Maize and how this 
crop, which was under review, was the only GMO crop grown in Europe at the time). 
602. See supra notes 590-604 and accompanying text (explaining the innovative policies 
under the Member States Cultivation Directive). 
603. See Traceability and Labeling Regulation, supra note 151, recital 2 (stating the 
need for uniform labeling and traceability standards). 
604. Id. (justifying the uniform approach taken for labeling and traceability). 
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III: ADVANCING GMO TRANSPARENCY UNDER THE 
CONSUMER RIGHT TO KNOW POLICY 
This Note was originally written with the intention of proposing 
a federal solution to the debate that would prevent the United States 
from experiencing a situation similar to the 1997 EU crisis. However, 
during the course of writing this Note, President Obama signed S. 764 
into law, making federal GMO labeling a reality and shutting down 
the state movement that paralleled the Member State actions in 1997 
during the EU crisis. As a result, the focus of this Note shifted from a 
stance of warning to a position of observation and suggestions for 
improvement. Thus, this Part will argue that while the United States 
successfully avoided a crisis similar to that of the European Union, it 
did not respond to public outcry as effectively as the European Union 
did in mandating GMO labeling through the Traceability and 
Labeling Regulation. This Part proposes a solution to the critical 
debate occurring in the United States over mandatory GMO labeling 
based on the Consumer Right to Know Policy that corrects the 
deficiencies under the new federal national standard established by S. 
764. 
A. How the United States Avoided a Crisis Similar to the 1997 EU 
Crisis 
Just as the European Union reached a pinnacle in its GMO 
labeling debate in 1997, the United States was at its apex, as 
individual states defied the FDA and passed laws requiring GMO 
labeling at the state level.605 Similar to the 1992 FDA Statement of 
Policy, the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive did not require GMO 
labeling in direct conflict with public opinion.606 When Bt-maize was 
under consideration for approval in 1997 in the European Union, the 
Commission approved the GMO product for the market despite 
Member State objections.607 This parallels the response of the US 
federal government in 2015 with the passing of H.R. 1599 by the US 
House of Representatives, which would have implemented a 
                                                                                                                         
 
605. See generally supra Part II (discussing the state movement). 
606. See generally supra Part I (explaining the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive). 
607. See generally supra Section I.B (describing the conditions surrounding the approval 
of Bt-maize in 1997). 
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voluntary GMO labeling system that defiantly rejected the state laws 
of Vermont, Connecticut, and Maine requiring GMO labeling by 
manufacturers.608 More broadly, the two responses are strikingly 
similar in their defiance to public opinion concerning GMO 
transparency and greater regulation of such products.609 Just as the 
Commission ignored public opinion concerning GMO transparency 
for several years, the US federal government has repeatedly refused to 
mandate GMO labeling based on the Consumer Right to Know 
Policy.610 It is this open defiance and refusal to consider public 
opinion that brought about the 1997 EU Crisis and the recent US 
national debate over GMO labeling, and which prompted severe 
action in both situations.611 
The responses to these actions are also eerily similar, as both the 
Member States in the European Union and individual states in the 
United States took GMO regulation into their own hands and imposed 
severe restrictions on GMOs in their borders.612 While the Member 
States of the European Union did not implement their own regulation 
of such products as the United States did, they did refuse to adhere to 
the decisions of the Commission and thereby demanded intense 
change.613 Furthermore, many of the concerns surrounding such 
action were the same, as those in both the European Union and United 
States feared a resulting patchwork system that would affect the 
marketing of GMO products based on the borders they entered.614 
However, the most important similarity between these two 
situations is the remedy used to calm public outrage and action from 
the Member States in the European Union and the individual states in 
                                                                                                                         
 
608. See generally supra Section II.A.8 (providing details about the voluntary system 
under H.R. 1599 and how it would affect the GMO labeling laws of these states). 
609. See generally supra Part II (highlighting the strong public disapproval of such 
responses). 
610. See generally Parts I-II (detailing how the EU Commission and US federal 
government reacted to public demand for more GMO transparency). 
611. See generally Parts I-II (analyzing how intense public opinion concerning GMOs 
influenced GMO regulation in both the United States and European Union). 
612. See generally supra Parts I-II (demonstrating how the Member States of the 
European Union and individual states of the United States took significant action in an effort 
to meet public concern over GMOs). 
613. See generally supra Section II.B.1 (highlighting how the Member States pushed for 
significant reform in GMO regulation). 
614. See generally supra Sections II.A-B (discussing such concerns). 
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the United States.615 In both the European Union and United States, 
mandatory GMO labeling was implemented and individual state 
action ceased.616 In the European Union, voluntary compliance with 
GMO labeling standards under the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive 
was replaced with mandatory rules governing the strict labeling of 
GMOs based on a threshold amount of genetic material found in the 
end food product under the Traceability and Labeling Regulation.617 
Almost identically in the United States, the proposed voluntary GMO 
labeling system under H.R. 1599 was superseded by the mandatory 
national standard under S. 764, which requires GMO labeling based 
on an amount of bioengineered substance found in a food.618 
Thus, the United States avoided a debacle like the 1997 EU 
Crisis by implementing a system that greatly mirrors that of the 
European Union under the Traceability and Labeling Regulation and 
requires GMO labeling based on an amount found in the end product, 
as opposed to mandating labeling based on genetic engineering 
alone.619 The urgency with which S. 764 was implemented also 
greatly parallels the actions of the European Union during the 1997 
Crisis, in which the Commission implemented a temporary fix and 
used a fast track procedure to implement the necessary changes.620 S. 
764 was crafted and passed within less than a year of H.R. 1599’s 
exclusion from the Federal Spending Bill and within a month of July 
1, 2016, which was the date that Vermont’s Act 120 went into 
effect.621 Therefore, it is clear that the United States avoided a crisis 
                                                                                                                         
 
615. See generally supra Parts I-II (providing an extensive discussion about how the 
European Union and United States developed solutions to the significant public unrest about 
the lack of GMO transparency). 
616. See generally supra Parts I-II (demonstrating how the implementation of GMO 
labeling requirements stopped individual action). 
617. See generally supra Sections II.B.2-3 (detailing how mandatory GMO labeling 
requirements were introduced to the European Union through the Traceability and Labeling 
Regulation). 
618. See generally supra Sections II.A.8-9 (showing how the proposed voluntary system 
under H.R. 1599 was replaced with the mandatory system under S. 764). 
619. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (explaining the requirements under S. 764). 
620. See generally supra Sections II.B.2-3 (explaining the actions of the Commission 
during this time). 
621. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (discussing the circumstances surrounding the 
passage of S. 764). 
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much like that of the European Union by using a very similar solution 
with the same sense of haste and necessity.622 
1. The United States Avoided a Crisis, But Missed the Goal 
As just demonstrated, the United States has taken crucial steps 
that eliminated a patchwork system of state GMO labeling laws and 
that will likely prevent a crisis similar to what the European Union 
experienced in 1997 with regard to GMO labeling.623 However, the 
avoidance of such a crisis is not the sole indicator of success here, as 
the new GMO labeling requirements under S. 764 do not adequately 
address the concerns of many consumers who desire GMO 
transparency and have significant deficiencies that result in 
inaccessibility to GMO information for certain parts of the 
population.624 It is because of these issues that S. 764 is not as 
successful of a solution to the GMO conflict in the United States as 
the Traceability and Labeling Regulation was in the European 
Union.625 The rest of this Note highlights these shortcomings and 
argues that S. 764 should be repealed and replaced with a mandatory 
federal GMO labeling system that is based on the process used in the 
production of the food, instead of how much bioengineered matter is 
present in a final food product.626 Through this mandatory system, the 
United States can simultaneously avoid a crisis like that of the 
European Union and also meet the call of the US population for GMO 
transparency under the Consumer Right to Know Policy.627 
 
                                                                                                                         
 
622. See generally supra Section II.B.2 (demonstrating the fast track approach used to 
enact GMO reform in the wake of the 1997 crisis). 
623. See supra notes 605-22 and accompanying text (providing an overview of these 
steps). 
624. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (describing some of the criticisms of S. 764). 
625. See generally supra Section II.B.3 (explaining how public concerns in the European 
Union were adequately addressed by the Traceability and Labeling Regulation). 
626. See infra notes 628-726 (highlighting the deficiencies of S. 7764 and suggesting 
improvements to correct them). 
627. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (detailing the Consumer Right to Know Policy); 
supra Section II.B (discussing the 1997 EU Crisis). 
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B. The Deficiencies of S. 764 
1. S. 764 Does Not Provide the GMO Transparency Desired Under 
the Consumer Right to Know Policy 
One of the most significant issues with S. 764 is the way in 
which GMO information is presented to consumers on the food 
packaging.628 Even though S. 764 is only applicable to foods that have 
been deemed “bioengineered” under the standards set forth by the 
Secretary of Agriculture, the words “bioengineered,” “genetically 
engineered,” or “genetically modified” will not appear on the 
packaging.629 In fact, such language is not permitted to accompany 
the three methods of disclosure, as manufacturers must only put 
language indicating that such disclosures will provide “food 
information.”630 There is an argument to be made that if disclosures 
were required to be accompanied by terms such as “bioengineered” or 
“genetically modified,” certain manufacturers would be at a 
disadvantage and consumers might be unnecessarily deterred from 
purchasing foods with such labels.631 However, the demands of the 
Consumer Right to Know Policy clearly outweigh such possibilities, 
as a failure to require such terms severely threatens the goals of GMO 
transparency and might result in consumers remaining largely 
uninformed about the GE nature of their foods.632 
Forbidding language such as “genetically engineered” or 
“genetically modified” to accompany disclosures on packages may 
also result in serious consumer confusion and misinformation.633 
While consumers may become aware that the statement “call for more 
food information” indicates that a food has been genetically modified, 
this is only a possibility that could take years to become a reality.634 
                                                                                                                         
 
628. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (discussing how such information is displayed). 
629. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (explaining the packaging requirements under S. 
764). 
630. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (setting forth this prohibition). 
631. See generally supra Section II.A.7 (generally explaining some of these arguments 
with respect to GMO labeling laws that require such language on packaging). 
632. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (presenting the goals of the Consumer Right to 
Know Policy). 
633. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (highlighting this argument). 
634. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (explaining that the only language to appear on 
food packaging is “call for more food information”). 
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Until that time, consumers will be responsible for discovering that 
such a statement correlates to information about bioengineering and 
that any food containing this statement is subject to federal GMO 
labeling requirements.635 Additionally, consumers might mistakenly 
believe that the words “food information” concern nutritional 
information, allergen content, or some other aspect of food 
information that does not involve genetic engineering.636 This 
possible consumer misinformation and confusion greatly defeats the 
stated purpose of S. 764 and GMO labeling requirements in general, 
while also falling short of the goals of the Consumer Right to Know 
Policy.637 
2. S. 764’s Burden on Consumers 
In addition to consumer confusion and misinformation, the 
absence of GE information directly on the package places a burden on 
consumers that will likely decrease GMO transparency.638 By placing 
the burden on the consumer to find out GMO information by either 
calling a telephone number or using their mobile device to access a 
website, consumers will lose their own valuable time and must 
overcome an extra hurdle to access the GMO information they wish 
to procure.639 If consumers are required to spend their time and 
resources to find out this information for each food product they wish 
to purchase, consumers might either not attempt to find out such 
information or not purchase the food at all.640 Either of these results 
produce negative consequences, as consumers will still remain 
uninformed about the GMO status of their food and manufacturers 
might be disadvantaged if consumers unnecessarily avoid certain 
                                                                                                                         
 
635. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (discussing the burden on consumers under S. 
764 to find out this information). 
636. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (discussing the obscurity of the phrase “call for 
more food information”). 
637. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (explaining the goals of the Consumer Right to 
Know Policy with respect to GMO transparency). 
638. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (highlighting this critical view of S. 764). 
639. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (detailing this burden on consumers). 
640. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (analyzing how the disclosure requirements of 
S. 764 results in the use of consumer time and effort). 
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foods that they might otherwise purchase if they knew more specific 
GMO information.641 
These burdens also might result in inaccessibility to GMO 
information for many consumers and therefore make GMO 
transparency only available to those who have easy access to 
telephones or the internet.642 As discussed in Part II, individuals who 
are elderly or financially disadvantaged might not have the devices 
necessary to make such phone calls or log onto the companies’ 
websites.643 By allowing disclosure only through these measures, S. 
764 essentially eliminates these consumers from any possible 
increased GMO transparency and disadvantages significant portions 
of the US population based on factors that cannot easily be 
changed.644 
As just demonstrated, S. 764 puts a severe burden on consumers 
that can result in consumer confusion, misinformation, and exclusion 
from GMO transparency.645 This clearly conflicts with the idea of 
GMO transparency in general, which is based on increasing consumer 
access to GMO information and removing any obstacles to such 
access.646 By hindering consumer access and thereby discouraging 
GMO transparency, S. 764 fails to achieve the goals of GMO labeling 
and the Consumer Right to Know Policy.647 
3. Problems with Basing GMO Labeling Requirements on the Final 
Product and a Threshold 
Perhaps the most severe deficiency of S. 764 is the way in which 
foods become subject to the law’s federal GMO labeling 
                                                                                                                         
 
641. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (highlighting some of the negative 
consequences of S. 764 and the burden that it places on consumers). 
642. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (describing the critical challenges facing these 
individuals as a result of the disclosure requirements under S. 764). 
643. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (explaining the special challenges facing these 
groups). 
644. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (setting forth the disclosure methods of S. 764, 
which do not include using direct language on the packaging that indicates the GE status of a 
food). 
645. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (describing this burden). 
646. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (showing the purposes of the Consumer Right to 
Know Policy with respect to GMO labeling). 
647. See generally supra Section.A.1 (highlighting these goals). 
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requirements.648 Instead of requiring foods to be labeled based on the 
genetic engineering process alone, S. 764 will only require a food to 
be labeled if it meets the threshold amount of bioengineered substance 
required to deem it a bioengineered food under the law.649 While the 
statute does not use the word “threshold,” the language of the statute 
implies this term.650 According to S. 764, the Secretary of Agriculture 
must determine the amounts of a bioengineered substance that may be 
present in a food product in order for it to be a bioengineered food.651  
Thus, any food that contains that specified amount will be deemed a 
bioengineered food and subject to the labeling requirements.652  This 
implements a threshold requirement, as a food will only be labeled 
under the law if it contains the determined amount of bioengineered 
substance in the final product.653 Therefore, any reference in this Note 
to a threshold level under S. 764 will refer to this statutory 
language.654 
As previously discussed, this assignment of responsibility places 
the regulation of GMOs, which were historically regulated solely by 
the FDA with regards to food, under another part of the regulatory 
system.655  The FDA expressed concerns about this assignment before 
S. 764 became law, warning that the new GMO standards may 
conflict with existing FDA regulations and places GMO regulation 
outside the sole jurisdiction of the FDA.656 According to the FDA, 
these conflicts could have serious implications for consumers and 
convolute the effort to provide more transparency on food labeling 
because different labeling requirements can create confusion or 
                                                                                                                         
 
648. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (demonstrating how foods become subject to the 
requirements). 
649. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (explaining how a food product will only have to 
be labeled if it meets the threshold level for bioengineered foods under S. 764). 
650. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (providing the language of the statute). 
651. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (describing this requirement). 
652. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (detailing how foods become subject to the 
requirements). 
653. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (discussing the threshold level). 
654. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (discussing the threshold level). 
655. See generally supra Section I.A.2 (detailing the responsibilities of the FDA with 
respect to GMOs under the Coordinated Framework). 
656. See generally supra Section II.A.9-10 (setting forth these concerns). 
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inconsistencies in packaging, thereby restricting GMO 
transparency.657 
In addition to possible conflicts with FDA requirements, labeling 
GMOs based on the contents of the final product presents other 
serious problems that further restrict GMO transparency and stand 
contrary to the goals of the Consumer Right to Know Policy.658 As 
indicated by the FDA, the definition of bioengineered foods in S. 764 
is narrow and may eliminate several foods that come from GE 
sources, including oil made from GE soy, starches, and purified 
proteins.659 Furthermore, S. 764 applies labeling rules to foods only 
where the genetic modification cannot otherwise occur through 
conventional breeding or be found in nature.660 According to the 
FDA, proving that such modification “could not” be obtained through 
conventional breeding or occur in nature might be difficult.661 This 
could potentially further narrow GMO labeling requirements and 
allow manufacturers to argue that their foods need not be labeled 
since it cannot be proven that their genetic modification cannot be 
obtained through conventional breeding.662 By excluding many foods 
from GMO labeling requirements through this potential loophole, S. 
764 results in inadequate GMO transparency and fails to achieve the 
goals of other measures, such as Act 120, that do not require such 
proof.663 
Mandating GMO labeling based on a threshold also fails to 
provide information to many consumers who desire GMO 
transparency for various reasons under the Consumer Right to Know 
                                                                                                                         
 
657. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (explaining the transparency goals of GMO 
transparency labeling with pursuant respect to the Consumer Right to Know Policy). 
658. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (setting forth some of these serious problems). 
659. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (presenting the arguments of the FDA 
regarding the scope of the definition and the possible exclusion of such foods from GE sources 
from the labeling requirements). 
660. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (explaining this specific requirement under S. 
764). 
661. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (discussing this difficulty). 
662. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (giving an overview of the argument that S. 
764 will allow manufacturers to hide GMO information from consumers through potential 
loopholes and conditions). 
663. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (describing how S. 764 contains possible 
loopholes that would restrict GMO transparency). 
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Policy.664 As previously discussed, there are a myriad of reasons why 
individuals want to know if their food has been genetically engineered 
or modified, including religious and ethical beliefs.665 For example, a 
person might want to avoid food that has been genetically engineered 
due to a personal objection to the genetic modification of food.666  
Under S. 764, such an individual would still not be able to avoid all 
genetically modified food, since genetic engineering alone does not 
subject a food to federal labeling requirements.667 If a food has been 
genetically engineered but does not meet the threshold level of a 
bioengineered substance in the final product to be classified as a 
bioengineered food, that food will not be required to meet the GMO 
disclosure requirements under S. 764.668 Thus, the individual who 
wishes to avoid any genetically modified food will not be aware that a 
food has been genetically modified and will unknowingly violate his 
or her beliefs by consuming it.669 
As also previously discussed in Part II, there are many 
individuals who want to avoid certain GMOs due to religious beliefs, 
including those who keep Kosher diets.670 An individual who is 
keeping a Kosher diet and wants to avoid a certain substance entirely 
would encounter the same dilemma as an individual who is ethically 
opposed to genetic modification of food.671 The person keeping a 
Kosher diet would not be aware that a final food product contains a 
certain amount of that substance if it does not meet the threshold 
                                                                                                                         
 
664. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (explaining how GMOs will come under 
labeling requirements based on a threshold level for bioengineered food). 
665. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (highlighting some of these reasons under the 
Consumer Right to Know Policy). 
666. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (listing this type of objection as one of the many 
justifications for GMO labeling under the Consumer Right to Know Policy). 
667. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (explaining how foods become subject to the 
GMO labeling disclosure requirements under S. 764, which is based on whether a food meets 
the definition of “bioengineered food” under the law and not whether the food was genetically 
engineered). 
668. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (stating that a food will only be required to 
contain a GMO disclosure if it meets the threshold level of bioengineered substances). 
669. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (discussing the concerns of this type of 
individual under the Consumer Right to Know Policy). 
670. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (highlighting the concerns of such individuals). 
671. See supra notes 367-68 and accompanying text (explaining the problem faced by 
such an individual). 
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level.672 This would cause such an individual to consume a substance 
that violates his or her beliefs and therefore increase consumer 
misinformation.673 This is yet another way in which S. 764 fails to 
result in optimal GMO transparency and does not meet the high 
standards of the Consumer Right to Know Policy, which should serve 
as the basis for GMO labeling in the United States.674 
4. S. 764 Fails to Achieve the Goals of the Consumer Right to Know 
Policy 
While S. 764 has brought GMO labeling under a federal regime 
that avoids the patchwork system consisting of the state GMO 
labeling laws of Vermont, Connecticut, and Maine, it clearly fails to 
achieve the goals of the Consumer Right to Know Policy and contains 
many severe deficiencies that limit GMO transparency.675 Instead of 
increasing consumer access to GMO information, S. 764 increases 
consumer confusion and misinformation by regulating GMO labeling 
based on a threshold system and barring descriptive GMO 
information on food labels.676 Such a system presents an even more 
dangerous reality than the lack of labeling under the 1992 FDA 
Statement of Policy: misperception of GMO transparency.677 This 
misperception could occur because consumers may believe they have 
more GMO information than they actually do.678 As shown, S. 764 
creates potential loopholes and exceptions that exclude certain foods 
that the public might otherwise consider genetically engineered from 
federal labeling requirements.679 Thus, consumers may mistakenly 
believe that any food that does not bear a disclosure has not been 
                                                                                                                         
 
672. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (demonstrating that even though a food has been 
genetically engineered, it will not be required to contain a disclosure if it does not meet the 
threshold level under S. 764). 
673. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (explaining the concerns of individuals who 
keep a Kosher diet). 
674. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (setting forth the goals of the Consumer Right to 
Know Policy regarding GMO transparency). 
675. See generally supra Sections II.A.3-4, 6 (giving an overview of these state GMO 
labeling laws and their different requirements). 
676. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (analyzing these aspects of S. 764). 
677. See generally supra Section I.A.3 (detailing the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy). 
678. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (discussing how S. 764 results in less GMO 
transparency than it projects to). 
679. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (highlighting some of these loopholes). 
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genetically modified and unknowingly continue to purchase and 
consume it under this misperception.680 Since GMO labeling 
measures should seek to avoid that very result, S. 764 is an inadequate 
solution to the GMO labeling debate in the United States and should 
be replaced with a federal law requiring GMO labeling based on the 
process used in food production instead of a threshold level of a 
bioengineered substance found in a final food product.681 By 
implementing such a measure, the United States could achieve the 
same level of success that the European Union achieved with the 
Traceability and Labeling Regulation and meet the needs of US 
citizens who desire true GMO transparency under the Consumer 
Right to Know Policy.682 
C. Furthering Progress in GMO Transparency 
1. The Solution to the GMO Labeling Debate in the United States 
As shown by the Traceability and Labeling Regulation, one of 
the main goals of EU GMO labeling regulation is to enable 
consumers to make an informed decision about the products they 
buy.683 Thus, while the European Union does not have a statutory 
“Consumer Right to Know,” it does acknowledge and uphold 
citizens’ rights to make informed decisions by requiring food 
manufacturers to provide accurate and non-misleading information 
about the GMO status of their food.684 This concern for consumer 
choice exists and thrives in a system that is based on independent risk 
assessment and traceability standards that stop risk at the source or 
along the supply chain.685 This demonstrates that measures taken to 
protect consumers’ ability to make informed choices do not oppose a 
                                                                                                                         
 
680. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (detailing the requirements of S. 764). 
681. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (explaining GMO transparency through the lens 
of the Consumer Right to Know Policy). 
682. See generally supra Parts I-II (explaining the desire of the American public for 
GMO transparency and how the European Union has achieved such transparency). 
683. See generally supra Section II.B (highlighting this goal of the regulation). 
684. See generally supra Section II.B.3 (describing how this right is recognized in the 
European Union). 
685. See generally supra Section II.B.3 (detailing the traceability requirements and their 
justifications under the Traceability and Labeling Regulation). 
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system that is based on science and accurate current knowledge, and 
in fact can be a part of that same system.686 
As opposed to the FDA’s policy on GMOs, which is based on 
the belief that GMOs are GRAS and safe until proven otherwise, the 
European Union’s regulatory system is based on the precautionary 
principle and presumes that GMOs are not safe until proven 
otherwise.687 However, these two systems can have common ground 
in the Consumer Right to Know Policy because the European Union’s 
Traceability and Labeling Regulation governs GMOs that have been 
approved through the regulatory system under the Genetically 
Modified Food and Feed Regulation.688 Thus, any GMOs that are 
labeled under the Traceability and Labeling Regulation have already 
been deemed safe and not a significant risk under the Genetically 
Modified Food and Feed Regulation and the precautionary 
principle.689 Through mandatory labeling, the European Union wants 
to ensure traceability in order to avoid future risk under the 
precautionary principle and to also allow consumers to make 
informed choices.690 Once an approved GMO enters the EU 
marketplace, it is considered safe, and thus the European Union and 
the US FDA have a similar view of that product going forward.691  
However, the European Union still requires GMO labeling in order to 
ensure traceability and to allow consumers to make informed 
                                                                                                                         
 
686. See generally supra Section I.B.1-3  (explaining how the EU GMO regulatory 
system encompasses both the precautionary principle and informed consumer choice). 
687. See generally supra Section I.B.1-3 (explaining the precautionary principle and its 
function in EU GMO regulation). 
688. See generally supra Sections I.B, II.B.8-9 (discussing the GMO scope authorization 
procedure and the tracing and labeling requirements that attach after such authorization is 
given of this regulation). 
689. See generally supra Sections I.B, II.B.8-9 (discussing how only GMOs that have 
been approved under the Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation are put on the 
market and labeled under the Traceability and Labeling Regulation). 
690. See generally supra Sections I.B, II.B.9-10 (detailing the goals of the EU regulatory 
system with respect to mandatory labeling). 
691. See generally supra Sections I.B, II.B.10 (explaining the views of the United States 
and European Union of GMOs at each stage of approval). 
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decisions.692  This is why the Consumer Right to Know Policy can be 
a valid basis for mandatory GMO labeling in the United States.693 
While these two different regulatory systems do have common 
ground, there is an important distinction between the Traceability and 
Labeling Regulation and a US law based on the Consumer Right to 
Know Policy that should make a difference with respect to how GMO 
products are labeled in the United States.694 While there is no 
indication of how the threshold level of 0.9% was determined in the 
Traceability and Labeling Regulation, it is clear from the EU system 
that GMO labeling is not required simply because a product was 
developed through genetic engineering.695 Instead, there must be a 
certain amount of a GMO present in a product before it must be 
labeled.696 This is to avoid requiring labels for products that have an 
unavoidable or undetectable amount of GMO matter.697 Since the 
United States does not operate from a position resembling the 
precautionary principle, mandating GMO labeling based on a 
threshold under S. 764 does not result in the same high amount of 
GMO transparency as achieved by the Traceability and Labeling 
Regulation.698 
While S. 764 and the Traceability and Labeling Regulation share 
many attributes, it is this difference in position that makes the latter a 
success and renders the former inadequate.699 Because the 
Traceability and Labeling Regulation uses a threshold level in the 
context of the precautionary principle and an entire GMO regulatory 
                                                                                                                         
 
692. See generally supra Sections I.B, II.B (discussing how GMOs that have been 
approved and deemed safe under the precautionary principle still must be labeled in the 
European Union). 
693. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (explaining the basis for GMO labeling in the 
Consumer Right to Know Policy). 
694. See generally supra Part I (describing and comparing the GMO regulatory systems 
of the United States and the European Union). 
695. See generally supra Section II.B.3 (explaining this requirement under the 
Traceability and Labeling Regulation). 
696. See generally supra Section II.B.3 (detailing this requirement within the threshold). 
697. See generally supra Section II.B (discussing the justification for the threshold 
level). 
698. See generally supra Part I (highlighting how the United States operates from the 
substantial equivalence doctrine, which greatly differs from the precautionary principle that 
serves as the basis of the EU GMO regulatory system). 
699. See generally supra Part I (demonstrating this difference in position). 
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system based on independent investigation, the threshold level meets 
the public demand for GMO transparency and is an adequate remedy 
for public distrust of GMOs.700 The use of a threshold amount in S. 
764 in the United States fails to achieve the same level of success 
because it contrasts with the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy on GMOs 
and does not meet public demand, as it is not clear how this threshold 
level will be determined.701 If the threshold level is established based 
on the effects on human health, then the GMO labeling requirements 
will stand in stark opposition to the FDA’s presumption that GMOs 
are safe.702 
Furthermore, a threshold level based on effects on human health 
will result in consumer misinformation.703 Such a threshold level 
would significantly ignore the concerns of many individuals who 
wish to avoid certain GMOs or GMOs entirely because of their 
religious or ethical beliefs.704 For example, an individual who 
ethically opposes genetic engineering will not be aware if all foods 
have been genetically engineered since a food will have to contain the 
threshold level of bioengineered substance that has an effect on 
human health in order to be subject to labeling requirements under S. 
764.705 As certain individuals want GMO transparency for reasons 
independent of the effects of GMOs on human health, this type of 
threshold could result in a narrow application that will deprive 
individuals from obtaining the information they need to live 
according to their beliefs.706 
Determining the threshold using factors other than effects on 
human health might still lead to the same problem, since it is not clear 
                                                                                                                         
 
700. See generally supra Section I.B.9 (explaining the threshold system in the shadow of 
the precautionary principle). 
701. See generally supra Section I.A.3 (analyzing the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy 
and its emphasis on the substantial equivalence doctrine). 
702. See generally supra Section I.A.3 (discussing the FDA’s position that GMOs are 
substantially equivalent to their traditional counterparts). 
703. See infra notes 704-06 (giving examples of these concerns). 
704. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (explaining some of the concerns of such 
individuals and how they are protected by the Consumer Right to Know Policy). 
705. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (describing how foods only must be labeled 
under S. 764 if they meet the threshold level of bioengineered substances). 
706. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (detailing how many individuals desire GMO 
transparency for reasons that do not involve the effects of GMOs on human health). 
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what factors will be used and how they will be weighed.707 
Misinformation might still occur, as it is not guaranteed that such 
factors will adequately meet the concerns of US citizens who desire 
GMO labeling under the Consumer Right to Know Policy.708 Factors 
that meet the concerns of those who desire GMO transparency for 
religious reasons might not be the same as those that meet the 
concerns of people who want it for ethical reasons.709 Thus, choosing 
factors used to set a threshold might result in a disadvantage to certain 
groups who demand GMO transparency under the Consumer Right to 
Know Policy, as certain factors that meet the concerns of specific 
groups might be favored over others.710 
It is because of these possible and significant complications that 
a threshold should not be used in mandating GMO labeling in the 
United States.711 As shown by these possible consequences, a GMO 
labeling system based on such a threshold results in inadequate GMO 
transparency and frustrates the goals of the Consumer Right to Know 
Policy.712 Such negative outcomes can be avoided by replacing S. 764 
with a mandatory GMO labeling system based on the process used in 
food production, which will meet the concerns of various groups 
under the Consumer Right to Know Policy and result in far greater 
GMO transparency.713 
2. Tailoring the Solution to US GMO Policy 
While mandating GMO labeling under a universal standard like 
the Traceability and Labeling Regulation is the solution to the GMO 
labeling debate in the United States, it is not the complete answer to 
                                                                                                                         
 
707. See generally supra Section II.A.9 (demonstrating how S. 764 directs the Secretary 
of Agriculture to set a threshold level for bioengineered foods). 
708. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (analyzing many of the concerns of US citizens 
who demand GMO labeling under the Consumer Right to Know Policy). 
709. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (setting forth some of the differing concerns that 
are at stake). 
710. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (discussing some of these groups and their 
specific issues with respect to GMO consumption). 
711. See supra notes 703-10 and accompanying text (explaining these complications). 
712. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (setting forth some of these goals). 
713. See supra notes 363-72 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns of different 
groups in society under the Consumer Right to Know Policy). 
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the problem.714 As shown, mandating GMO labeling under a 
threshold system similar to that under the Traceability and Labeling 
Regulation limits the progress made by GMO labeling proponents and 
does not parallel the high success achieved under the Traceability and 
Labeling Regulation in the European Union.715 After learning from 
the European Union’s example and avoiding a GMO crisis by passing 
federal labeling requirements, the United States should now diverge 
from the model of the Traceability and Labeling Regulation and 
require GMO labeling for products based on the genetic engineering 
process used in food production, instead of basing the requirement on 
a threshold level of bioengineered substance in the final product.716 
This would prevent the FDA from having to change its 1992 
Statement of Policy and would address the concerns of the US 
citizens under the Consumer Right to Know Policy.717 
The federal law should also model the approach taken by 
Vermont, Connecticut, and Maine by requiring GMO information to 
be displayed directly on the food package or on a nearby display, 
depending on the type of food.718 Specifically, any food subject to the 
regulation would be required to have the statement “produced with 
genetic engineering” printed on the label.719 It is not clear whether the 
federal law should ban the use of “natural” or similar words that 
might mislead consumers, or if the law should define “natural,” as 
this concerns many issues within the expertise of the FDA.720 
Mandating GMO labeling through this type of federal law that is 
based on the process instead of a threshold amount would correct 
                                                                                                                         
 
714. See generally supra Section II.B.9 (explaining the mandatory system under the 
Traceability and Labeling Regulation). 
715. See supra notes 699-712 and accompanying text (explaining how a threshold 
system leads to these negative results). 
716. See generally supra Section II.B (detailing the EU crisis and the European Union’s 
response); supra Section III.A (describing how the United States successfully avoided such a 
crisis). 
717. See generally supra Section I.A.7 (explaining the 1992 FDA Statement of Policy); 
supra Section II.A.8 (analyzing the Consumer Right to Know Policy). 
718. See generally supra Sections II.A.3-4, 6 (detailing the packaging requirements 
under these state laws). 
719. See generally supra Sections II.A.3-4, 6 (providing this language from the state 
laws of Connecticut, Maine, and Vermont). 
720. See generally supra Section I.A.2 (giving an overview of the FDA’s specific 
duties). 
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many of the significant deficiencies of S. 764.721 Requiring “produced 
with genetic engineering” or similar language directly on a food label 
will eliminate much of the consumer confusion and misinformation 
that will result under the current disclosure requirements under S. 
764, such as a telephone number or website information accompanied 
by the generic statement about “food information.”722 Consumers will 
be immediately notified that the food in their hands has been 
genetically engineered, thereby resulting in instantaneous GMO 
transparency.723 Consumers will also be relieved of the burdens of S. 
764, as they will not have to call a phone number or access a website 
to find out GMO information.724 This also eradicates the disadvantage 
to financially disadvantaged and elderly consumers who may not be 
able to access GMO information under S. 764 because of limited 
access to phones or the internet.725 By eliminating such burdens under 
S. 764, this federal law again will result in immediate GMO 
transparency and meet the demands of the Consumer Right to Know 
Policy.726 
CONCLUSION 
The parallels between the EU crisis in 1997 and the current 
debate in the United States are staggering.727 As the public demand 
for GMO labeling was being met at the state level and essentially 
opposed at the federal level, a tricky battle between Congress and the 
individual states manifested.728 In order to preserve order, maintain 
continuity, and to avoid many of the potential negative effects 
                                                                                                                         
 
721. See supra Sections II.A.9-10 (detailing these deficiencies). 
722. See supra Section II.A.9 (explaining the current disclosure requirements under S. 
764). 
723. See supra notes 638-44 and accompanying text (demonstrating how a lack of 
language indicating GMO status directly on packages leads to consumer confusion and 
misinformation). 
724. See supra Section II.A.9 (detailing these methods of accessing GMO information 
under S. 764).  
725. See supra Section II.A.10 (discussing the specific challenges facing individuals in 
these groups in accessing GMO information under S. 764). 
726. See generally supra Section II.A.1 (explaining the goals of the Consumer Right to 
Know Policy). 
727. See generally supra Section II.A (detailing the GMO labeling dispute in the United 
States); supra Section II.B.1 (describing the 1997 EU crisis). 
728. See generally supra Section II.A (analyzing this conflict). 
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discussed above, the US Congress followed the example of the 
European Union and enacted a federal GMO labeling law that bases 
GMO labeling on a threshold system with a focus on the end 
product.729 While the United States successfully avoided a crisis that 
the European Union faced in 1997, it failed to parallel the successful 
example of the European Union when it enacted the Traceability and 
Labeling Regulation in response to public outcry.730 By using a 
threshold system and thereby failing to mandate GMO labeling based 
on the genetic engineering process used in food production, the 
United States has provided a solution that restricts GMO transparency 
and does not address the concerns of its citizens under the Consumer 
Right to Know Policy.731 The US Congress should correct these 
problems by replacing S. 764 with a federal law mandating GMO 
labeling based on genetic processes used in food production, as 
opposed to a threshold system.732 In addition to complying with the 
1992 FDA Statement of Policy, this solution will result in optimal 
GMO transparency and make GMO information accessible to all.733 
                                                                                                                         
 
729. See generally supra Section III.A.1 (demonstrating how the United States avoided 
this crisis). 
730. See generally supra Section II.B (discussing the success of the Traceability and 
Labeling Regulation). 
731. See generally supra Section II.A.10 (explaining these critiques of S. 764). 
732. See generally supra Section III.C  (explaining this solution). 
733. See generally supra Section III.C.1 (highlighting the benefits of mandating GMO 
labeling based on genetic processes used in food production); supra Section III.C.2 (discussing 
how the solution can be implemented in accordance with US GMO policy). 
